PHILOSOPHY

THE JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY

VOL. XXVIII. No. 105 APRIL 1953

THE FUNCTION AND NATURE OF AUTHORITY IN SOCIETY[1]

W. D. HANDCOCK

THE subject you have set me is a vast and daunting one, but I have my consolation that if I must inevitably trench a little—though as little as possible—on the issues my distinguished successors are to speak upon, they must equally come back on the ground assigned to me, and will be able to supplement for you my deficiencies and correct my mistakes.

In speaking of the function and nature of authority in society, I had better begin with the more obvious functions. Clearly we cannot do without authority. At innumerable points our common life is made possible only by our acceptance of rules and decisions which we do not ourselves make, at any rate in any direct or personal way. We seek nowadays to domesticate authority, to confine it to tasks whose necessity we recognize, and to modes of action of which we approve, to make it responsible authority. That has been the great aim of the political movement of the last 150 years, since the French Revolution. But whether or not we are satisfied that we have succeeded in this, or indeed that it can be done, we recognize just as freely as our predecessors the need of authority in manifold matters of our daily life. The late Professor Bosanquet had a phrase for its function on these levels which I always remember. The State, he said—and the State is the typical form in which authority of this sort meets us—the State is the great fly-wheel of our social life. The function of a fly-wheel, as you will remember, is to transform the intermittent energy imparted by the strokes of a piston into a smooth and continuous flow: so the State translates impulses which we recognize and acknowledge in ourselves, but which in the stress of

[1] Paper read to the Erasmus Society of Exeter, October 23rd, 1952.

immediate and more personal preoccupations may get lost and overlaid, into a system of administration and law which is a standing monition to us to be ourselves at the level of responsibility at which we like to think of ourselves, but do not always behave. This is authority—idealized, perhaps, but not unrecognizable, I think—in the man to man relations of our daily social life, in the relatively external sphere of our common duty to our fellows, and to the common life.

But there is another sphere in which authority plays a vital, and not so readily acknowledged a part. That is the sphere of our intimate personal lives, that in which we think ourselves most ourselves. We are each of us, ineradicably, in a large part of our beliefs, in our prejudices, whether or not we admit to any, in our habits and customary outlook, the creatures of authority, having taken them over from an external source; whether as children dutifully accepting what our parents tell us, as adolescent rebels adopting fervently the latest intellectual fashion of the day, or as adults, more discriminatingly, it is to be hoped, looking round for what seems solidest to us in the outlook of our times, and in that of people whom we respect and admire, to find whereon to ground ourselves and our lives. There is a sentence of Professor Cole's which I like to use in this context; partly because of its convincingness and clarity, and partly because its deeper implications do not seem to me to be carried into the rest of the book from which it comes. "The generality of men and women," writes Professor Cole, "take their experience of the social scene about them unphilosophically. They do not reflect upon it; they merely accept it. But that does not make it any the less a real experience, or any the less a part of their mental equipment. They are born into a complex society, and by a natural process that complex society becomes a part of their lives—as real a *Weltanschauung* as any Teutonic philosopher ever imagined." Social tradition exercises an authority over us which none of us escapes, and which indeed provides the ground and scaffolding of our personal lives. This is what Dr. Figgis meant, I assume, when he wrote "Authority is, in fact, the expression of the social nature of men, and the true character of personality." He goes on "Its only true antithesis is a pure individualism which springs in thought from the barest rationalism, and in politics leads to anarchy." Thus the authority with which I have to deal ranges from that which decides, *inter alia*, that the rule of the road shall be the left in England, and the right in France, to that which in conjunction with the attitude that we take up to it, largely determines what sort of persons we shall be.

I will first of all deal with two extremes that I think have to be rejected—the view that authority is everything in society, and the view that it has no rightful function in it. The first is the theory of

sovereignty, and its classic exponent is Hobbes. Hobbes' argument, if I may attempt to pack it into a sentence or two, is that since it is possible to dispute about anything, and since the subjects of possible dispute cannot be segregated into watertight compartments, if we are to have a peace we can rely upon, and to remove all possible threat to the unity of society, we must be prepared to submit ourselves without limit to authority; and more than that, since an authority that has to be always on the job must be always on the spot, to specific and determinate authority. No society is constituted properly, or can be expected to have other than a precarious existence, which has not a recognized sovereign whose decisions, in all matters, all, or an effective majority of its members are prepared to accept. So put, and *a fortiori* as Hobbes puts it himself, with his inimitable pungency, in the Leviathan, the argument is difficult to meet. It is difficult to meet because there is no part of it that is not, in appropriate circumstances, true; because you can find instances in which constitutions and laws have had to be disregarded in the interests of social peace, instances in which claims of conscience, or of the autonomy of the spiritual life have had to be overridden, cases almost daily in which what are normally regarded as individual rights have had to be disregarded. There are various ways of outflanking, or of minimizing the importance of Hobbes' arguments, but so long as we treat political theory as essentially an abstract or general argument, I do not think they take us anywhere very decisive. I would suggest the wholesale way in which Rousseau fell for the Hobbesian argument, despite his intention of founding the city of individual rights and freedom, and the influence that the argument from unity continues to exercise, as substantiations of my point. The opposite theory to that of Hobbes is philosophical anarchism, which underlies a large part of the theory of Locke, was developed by William Godwin, and has its best known nineteenth-century exponents in the Russian revolutionaries, Bakunin and Kropotkin. Philosophical anarchism is both an optimistic theory of human nature; an aspect of which I need not say any more: and a theory of right, a theory that no one ought to exercise authority over another, that power corrupts both parties to its exercise, that complete individual freedom is the only morally permissible regime. In this aspect it clearly has considerable affinities with popular conceptions of democracy. I need only mention the phrase "self-government." This implies, as it seems to me, either an attempt to blink the fact of government by pretending that governors and governed are the same—which nobody who is not consciously talking political theory ever for a moment believes; or an attempt, as often misguided as not, because it starts from a theory with which it dare not finish—for who dares to be consistently democratic?—to

make government better and more responsible. Actually it is probably a bit of both of these. Now what seems to me wrong with both these arguments—the authoritarian one and the democratic—is that each proves too much. There is authority, and there is freedom, and a lot to be said on occasion for either of them, much room for argument as to the mixture of the two appropriate in any given circumstances, but nothing at all to be gained by a theory of either which attempts to make it swallow the other. Neither the authoritarian claim nor the democratic one merits an argument which proves it right at all times and places. I do not want to spend too much time on the Aunt Sallies I am knocking down; it is rather my business to put up one of my own for you to knock down. But I must express my feeling that the error which infects these views vitiates the whole of the dominant tradition of modern political theory. It is the error of abstract thinking; of social theorizing without first thinking what is involved in the fact of society. Hobbes desiderates unlimited authority in the interests of an irrefragable unity of society. But the very fact of society implies some measure of unity, and on the other hand no society is completely unified; it is diversity on a basis of unity; unity changing its form and content, and diversity ever showing itself in new places. The only societies safe from disruption that I can think of are those that are dead, or the one that Plato laid up in heaven, or the City of God that Augustine dreamed about. The worship of unity for its own sake, apart, that is, from the things wherein we may lawfully unite, seems to me precisely that attempt to challenge human conditions and limitations that is the supreme impiety, and incurs the deepest condemnation of the Gods. Similarly, I cannot, except in theological terms, think of a man wholly free. It is late in the day, perhaps, to seek to draw fresh lessons from the Aristotelian tag that society is prior to the individual. But the failure to apply this seems to me the root of the trouble. Behind the fact of society we are not entitled to go, because the social condition is the primary human condition; and the fact of society, as I have just said, implies both unity and diversity, both authority and freedom. The ultimate postulate of both forms of the modern political theory is the abstract individual, who corresponds to Aristotle's solitary, and is either a beast or a God. For Hobbes he is a beast, to be tamed only with whips and scorpions; for Rousseau a God, whose freedom of will is intangible. Between these poles modern theory, and we may say to some extent modern history, has shuttlecocked to and fro, seeking combinations of the two which are as of oil and water, because the principles are incompatibles. Even the line of thought which begins with Montesquieu and Burke, and does, in my view, take a starting point from which the conceptions of authority and freedom can be both founded and controlled, that is

that of the social tradition, falls a victim, when it comes to Hegel, to the dominant tradition. Hegel's exaltation of the State corresponds to his sense of the necessity of meeting the individualism of the revolution by proving the State itself to be the real substance of individual freedom. The result was thus to provide even more congenial soil for the taproots of totalitarianism, both of the right and the left.

It is time, however, that I indicated my own attitudes to State and Law. The authority of the State I think of as acting on a fairly mundane level, at its highest where it is the instrument of Law. Something comes over to it, in hours of crisis particularly, from deeper than utilitarian levels, but in the main, and except to the eyes of that political apocalypticism which I admit to be widely prevalent, but which seems to me the root heresy of the day, it operates in the daylight, or if some of you think that too kind, in a bureaucratic twilight, serving purposes essential, and practically, no doubt, very complex, but dealing with the surface of life, facilitating, but incapable directly of nourishing that life of the spirit which is the deeper vocation of man. I do not think that this characterization is essentially affected by the form of the State, whether, in the traditional classification, it is monarchical, aristocratic, or democratic. Ultimately the State is judged by pragmatic tests, whether it works and delivers the goods. If it does not, Divine Right of Kings or Divine Right of Peoples will, in the long run, avail it little. The arguments as to the merits of different forms of States—important though they may be—are finally circumstantial and conditional ones. When we come to Law, however, we touch, in my feeling, a deeper principle. Law is nowadays very largely formulated through the State, but it seems to me profoundly mistaken, and to compromise its very nature, to regard it as made by the State, in the sense in which it is often spoken of as representing the will of the State. The hypostatization of social concepts, such as is involved in the attribution of will to the State, is to me a darkening of counsel, if not, indeed, a form of idolatry fraught with very pernicious consequences. We may accept it as a species of convenient mental shorthand, perhaps, provided we remember that in sober fact the State is no more than human beings in special positions, and above all in special legal positions *vis-à-vis* each other and the rest of us. What is common in our relations to those whom we lump together as the State is that in different ways and degrees they claim to make us do what they say, and dispose of means to that end. If, therefore, we seek a generic name for the State, it should be Power, whether power mediated through the ballot-box, or otherwise derived, as has been, and is now the case with perfectly respectable States. At least we can say of Power, as we cannot of the ballot-box, that without it there

is no State. But we do not think of Law as Power, as the material possibility of compelling obedience. It can be law without the power of getting itself obeyed. We think of Law as Authority, as something that we ought to obey. There may be bad laws, but their badness is in subtraction from their legality. Beyond them there is still law, representing values, and a principle of generality by which we live and must live. How then, do I define Law? Here again I prefer to begin with the concrete—with Society. Law is the rule of a society. Now rule is not fundamentally something imposed on a society, it is intrinsic to it, something that we imply in saying society. A society is men and women with common characteristics, living together, and therefore in a common situation, having values and purposes and conceptions of life in common. If there were not these elements there would not be society, and there always has been and will be society. Ultimately law is the externalization of that community, or rather not of the whole of it, but of so much as requires externalization in rule. It is a function of a situation—circumstances as they are, people as they are, their common life as it is, and moving in the direction in which it is moving. The second mark of law is necessity. It is the rule that that situation prescribes, if internecine war is not to break out, if the productive system is to function adequately, if consciences, and perhaps prejudices, are not to be unbearably shocked, if what are recognized as the higher forms of life are not to be inhibited. Thirdly, all social situations are human situations. They are situations in which human individuals are implicated, and the rules that arise from them have to be considered in their relation to those individuals. This raises the question of Justice. Justice, I need not remind you, is of two kinds; justice in relation to accepted common purposes, which takes into consideration persons, conditions, opportunity; and justice in relation to individuals identically situated, which is no respecter of persons. You will notice I have given precedence to the social character of law. Therefore, though I believe in the "irreducible minimum of Natural Law" that Professor Gény postulated, I do not think justice can be approached by way of formulating Declarations of the Rights of Man. I have lately been reading that immensely intelligent work, Simone Weil's *The Need of Roots*, which to my mind expresses the predicament of the individual in face of society much more comprehensively and penetratingly than many of the more orthodox manuals of politics. It was written as a sort of prelude to the work that has been undertaken towards the formulation of a Charter of the Rights of Man. Anyone who reads it will feel, I think, how hopeless it would be to try to turn it into anything like a code of law. So I give you my conception of the authority of law; its root in the uniformities that constitute and are constituted by the social life; its necessity as

rule as a first critical principle, distinguishing it from the merely impositional; vivified by an expanding principle of justice, which is the end, not the beginning of law, "its seat in the bosom of God," as social life itself is vivified by the development within and beyond the forms of law of those higher perceptions of the vocation and duty of man which come not from the State, or even from the Law, but from man to man, or perhaps I should say from God to man. You will notice that I have presented the authority of Law as primarily self-sanctioning. The role of Power is not to impose it on society as a whole, but merely on the casual recalcitrant. If this were not so should we not expect the police to outnumber the citizens?

I spoke of the casual recalcitrant, having mainly the criminal or irresponsible classes in mind. But how about the conscientious recalcitrant, the man who has decided that he cannot obey a given law? If the titles I have cited—the consideration that the law belongs to the society that, so to speak, has bred and nurtured him; that law is necessary to the social life, and that its fabric must to some extent be damaged by his resistance; and that to his fellow-citizens the law appears necessary and just—if these do not incline him to obey, I do not see that we have further burdens that we can legitimately lay on his conscience. If he will resist he must. On the other hand, sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. If individuals and minorities may conscientiously resist, majorities may conscientiously compel. Law will have the organized power of society behind it, and in general looks very well after itself. I should, however, say something of the role of power in social life. Communities are spiritual things, and depend on an assent which is natural, indeed, but which if it should happen to fall away, cannot, in the ultimate, be forced. What I have in mind is expressed in the popular saying that you can do anything with bayonets except sit on them. Societies change and grow, pass through phases that strain the allegiance of sections of their membership to them; they need to look to their foundations, and keep in repair the ultimate ramparts of their defence, which are in men's breasts. In this sort of sphere force may defend, but it cannot create. It can defend existing unities of interest, feeling, and thought, so far as to repress action directed against them, even acts which take only the form of writing or speech. It seems to me untrue to say that repression of this sort is never effective. There are points at which all societies will feel compelled to take such action, nor do I think so-called imprescriptible rights of freedom of speech and so on, ever will, or even ever should, bar such action in the appropriate circumstances. The true principle of restraint lies rather in the nature of the case, as I have described it. Such action—I have particularly in mind the proscription one way or another of particular opinions—has a tendency so far to outlaw those against whom it is directed.

Once embarked upon it is very difficult to limit or to stop. It also proclaims a weakness, and so may easily intensify it. Therefore I think that particularly in the case of those inner liberties of the spirit whose denial does have the effect of a sentence of outlawry, nothing but urgent necessity—the "necessity that chooses, and is not chosen"—makes such action other than unwise. Contingent danger, the logic of unity, the "right" of the community so to act, seem to me dangerous foundations. The unity that has to be defended is no more than a conditional and pragmatic unity. Legal action is always clumsy in such matters; far more effective, unless the danger to be dealt with permits of no delay, is the impalpable pressure of public opinion exercised in an atmosphere of freedom. This, to me, is the genuine liberty; not a set of rights which by definition are rights to do wrong as well as rights to do right, but a temper of statesmanship that realizes that the sources of unity and strength are spiritual, and achieve lasting results only in an atmosphere of freedom.

I have several times referred to social tradition as the ground of authority in its social field, and in my feeling its principal ground. I now want, as the terminus of my argument, to turn my attention to this subject for some moments. What I have to say will have its roots in the Hegelian tradition, qualified by the criticism I have already briefly made of this; but I shall refer chiefly to the book by which Hegelian politics are best known in England, that great, though in many ways perverse book, Bosanquet's *Philosophical Theory of the State.* Broadly, Bosanquet's argument is that the coherence of our values, the discipline of our moral life, comes to us not so much from effort of our own, though it does, of course, require effort from us, as from our acceptance, unconsciously, with conscious approval, or even under pressure of social approval or disapproval, of the conventional pattern of life, the structure of values, that we find about us in society. "Take the actual casual will of the individual at any given moment" he writes, ". . . let it be for example, an impulse of sensual passion. It is a commonplace that in such impulses the self can find no abiding satisfaction. . . . Yet they have their meaning . . . they imply a need for union, and an attraction outside the immediate self. . . . The impulse, in passing into family affection becomes both less and more. It is both disciplined and expanded. . . . You can make a life out of the one, and you cannot out of the other. . . . We might compare in the same way the mere impulse to earn our daily bread with the horizon of a great intellectual profession, or the routine of an industry or profession vacantly followed, with the same routine followed conscientiously, in a spirit of enlightenment." These, for him, are typical specimens of the relation of the individual moral life to the social. But it is what he

goes on to argue that seems to me particularly worthy of attention. In the first place he insists that the social tradition is not a mere congeries of conventions and values, something that merely is, which necessarily influences us, but whose influence we are entitled to accept or reject as we think best. It hangs together, it is a "system adjusted to unity"; the specific social tradition to which any one of us is born represents for him the catholicity of the human spirit, as far as it has got, as it were, at the given time and place. Thus it has authority for him. The first of these arguments, that the social tradition is a unity, is one to which we pay tribute, consciously or not, as it seems to me, when we use such phrases as the spirit of an age, the tradition of a nation; when, for example, we recognize that there will be common factors informing the thought and outlook of a Frenchman different from those we should find with an Englishman, or that we may expect threads of similarity and dissimilarity to distinguish the ideas and outlook, in any and all spheres, of, say, the sixteenth century and the eighteenth century. To Bosanquet this unity follows as a consequence of the primary impulse of the reflective mind, namely to unify its experience. We are not finally happy to follow our activities of thought simply in this or that practical context, or specialized field; we are influenced by what is going on in other fields, we seek to eliminate what we sense as dissonances between the different spheres of our own and of contemporary interest; knowledge, art, and thought impinge on each other, and what is expressed in any one sphere is conditioned by what is going on in all the rest. And what is thought to-day is conditioned by what has been thought and said in the recent and remoter past; the roots of the present are deep in the past. So he argues that the social tradition comes to represent that frame of reference in which alone our specific and individual interests and qualities find the discipline and the integration that they need to validate themselves; in a sense it is more ourselves than our empirical selves. Bosanquet goes so far as to suggest that the principal value of empirical individuality—the differences of apprehension and outlook that mark us—is that they make it possible to "cover the ground," ensure for the social tradition that quality of roundedness and completeness in the expression of human values that makes its contrast with the merely individual outlook, and *a fortiori* with that of the individual divorced, by circumstance or act of will, from sympathetic contact with it. Arising from these views, and the form in which they are best known, because of the many attacks that have been made on it, is Bosanquet's contention that the social system, adjusted to unity in the State, represents the "real will" of the individual, as opposed to his "actual," or empirical will, a more real expression of himself than that which he himself gives out as himself.

With the last part of this teaching I most heartily disagree. Its emphasis on the political seems to me to be utterly wrong, and the attempt to make politics an architectonic discipline, in spite of Aristotle's authority, in the last degree unhappy and misconceived. Politics is instrumental, not creative; unity, in the sense in which it represents integration as opposed to a strait-waistcoat, is more subtly won, and at deeper levels of the spirit than are touched by politics. On the whole conception of the General Will I stand with Professor Hobhouse—"In so far as it is general, it is not will; in so far as it is will, it is not general." But this does not mean that we can ignore the importance of the conception of social tradition for social and political thought, and for the general doctrine of authority. Specific authorities, such as those attaching to office and function, to knowledge and expertize, seem to me shallowly and insecurely rooted unless they have consciously and deliberately reckoned with the traditional bases on which they stand. If we want to think society out for ourselves we must begin by thinking ourselves into society. But this, you will say, leaves social tradition a subjective rather than an objective authority; it prescribes a method of approach to problems, rather than offers a solution of them. I accept this limitation. Once we have abandoned the General Will, and what I call broadly mystical conceptions of the social tradition, I do not see how else we can think of it. I accept the limitation the more freely because I do not think the challenge of our time comes from lack of discipline in action, but from lack of discipline in thought; from short and superficial thinking which has not been ready to reckon with the authority of what has been said and thought and practised before. There are important advantages, too, in this way of looking at social authority. Once we concede that the catholicity and unity of the social tradition, the roots of its authority, represent not the fine adjustments of a single superior social will and intelligence, but rough pressures to unity resulting from the impossibility of dividing life into watertight compartments, and the need to harmonize feeling and thought in all the differing departments of human activity, the conception of social authority carries with it its own corrective, even, we may say, borrowing an Hegelian smirk, its opposite. For so soon as we recognize that social tradition lives, not in the clouds, or in some hypostatized social concept such as the State or the nation, but in the generations of its inheritors, it becomes clear that its authority is in proportion to the vigour with which it is lived, that it is only as people seek to make its lessons real in terms of their own lives and thought—turning themselves to the past for inspiration and nourishment, for wisdom indeed, but turning what they derive from it to contemporary use and criticism, that the pressures to which I have referred, the cross criticism of the different

aspects of life by each other, from which the catholicity and humanity of the social tradition derive, can continue to be efficacious. Thus my challenge, if I may be impertinent enough to consider myself as making one, is as much to traditionalists to state their beliefs in modern contexts and terms, as to march of mind men to consider the past, and to conceive it possible, in the bowels of Christ, that they may be mistaken.

Two more points—not slight ones, though I must treat them slightly—and I have done. The first concerns the locus of the search for authority. Hegelianism placed this in the State, as representing the nation. I do not think anyone to-day would be satisfied to accept the nation as an autonomous source of higher values. We are driven further back, even by the logic of Hegelianism itself, nor can we stop, I think, till we reach the culture. This seems to me the most important conception of the day, both for historical thinking, and for social philosophy, though I do not know that I should feel that its implications in either field have as yet been fully explored. Provisionally we may perhaps think of the culture, in historical terms as the field of historical study which, by and large, is intelligible in terms of itself; and philosophically, borrowing Hegelian language, as indeed, rather than the State or the nation, "the World that the Spirit has made for itself." Descriptively we should say, perhaps, that a culture is a working unity of social life in which modes of living, from the humblest to the highest, have found mutually satisfactory and supporting relationships under the aegis of spiritual values, which are in principle as abundantly present in the workaday activities as in those more specifically devoted to them. I want to stress this democratic aspect of the conception of culture lest I should seem to be thinking too much from an ivory tower; and I would further say that from what I gather of what I have read of the morphology of cultures, they are vulnerable not only to the growth of scepticism as to their higher values, but as much to social and economic change, where the higher spiritual direction of the society, so to speak, has not redeemed the times, and has allowed change to take place without sufficient care to preserve contact between the different spheres of life, so as to secure their mutual penetration and comprehension. The influence that social and economic changes have at the higher levels, as well as at their own, accounts in part for the fact that epochs of such change are ones in which traditional spiritual authority is apt especially to be challenged, and the inference, to my mind, is that the authority of culture cannot be re-imposed, as it were, *ab extra*, but must be achieved by a subtler penetration, in which its modes and forms may well be changed, though its social vitality will stand to be enhanced. Only the most resolute search and expectation of the greatest and exactest things can

provide the intellectual and spiritual basis necessary to the refabrication of cultural harmonies once these have seriously been disrupted.

Secondly, when I accepted your invitation to read a paper to you it was a matter of some concern to me that in the audience to which I was to speak, I, who am neither a philosopher nor a theologian, must expect to find in your minds the question of the authority of faith. It would be cowardice not to face it though I must oppose an unarmoured breast to it. I have hitherto been talking in what I may call humanist terms, as I supposed I was meant to do, and as we all must, first of all, so I imagine. Faith, I would venture to assume, is the fortress of an integrated spirit, which has faced, so far as it has been able, the issues of life, and while it does not pretend, perhaps, to know all the answers, knows, at any rate, the answers that it intends to give. I cannot but suppose that if that integration is purchased at the expense of reason, it is so far the less certain and stable. I should like, too, to be able to assume that revelation is not, if I may put it so, a revelation of all the answers, but marching orders, and a mode of seeing things, of which, on the human side, the justification is that it is the only one adequate to the breadth and height of the human spirit "Thou madest us for Thyself, and our heart is restless till it rest in Thee." I am confident in my own mind, and from my own angle, that if no answers that are patently unreasonable will suffice, it is also true that reason does not know and cannot find out for us all the answers that we need. As a historian I feel I cannot but accept the evidence of this, and that if I want the monuments of the creative and conservative efficacy of faith, the evidence of what, from the purely human point of view, it is able to do, I have only to look around me. But faith itself, apart from the readiness to admit its power which seems to me a conclusion of human reason, comes where it lists, may I take it, and cannot be imposed, or comes, perhaps I ought to say, as God's gift, not man's. What I am trying to indicate is that in my own thought, between the attitude that I have tried to take up, resting on a regard for human achievement and the conditions in which it can be preserved and improved, and that indicated by faith, there is no necessary solution of continuity.

May I finally summarize what I have been trying to say from a slightly different, and perhaps rather profounder angle? I have followed medieval tradition, rather than modern, in thinking of the State as concerned with utilities, rather than with values, in medieval phrase as of man, rather than of God. That is because I follow the older tradition in thinking of man as primarily a spiritual being. By this I do not necessarily mean more than that no life, in my view, has answered itself which has not succeeded in bringing its daily activities and avocations into a scheme involving transcendental elements—though these need not necessarily be more than is

involved in family life, or in the responsibilities and companionship of spare-time duties voluntarily assumed, even in private hobbies or activities, gardening, boats, countryside, reading of some sort—something chosen by the self for its enduring worthwhileness, and made the centre round which the life is organized so far as is possible. That this personal living, this finding out of the self in the context of its concrete opportunities, is what is, in fact, life, seems to me something that novels and poetry, for example, have always freely recognized, and politics and economics not nearly enough. Most of us know people, often in ordinary enough circumstances, whose lives have this integral quality, and recognize in them, as we may not do in lives of much higher ostensible achievement and claim, that what they have found is the secret of living. It also seems to me in principle the secret of higher spiritual achievement, as in art, or thought, or religion. I sought deliberately, however, to phrase myself in terms of everyday life, because, in the first place, it is the breath of the eternal in a man's life that redeems it, no matter how it comes to him, and secondly, because, from what I started out to say, it follows that I want to claim the opportunity for this sort of life as the fundamental human right, perhaps the only one. The issues on which it depends belong, however, to the stuff of personal life, ambition and hope, love and friendship, and their fulfilment or betrayal, the incidental chances and happinesses and tragedies of life. They are remote from politics and the clashes of conflicting ideologies. As human individuals we have only the Psalmist's span to live, or perhaps nowadays a little more, and it is in this span that we have to meet and to solve our problems, and attain our personal significance. We cannot hope for much help from changes in the external ordering of the world, and indeed to look to have the frame of things tailor-made to our needs seems an extravagant expectation. What helps us most, as it seems to me, so far as the ordering of the external world is concerned, is that it should be reasonably stable, that it should give us situations we can stay in long enough to understand them, prospects we can work for and rely on, in a word, footing for the personal life. That is why programmes of fair shares and equal rights seem to me in the ultimate little more than dressed-up and bedizened versions of the ancient, common, and never very laudable ambition of keeping up with the Joneses. The rights that do perhaps begin to matter are historical rights, the expectations to which a man has been bred, as the stuff of which he is to make his life. I make a reservation, and an addendum, to this statement of view. I feel that the ordering of the external life that does not secure to the industrious and rational—I am using Locke's phrase—the means of a stable life, however humble, lived in self-respect, sins against the spirit, as befel us as a nation, in the 'thirties. As to my

addendum, I think that a social life turned towards personal living rather than towards programmes of material and social betterment, would in fact, be rich in goodness and mutual aid, as well as in self-help. I believe that this was in fact so to quite an extent, in Victorian times, and was the root of the best of Victorian progress, as opposed to the confidence in snap solutions of political and economic justice which wrought much of the material, and most of the human harm of that period. The line of thought I am indicating lies behind my feeling for law as the highest political value. Law is above all the ground and guarantee of personal life—"mother of our peace and joy." My wider conceptions of authority rise from the same preoccupations. Personality, in any sense in which it represents integration of our problems, roots far back and widely. This seems to me a conclusion that not only historical, but modern sociological and psychological studies enforce. The conscious and explicit contacts of the integrated personality with the greater intellectual and spiritual achievements of the culture and race need be neither many, nor necessarily profound. What matters is that the frame of reference itself should be capacious and coherent, values stable and orderly, the sense be conveyed of a world continuous and coherent, stretching beyond the immediate personal contacts. Such an atmosphere and outlook cannot be created *ad hoc*, or in a hurry; by persons, or even generations putting out to trade on their private stocks of wisdom and insight. It is a creation of disciplined thought and feeling in many generations, and even centuries. That is why the search for the older and wider references of each problem as it arises, the discipline of thought and feeling that this involves, seems to me the first rule of authority; as the keeping of them bright in modern use seems to me the second. It is not an authority that can be cabined or confined, given any precise circumference or location. It is of the spirit, as authority that is genuine authority must be of the spirit, and it speaks to the spirit. We have built ourselves too many brazen images, and ours is an age of political idolatries, "where ignorant armies clash by night." So it has not seemed proper to me to lay burdens in the shape of objective authority on any man's conscience, beyond those of the plainest social necessity. I have not pretended, indeed, to set bounds beyond which this may not go; I have rather emphasized that in circumstances which can and do arise, it might stretch very far indeed. But the principle I have aimed at has been a minimal one, so far as objective authority is concerned, and beyond plain necessity it has been my feeling that the leading of authority should be no more than what a man trying to do his duty may properly consult, and what he may properly respect. What answer the oracles report to him, let each man say for himself.

REASON AND DESIRE

J. D. MABBOTT, M.A., B.Litt.

I PROPOSE to consider in this paper some points concerning the part played by reason in non-moral conduct. The place of reason in ethics is a separate issue with which I shall not be directly concerned.

"The thoughts are to the desires as scouts and spies, to range abroad, and find the way to the things desired" (Hobbes). "Reason is and ought to be the slave of the passions" (Hume). Here is the first activity of reason in conduct; it discovers means to the ends set by desire. On Hume's view reason alone can never be a motive to action; reason alone can never oppose a desire. Take Plato's example. I am thirsty and see some water. Something in me, however, says "Don't drink it." This, says Plato, must be reason. How might this occur? Reason might say "Higher upstream is a farm; the water is probably polluted." Hume would maintain that reason is here pointing out that this water would be likely to cause me to have a stomach-ache. But the opposition to thirst is then provided wholly by my desire not to have a stomach-ache. Reason alone is powerless. We all know cases to confirm this. We say "Stop and think before you do that." Our friend says "Well, what?" We reply "If you go ahead you will be unpopular." He says, "I know. What about it?" We recall Hippocleides in Herodotus, who stood on his head on a table at his engagement party. When his prospective father-in-law said "You have danced away your marriage," he replied "Hippocleides doesn't care."

But these examples reveal another activity of reason quite different from that of seeking means to ends already actively desired. Reason can show us that actions will lead to or deprive us of other ends which, when we notice them, we feel to be objects of aversion or desire. Now Hume himself admits this second type of rational activity. "Reason can influence our conduct only after two ways: either when it excites a passion by informing us of the existence of something which is a proper object of it; or when it discovers the connection of causes and effects so as to afford us means of exerting any passion."[1] Or, more briefly, "Reason and judgment may be the mediate cause of an action by prompting or directing a passion."[2] The second of these activities might entitle Hume to call reason "the slave of the passions," but it is an odd slave who can "excite" or generate his own masters, or "prompt" them and make them work when they would otherwise be fast asleep. In the Platonic

[1] *Treatise of Human Nature*, III, i. Edition Selby-Bigge (1896), p. 459.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 462.

example, but for the activity of reason, we should not have shunned the drink. Reason here is like a boxing promoter. Without his efforts, there would have been no contest; he produces one of the combatants, who would not without his aid ever have entered the ring.

Nevertheless, Hume may still urge that reason takes no part in the fight. Having introduced the combatants, the promoter steps out of the ring and leaves them to fight it out: he never dons the gloves himself. He may do his job to perfection and yet the boxer he produced may lose the fight because his rival is the stronger man. I may be so thirsty that I risk the stomach-ache.

It must be granted to Hume that most of the cases in which we say that "reason prescribed what we should do," or that "a little thought made us change our minds," come under one of these two heads. And most charges of "silly," "senseless," or "irrational" conduct are aimed against people who do not choose appropriate means to the ends they desire or who do not take note that the means they do choose will lose them something else they would have desired more or will bring on them some consequence they will dislike.

I now propose to argue that there is another group of activities which everyone would call rational and which influence our conduct quite continuously. This group is of special interest because they are activities found only in conduct (though they have parallels elsewhere); while, as Hume rightly points out, the two activities of reason which are the only ones he recognizes are examples of "reasoning concerning causes and effects" and are therefore found equally in purely theoretical or scientific enquiries.

Let us start with a simple example. I hear one o'clock strike. I feel hungry. What can reason do? It can tell me how to satisfy my hunger, by going home to lunch. What else? It may remind me that if I want a book which I can borrow from a colleague, I must catch him now; and I do want the book. Here, according to Hume, the work of reason is ended. The rest is a straight fight between my desire for food and my desire for the book, in which the stronger will win. What in fact is likely to happen? I say to myself, "Lunch can wait five minutes." And I should probably say this even if hunger were the stronger desire of the two; that is, if the circumstances were such that I could not get the book without forgoing my lunch, and if in that case I should let the book go. The ordinary picture (Hume's picture) of a conflict of desires is like a boxing match in which both sides cannot win. What reason does here is to ensure that both sides do win.

We regard Köhler's apes as showing intelligence when they use jumping sticks or make piles of boxes on which to climb to reach their bananas. Should we not be even more astonished if we found

evidence of an animal having two conflicting desires and arranging to satisfy both, one after the other? Should we not be more astonished still if we had reason to believe that the stronger desire had had its satisfaction postponed to that of the weaker? And should we not regard all that as evidence of a level of intelligence higher than anything Köhler's apes display? What is involved here is recognition of time. Any administrator or business man knows that the planning of time (his own time included) is one of the most important and rewarding uses to which he can put his intelligence. We have seen that this often means putting off a present desire with a promissory note. I know of no evidence that any animal is capable of this. Most children will not accept promissory notes. Many adults are noticeably weak in envisaging time-plans as solutions for their problems and conflicts, or in their power to devise such time-plans, or in their capacity to stick to them when they have been devised. And just so far as they fail in one or more of these three ways (and people who fail in one tend to fail in the others) they fall back into the Humean condition of satisfying the strongest desire of the moment and using reason only as its slave. And this is a frequent form of unintelligent and irrational action.

In the simple case I have considered, the two desires remain unaffected by the planning. I go to see my colleague and get the book. Meantime my hunger remains unabated (or increased) until in its turn it, too, is satisfied. But there are many ways in which planning results in altering the desires themselves, and the possibility of satisfying them. The desire whose satisfaction is postponed may diminish or disappear; and when this is known a time-plan may be used to weaken or destroy it. "Count ten when you are angry." Secondly, a time-plan can eliminate the actual occurrence of a desire by the paradoxical method of anticipating it. Civilized people in easy circumstances are seldom very hungry or thirsty; they do not eat and drink *because* they are hungry or thirsty but because their time-plan prescribes it. Their regular meals stave off these desires. Thirdly, a time-plan can check the operation of a desire by ensuring that, when the time comes for it to arise, it will not be possible or easy to satisfy it. If I want to reduce my smoking I put only a few cigarettes in my case before leaving home and keep none where I work; if I am suicidally inclined I give my gun to a friend to keep for me; if I go burgling I leave my gun at home, so that when I very much want to wing my pursuer I shall not be able to do it. Fourthly, I may reduce the extent to which I shall satisfy one or more of my desires (including, perhaps, the strongest) so that other desires may be satisfied too. Or I may reject altogether the satisfaction of one desire (again including, perhaps, the strongest) as being incompatible with the satisfaction of too many others.

Now, with such powers as these, reason seems even less plausibly called "the slave of the passions" except by some such transcendental analogy as enables a domineering bureaucrat to call himself a "public servant" or the Pope to be "*servus servorum.*"

I propose next to illustrate these conclusions by reference to two classic authorities on morals, Butler and Kant. Only a recognition of the activity of reason which I have been describing would have enabled Butler to give a consistent account of what he calls "self-love." Butler rejects the hedonist analysis which would make every desire a desire for pleasure. He agrees with Plato that each desire has its own special object and he adds that this object is always something "external to" the agent. He holds that over and above these particular passions, and often in conflict with some of them we have a principle of "self-love." (With his other higher principles, "benevolence" and "conscience," I am not here concerned.) Butler says, "Every man hath a general desire of his own happiness" and this "proceeds from or is self-love. . . . Self-love never seeks anything external for the sake of the thing, but only as a means of happiness or good."[1] Butler draws no distinction between happiness and pleasure or the absence of pain and in one place[2] explicitly identifies them. And on most other occasions he treats self-love as the pursuit of our own greatest pleasure and avoidance of pain.

But such a view leaves a number of puzzles. Pleasure or happiness (like anger or knowledge) is a specific state of mind. The tendency to pursue it should therefore rank as one particular passion among the others. But Butler thinks self-love is different in kind from the particular passions and ranks above them in the hierarchy of the self. He believes that self-love is rational in a sense that they are not. He calls it "general" (as in the passage quoted above). He regards it as an expression of the whole self. Now none of this is true if self-love is merely the desire for pleasure. It is true that the pursuit of pleasure will require much reasoning about means to ends, but so may any other desire, for example, the miser's love of money or a pursuit of revenge. I can eat because I am hungry or I can eat sweets because, not being hungry, I desire a pleasurable sensation. The latter is no more "rational" than the former, no more representative of the whole self. Similarly, I can pursue money like a miser, for its own sake, or in order to spend it on a rare postage-stamp. Neither desire is more rational than the other; neither more completely represents the whole self.

Why did Butler fail to see that the desire for pleasure or happiness is simply one particular desire among the others? I think, for two reasons. First, because he had said that all particular passions are

[1] Sermon XI. Selby-Bigge, *British Moralists*, Vol. I, para. 228.

[2] Sermon I. Selby-Bigge, para. 205.

desires for "somewhat external," and pleasures or happiness is not an "external" object. But this was a mistake. There are hosts of particular desires which are not desires for external objects. Curiosity (whose object is knowledge—an internal state), the desire to dance, the desire for sleep, all these are obvious examples. Moreover, even when it is plausible to say the desire is one for an external object this is really misleading shorthand. When I am thirsty I do not desire *a* drink, I desire *to* drink. What would satisfy me is not an external object, water or beer, but to do something with an object. Thus the first reason why Butler may have concluded that the desire for pleasure is not a particular passion was the mistaken view that all particular passions are for external objects, whereas none is. The second reason why he refused to recognize a desire for pleasure may have been the psychological fact which is the basis of all the mistakes of hedonism or eudaemonism. Whenever I desire anything and achieve it, I achieve pleasure or happiness as well. The only way to get pleasure or happiness is to have other desires and have them satisfied. But it does not follow from this that the pursuit of pleasure or happiness has the status Butler attributes to self-love. Here is a mistake and a confusion. The mistake is to suppose that the pursuit of a desirable by-product of a desired end is something higher or more rational or more expressive of the whole self than the pursuit of the desired end itself. And the confusion is one between the desire for happiness and the achievement of happiness. It may be true that I achieve happiness if I have many desires and have all of them satisfied. But I can do this without desiring happiness. Indeed, if I desire happiness—if I enthrone the principle of self-love as Butler defines it—I shall almost certainly lose it. In the same way many of our particular desires have health as a by-product. "A little of what you fancy does you good." We pursue our meals, our walks and our games with no thought of health, yet health ensues. To enthrone the pursuit of health over all our lives is to lose health in hypochondria.

Butler's language occasionally hints at an alternative account of self-love. He sometimes substitutes "good" or "interest" for "happiness" as its object. To say that a man is achieving what is his good or his interest may mean simply that he is getting most of what he wants. When "interest" is used in the plural, this interpretation is even more plausible. "The very idea of interest or happiness consists in this, that an appetite or affection enjoys its object. . . . The very idea of interest or happiness, other than the absence of pain, implies particular appetites or affections, these being necessary to constitute that interest or happiness. . . . Men form a general notion of interest, some placing it in one thing, some in another."[1] "If we will act

[1] Preface to Sermons. Selby-Bigge, Vol. I, para. 199.

conformably to the economy of man's nature, reasonable self-love must govern."[1] "Our interest or good being constituted by nature, self-love only puts us upon obtaining and securing it."[2] "Human nature is . . . a composition of various parts, body, spirit, appetites, particular passions and affections; for each of which reasonable self-love would lead us to have due regard and make suitable provision."[3]

These quotations, and particularly the last of them, suggest a different view of self-love. A man is under the influence of a particular desire; he wants X. He considers the results of getting X and observes that to achieve X may involve sacrificing Y and Z which he also wants. He observes that to-morrow or next year he will want A and B though he does not want them now. So far Humean reasoning would allow him to go. But he now goes on to consider how he is to get all these things or as many of them as possible. And much the most common answer is a time-plan. Notice that the making of such a time-plan does not involve the appearance of any new or ulterior object of desire—other than X, Y, Z, A and B—such as pleasure or happiness. It involves the organization of the particular desires I have or expect to have, and not the addition to them or the substitution for them of some quite different desire. And such organization, widened to include all actual or anticipated desires, would be (on this second or alternative view) the activity of self-love.

With this second interpretation Butler would indeed have been justified in regarding self-love as rational in a way in which the particular desires are not. He would have been entitled to give it a hierarchical position above the desires (since it orders and organizes them) but not I think a *morally* higher status. And obviously this interpretation justifies (as the pleasure-happiness interpretation could not) phrases like "the whole self," "on the whole," "general" and indeed the very name "self-love." This interpretation also removes the paradox of self-love. "If self-love wholly engrosses us and leaves room for no other principle there can be no such thing as happiness."[4] It is very difficult to reconcile this with Butler's repeated assertion of the superiority of self-love to all other aims (conscience alone excepted, and conscience is not here involved). On the first interpretation the paradox is inevitable. "If you would get happiness, forget it." But on the second he could say "Forget about pleasure; forget about happiness; go for what you want. But remember there are other things, too, worth having. See you do not miss them through lack of forethought and design."

We can deal more briefly with Kant because the two alternatives are the same as in Butler and because the contradiction between them

[1] Sermon II. Para. 217.
[2] Sermon XI. Para. 231.
[3] Sermon XII. Para. 241.
[4] Sermon XI. Para. 231.

has already been brought out very clearly by Professor Paton.[1] (I should add here that Professor Paton is the only writer on moral psychology in whom I have found any recognition of the type of rational activity I am discussing in this paper. Cf. *The Good Will*, chapters vii and viii.) In the *Critique of Practical Reason* we find "a rational being's consciousness of the pleasantness of life uninterruptedly accompanying his whole existence is happiness, and the principle which makes this the supreme ground of determination of the will is the principle of self-love."[2] Here again is the hedonist definition of self-love. But in Kant, as Professor Paton points out, there are even clearer traces of the alternative theory. "All men have the strongest and most intimate inclination to happiness, because it is just in this idea that all inclinations are combined into one total."[3] Kant refers also to "man's wants and inclinations, the entire satisfaction of which he sums up under the name of happiness."[4] Or again, "In the precepts of prudence, the whole business of reason consists in uniting all the ends which are prescribed for us by our desires in the one single end, happiness," though Kant slips back into the utilitarian interpretation by adding to this sentence "and in co-ordinating the means for attaining it."[5]

We may here recall a similar transition in Mill who also held the first view as his main doctrine. "By happiness is intended pleasure and the absence of pain . . . pleasure and freedom from pain are the only things desirable as ends."[6] But, later on, "money is in many cases desired as an end in itself. . . . Money is desired not for the sake of an end but as part of the end. . . . The desire of it is not a different thing from the desire of happiness any more than the love of music or the desire of health. They are included in happiness. . . . Happiness is not an abstract idea but a concrete whole, and these are some of its parts."[7]

We began this enquiry with the example from Plato of the man who was thirsty yet rejected a drink. Plato's view that in this example the competing elements were desire and reason was contrasted with Hume's that the competitors are thirst and aversion from stomach-ache; and Hume's was agreed to be the more plausible description. But this verdict may now be reconsidered. The example we took was one where the water was foul and a danger to health. But should the desire for health be treated as ultimate? Hume gives an answer to this problem. "Ask a man *why he uses* exercise; he will answer, *because he desires to keep his health.* If you then enquire *why he desires*

[1] *The Categorical Imperative*, pp. 83–7.
[2] Trans. Abbott. *Kant's Theory of Ethics*, p. 108.
[3] *Grundlegung*. Trans. Abbott. *Op. cit.*, p. 15. [4] *Ibid.*, p. 21.
[5] *Critique of Pure Reason*. Second Ed., p. 828. Trans. Kemp-Smith, p. 632.
[6] *Utilitarianism* (Everyman Edition, p. 6). [7] *Ibid.*, pp. 34–5.

health, he will readily reply, *because sickness is painful*. If you push your enquiries further and desire a reason *why he hates pain*, it is impossible he should ever give any. This is an ultimate end."[1] Here is the answer we suggested; he rejects the drink because he wants to avoid a stomach-ache. But in the same passage Hume continues at once to give an alternative answer which opens the way to the true view. "Perhaps to your second question, *why he desires health*, he may also reply that *it is necessary for the exercise of his calling*. If you ask *why he is anxious on that head*, he will answer, *because he desires to get money*. If you demand *why? It is an instrument of pleasure*, says he. And beyond this it is an absurdity to ask for a reason." The implication is that pleasure or avoidance of pain are the ultimate ends discovered by such enquiries. But surely the real reason why we wish for health is not just that illness is painful, but that illness is "incapacitating." Health is necessary not only for "the exercise of our calling" but for our hobbies, our social activities, our work for our friends, and so on. Illness prevents us from getting and doing all the myriad things we want to get and to do. It makes planning impossible. And it is this rather than any particular pain or the loss of any particular pleasure which lies behind our desire for health. The activity of reason I have been discussing has escaped notice partly, I think, because our vocabulary includes no words appropriate in this connection and partly because the activity is never pressed to those ideal limits which would make the use of a single word proper to describe it as a "principle of action."

Mill's change of mind is obviously an improvement and the recognition of plain fact, yet "happiness" is quite an absurd name for the "concrete whole" which he envisages, as G. E. Moore pointed out with great gusto.[2] "Happiness" is certainly in English a name for a state of mind other than all the states of affairs normally desired as ends. It, like pleasure (if they can be distinguished), accompanies or follows the achievement of a desired end. There is no name for the "concrete whole" which is the good for man. But this is because there is no such "concrete whole."

We certainly attempt to order and organize our desires, but "self-love" would be a very misleading name for the tendency to do this. It borrows its normal force from the contrast with love of others. Yet, as Butler points out, love of others in its various forms covers a group of desires which are among those we have to order and harmonize. The same argument which makes Butler refuse to call desires "selfish" or "interested" should make us equally suspicious of calling this organizing tendency "self-love"—though of course on the hedonist or happiness analysis "self-love" would be less misleading.

[1] *Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*. Appendix I. Ed. Selby-Bigge, 1902. Para. 244, p. 293.

[2] *Principia Ethica*, pp. 71–2.

But no name is needed. For no one ever attempts to reduce the whole of his life to a plan or to organize the satisfaction of all the desires he has or ever will have. We do attempt these harmonies over limited fields and short periods, and most commonly, perhaps, with only two or three desires. The most extended uses which we ever make of this tendency occur in choosing a career or in planning a holiday. In the latter case, we ask "what are the various things I want to do?" and we try to fit them in or as many of them as possible. Some of them of course have to go to the wall; others emerge in a severely truncated form. Or again, if I ask myself where I should like to live when I retire, I have to consider what sorts of things I am likely to want or to want to do, and how best they, or some of them, can be fitted in. But if anyone asks me what is the tendency in me which thus tries to fit a number of different objectives into a single plan, "self-love" seems an inadequate and misleading name, both because altruistic ends may be among those fitted in and because a holiday or even a career does not cover the whole of human life. "Prudence" comes a little nearer the mark, but it, too, has a selfish ring. I think "intelligent anticipation" is the common phrase most nearly appropriate, but the emphasis in it is on "intelligent."

(The distinction between the happiness analysis of self-love and that I have been suggesting has some relevance in connection with the basic assumptions of economics. Economic theory had for long rested on a utilitarian basis of maximum happiness as the aim of a man so far as he was rational. There have recently been moves, of which Pareto was the forerunner, away from this utilitarian basis towards other criteria of rational decision. Cf. I. M. D. Little, *A Critique of Welfare Economics*, chapters 1–3.)

In stating the aim of this paper I explicitly excluded moral action, but there is here an exact parallel to the use of reason which I have described. I have been considering so far conflicts of desire and noticing how the construction of time-plans can sometimes resolve them and can sometimes prevent them from arising. The parallel is with conflicts of duty. Those who complain of conflicts of duties are often people who have failed to devise a time-plan for their duties or have failed to carry it out when they have devised it. We often find ourselves in "impossible situations" because we have put ourselves in them. One of our obligations is to think before acting. Two types of such thinking are parallel to the types Hume recognized in non-moral conduct. We have to think about means of carrying out our obligations, and we have to consider whether carrying out one obligation will result in shirking others. Moral philosophers tend to stop here, as Hume stopped, and to regard the resulting situation with its conflict of duties as a straight fight in which the stronger ("more stringent") duty should prevail. Yet surely here, too, there

is room for the type of thinking which tries to plan the organized and orderly achievement of our duties or as many of them as possible. They sometimes cannot be combined in a plan but this need not be taken as the normal or the only case; and frequently this special case occurs because of a failure yesterday or last week to plan so that they can be combined.

I have thought it worth while to describe this special function of reason in conduct because Hume's influence is strong to-day and his position very plausible. And it is also the case that the triumphs of science have tended to have the effect they had on Hume—to restrict the use of "reason" to those types of reasoning found in mathematics (and logic) and natural science. And this, if it developed, would result in irrationalist views of conduct and ethics. In "writing up" this activity of reason I may have given the impression that only by such attentive and continuous planning can anyone get along well in life. But there are three cautions to be observed here.

First, in non-moral action, planning can obviously be overdone. It may not allow for the unexpected. The man who solves his problems by time-plans is often the man who refuses to change them when new circumstances arise. Then again it is often advisable to leave some chance for gaining unplanned ends, and this the planner may tend to overlook. His nose is so deep in his map that he misses the kingfisher. Again, there must be a place for spontaneous creative activity, which is often wrongly and abusively called "improvisation." And planning of time, like planning of space or money or energy, itself consumes time (and space or money or energy), and may leave too little of these commodities for the activities planned. The too-rational man then becomes a Hamlet, whose

> "native hue of resolution
> Is sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought,
> And enterprises of great pitch and moment
> With this regard their currents turn awry
> And lose the name of action."

Fundamentally Hume was right. Reason *alone* cannot move to action. However much the desires may be directed, organized, encouraged, selected, curbed or even eliminated in reason's planning, the desires remain the raw material of action like the paints in the artist's box, and without them planning is beating the air over castles in Spain.

The second caution is that there is nothing specially moral about this activity of reason. The man who so plans is not morally better than the man who does not. Butler was no doubt right in holding that most immoral action is due not to selfishness or "cool self-love" but to the over-development of some particular passion. Yet the

man who carefully plans how to get most effectively all the things he wants may present just as unadmirable a character.

The third caution is a stronger form of the second. There are theories which try to find in the ideal of a unified or harmonious self in which all compatible desires (including of course the social or altruistic ones) are satisfied in due proportion a definition of the moral standard. Plato is not free from this. Butler, in his watch simile, comes near it. T. H. Green's self-realization theory implies it, and, though carefully qualified, it remains a dominating factor in Professor Paton's coherence theory of the good will. But just as the raw material of non-moral planning is the desires, so the morality of actions lies in the ends pursued and the motives from which they are pursued and coherence or organization has here, too, only a conditional or dependent place.

Much of this paper seems to me obvious, not to say platitudinous. But the obvious is sometimes overlooked in the pursuit of one-sided theories or through the adoption of unduly limited views of the nature and powers of "reason" or "intelligence."

A last word. I have been writing throughout of "reason" doing this and "desire" doing that, of desires conflicting and of reason organizing them. It is clear that such language is dangerous and I have used it only because the authorities I wanted to discuss have used it and because its use greatly reduces the length of the sentences we frame. I am sure that it would be safer and more accurate to eliminate these "faculty" words, if strict accuracy was required. Instead of saying "thirst is a desire not for an external object, water, but for an activity, drinking." I should say "When a man is thirsty he would not be satisfied by being given water but only by being allowed to drink it." Or again, when I say "reason arranges to satisfy both desires by means of a time-plan" I should say "A man can properly be said to be acting intelligently when he arranges to achieve at two different times two activities both of which he desires to achieve and which he cannot achieve simultaneously." The whole of the paper could be rewritten in these terms, avoiding the nouns "reason," "desire," etc., altogether, without any change or loss of meaning. It would be twice as long; it would be distressingly pedantic to read; and, unless all the Butler, Hume, Kant and Mill passages were rewritten in this sterilized language too, the connection between their views and those I have been presenting would be lost.

(*University of Oxford*)

ARCHAISM AND FUTURISM

The Very Rev. W. R. INGE, K.C.V.O., D.D., D.Litt., LL.D., F.B.A.

We are all waiting eagerly for the last three volumes of Toynbee's great *Study of History*, which has brought a new honour to British scholarship. For no English and perhaps no German writer has amassed such a wealth of information on human affairs in every age and every continent. We hope, rather anxiously, that his final diagnosis will not be to expect a "knock-out blow" from the strongest Power, which must be Russia. He is no disciple of Spengler, but the downfall of the West looms before his eyes.

These supreme merits do not prevent his book from being at times intensely irritating. He is in love with a few catchwords—"proletarian, dominant minority, universal State," which he misuses in a sense peculiar to himself, Christianity has never been a proletarian religion. The Galileans were a well-educated and upstanding peasantry, whose prosperity is attested by Josephus. The Epistles of St. Paul and the Fourth Gospel were not written for the submerged tenth. The Western wage-earner is anything rather than a proletarian. He is, if we must talk French, a *petit bourgeois*. The payer of supertax, mulcted of ninepence or more out of every shilling that he earns, must smile ruefully when he is told that he belongs to a dominant minority. There never has been and probably never will be a universal State. A moderate-sized empire is certainly not universal. We may add that a wastrel does not mean, as he supposes, a spendthrift, but a worthless person.

In the sixth volume he discusses in a very interesting manner the possible reactions of the citizens in a society which has realized that it is in a state of disintegration. Of these mental states, there are four; the first two, Archaism and Futurism, are methods of escapism. The third, Detachment, is an arrested movement, a withdrawal which ought to be followed by a return. The fourth, Transfiguration, is the way of salvation traced by the Platonists and by St. Paul, followed by the Catholic *philosophia perennis*. "Be ye transformed by the renewing of your mind" is the palingenesia prescribed by the higher religion and by the psychology of mysticism.

It is plain that these alternatives belong only to a society which is dissatisfied with its conditions. There have been times when men have felt themselves in harmony with their surroundings. If they do not say, with Faust, to the passing hour, "Stay with us, thou art so fair," they have no wish to mount a time-machine or to renounce all that the world offers them. Such golden ages never last long, for as Walt Whitman says, "It is provided in the essence of things that

from any fruition of success shall come forth something to make a greater struggle necessary"— *Ubi nil timetur quod timeatur nascitur.* Nevertheless, in the reign of Saturn men do well to be happy.

We look for historical examples, and our education leads us to think first of Hebraism and Hellenism. Our ideas of the former are confused, because the craving for revealed authority, always strong in organized religion, led the early Christians to inflict upon the Church, and the Protestant Reformers with crass stupidity to reimpose, the whole *corpus* of Hebrew sacred literature, folk-lore, patriotic legend, prophecy, moralistic aphorisms, and liturgical poetry. It is seldom realized how completely the religion of the nomad Bedouins was changed after the Jews came under Persian influence. "Apart from the virgin birth, the Son of Man has other features and prerogatives, pre-existence, a touch of something god-like, last judgment, ascension into heaven, which the Jewish Messiah lacks" (Toynbee 6: 163). It seems that we owe more to Zoroaster than to Moses. Jewish Futurism is mundane but not evolutionary. So our pro-scientific theology makes divine intervention discontinuous and catastrophic; modern thought eliminates the word supernatural by bringing God back into nature.

St. Paul says that the Pagans "have no hope," unlike the Jews, who "against hope believed in hope." The mundane hopes of the Jews destroyed them as a State and preserved them as a nation. The Greeks and Romans did not "take Time seriously." They had an intelligent interest in their own past, and produced great historians in Thucydides, Polybius, and Tacitus; but there was no professor of history at any ancient university. The prevailing view was that there is a vast pulsation, a systole and diastole in the natural order, resulting in cycles which in human life resembled or repeated each other. This view of history, which was held by Goethe as well as by Nietzsche, is by no means contemptible; it was accepted by Origen, who believed that each world-order has its beginning, middle, and end, but that the series is everlasting, as the spiritual world, of which it is the moving image, is eternal. Nevertheless, it is rejected by Toynbee with horror and indignation; he even calls it absolute pessimism. It is not pessimistic at all; it would be rather consoling to know that even politicans cannot do irremediable damage. It is almost impossible to become critically conscious of our own habitual assumptions. Doctrines taken as facts are not recognized as doctrines until they have been judged as climates of opinion. The ghosts of a dead eschatology, the belief in a cosmic law of progress and human perfectibility, which Catholics call the last Western heresy, still hover over those who think they have abjured it. We see this in a champion of the perennial philosophy like Urban, and I think in Samuel Alexander, as well as in Matthew Arnold. The ancients

believed that they were living in a period of decline; the men of the eighteenth century that they were living in a period of advance; both were unhistorical. Historicism in fact is a modern creed. The pleasing belief in human perfectibility, which became almost insane in the time of Herbert Spencer, ignored the second law of thermodynamics, which had already been proclaimed by Carnot and Clausius. If Time is real, a day will come after which nothing will happen any more. If God is wholly embodied in His creations, as Pringle Pattison and many others affirm, God will accompany the universe into Nirvana, lost to Time and use, and name and fame. The theory of perfectibility seems to be the only philosophy which can be definitely disproved. And yet the plain man may answer the physicist: "You say that no one and nothing can ever wind up the world-clock again. But it has been wound up once, at a date which we could name if we knew it. Whoever wound it up once may presumably wind it up again." Cycles, after all? We are up against one of the ultimate and insoluble problems, the relation of Time to Eternity.

Toynbee's third choice, Detachment, is not so much a pilgrimage arrested half-way as an attempt to solve an antinomy by suppressing one horn of the dilemma. It is to accept Parmenides against Heraclitus, and to eliminate Time and change. There are degrees of detachment. The Stoic wishes only to be detached from all that is morally irrelevant, including unfortunately love and pity, for a loving and pitiful man is not invulnerable; and to be invulnerable is the goal of philosophy. The exclusive mystic prays, as Crashaw makes Teresa pray, "Leave nothing of myself in me." But we cannot kick down the ladder by which we are still ascending. Time and Space are only the warp and woof of the canvas on which we draw our pictures of things and events. But we are *in via*, not *in patria*. A journey through the unreal is an unreal journey and leads nowhere. He who grasps at the infinite clasps only zero. To be disinterested without being uninterested—that is the problem of Detachment.

Archaism and Futurism, Toynbee says, are both "flying leaps" away from the present into another stopping-place in the Time-series. But no flying leaps are necessary. If we believe that Time is the enemy—*damnosa quid' non imminuit dies*—we are archaists; if we believe that Time is the friend, we are futurists. There are two kinds of prejudice, one says "This is old, therefore it is good," the other "This is new, therefore it is better." The tendency to believe in the old is not peculiar to Solon's Egyptians. Tradition is the stored wisdom of humanity; it is sometimes the petrified wisdom of dead yesterday. *Quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus* is an impressive slogan, even if the first means "in 1563," the second "at Trent," the third "by a majority." It is no doubt better to be an ancestor than a

descendant, but we can count other descents from King Edward III with some degree of probability, while our grandchildren are likely enough not to be proud of us. It is in religion that Archaism is most potent. We should not value thirty-nine articles of physic drawn up by the physicians of Henry VIIIth, though it is true that Galen was appealed to as an authority not very long ago, but there is an outcry at any suggestion to substitute a simpler creed for the symbol drawn up in the fourth century. Revivals are not always so futile as Mussolini and his lictors; but they are often attempts to restore what belonged only to a past age, and Archaism is responsible for some of the worst blunders of ambitious militarists.

Nevertheless, we must not be blind to the sins of anti-Archaism. We most of us like to consign our parents' household gods to the scrapheap. There was a dignity and gravity in the Victorians which we ought to be sorry that we have lost. We do take care of our artistic treasures from the past, but it has not always been so. The people of Norwich petitioned the Long Parliament for leave to destroy their "vast and useless" cathedral. Molière, in presence of the perhaps even more splendid triumphs of French Gothic, wrote:

> Le fade goût de monuments gothiques,
> ces monstres odieux des siècles ignorants.

In the Dark Ages there was a general destruction of the incomparable Greek works of art, and the public library at Rome was burnt to provide fuel for the baths. If I remember aright, the sainted Pope Gregory was the culprit. There have, it seems, been times when the sight of the masterpieces of human genius evoked no sentiment except a wish to destroy them.

Futurism is the belief in a good time coming. It has taken many forms. As belief in a future life it has accompanied in many countries the wonderful emergence of a higher religion which occurred almost simultaneously, about the middle of the first millennium before Christ, in China with Confucius, in India with Buddha, in Persia with the spread of the doctrines of Zoroaster, in Palestine with the late prophets, and in Greece with the Orphics. It was often combined with belief in pre-existence, reincarnation, and reward and punishment. But belief in a future life is not necessarily belief in a good time coming. An early view among both Jews and Christians was that the return to earth of the Messiah or Son of Man will be followed by a reign in this world of a thousand years, after which will come the last judgment. Chiliasm has revived sporadically at various times, but has never been a Christian dogma.

A very popular notion now is that a future state of rewards and punishments will be disciplinary. The saved will continue to grow in

grace; the lost will learn by suffering, and perhaps, as Origen thought extending his charitable hopes, like Robert Burns, even to "auld Nickie Ben," may ultimately be admitted to salvation. This is not a Christian doctrine, any more than the other merciful suggestion that damnation may mean total extinction. *Questi non hanno speranza di morte,* says Dante, affirming the orthodox doctrine. Heaven and hell, in orthodox theology, are states of fruition and torment, not of education. But since in our experience almost all men and women seem to be "over bad for blessing and over good for banning," the intermediate state of purgatory has been introduced, this being of course not a "second paper" for those who are near the borderline, but a reformatory for those who will ultimately be saved. But in eternity "there shall be time no longer," and how can there be change except in time? Roman Catholic theologians have seen this difficulty, and have decided that purgatory must be in Time, though apparently not in Space. The difficulty remains; future probation or discipline is hardly intelligible without reincarnation. In spite of this, popular belief in Protestant countries has virtually abolished hell and substituted purgatory under another name.

Early Christian eschatology, though futuristic, was not consolatory, since it was agreed that only a minority would be saved. The majority would be condemned to endless physical tortures, which were graphically depicted on the wall paintings in churches. Some of these, in spite of their antiquarian interest, have been whitewashed over as too painful for a modern congregation. This raises a question of great interest. Cruelty, which for us is the blackest of all wickednesses, was never one of the deadly sins. St. Thomas Aquinas calmly says that in order that nothing may be wanting to the felicity of beatified spirits, a perfect view is granted them of the torments of the damned. Martin Luther rejoices in the thought that through no merit of his own he has been exempted from the fate which all descendants of Adam have justly incurred. Such heartlessness is horrible to us. All eschatology is really symbolic; but because no evidence is available the colours have been heightened and coarsened by imagination till we are presented with pictures of vapid enjoyment and revolting horror. Is it possible that this can be the final dispensation of the God whom the Founder of Christianity came to reveal in His own person? Do we not all sympathize with the well-known protest of John Stuart Mill, who declared that he would call no Being good who was not good in the sense in which he applied the word to his fellow-creatures, and that if there is a God who can send him to hell for not so calling him "to hell I will go"? If this is what we feel now, were our co-religionists until quite recent times very differently made? It is a difficult question; there has undoubtedly been a great increase of humanitarianism in the last two centuries, though there

have been alarming signs of reaction lately. It is perhaps true to say that beliefs about the future which rest solely on supposed revelation are seldom held as firmly as facts in the sensible world. With very many persons who do not own it, the future life is only a half-belief. Letters of condolence are more kindly than absolutely sincere. On this subject we ought, I think, to give importance to a questionnaire conducted in America, and published by F. S. S. Schiller in his *Problems of Belief* (Hodder and Stoughton). The main results of this inquiry were as follows. Fear of hell was not expressed anywhere. Hopes of heaven were weak and hardly rang true. Indifference was surprisingly frequent. The pathetic longing of the bereaved for reunion with those whom they loved was very prominent, and in many cases had led to spiritualistic beliefs. But "perhaps the strongest position is occupied by those who rely on an immediate experience or intuition, which may be called mystical. This mystical belief certainly rings true, which is more than can be said of some of the other types of sentiment." But the mystical belief in eternal life is not futuristic in the ordinary sense. Keyserling says that mysticism, whether it so wishes or not, always ends in impersonal immortality. I do not like the negative word impersonal, and I think there are three ultimate problems to which we shall never find an answer while we live here. These are the relation of Time to Eternity, Personality human and divine, and the Problem of Evil. There is nothing irrational in recognizing a stone wall when it bars our path, instead of knocking our heads against it. But it is true that the mystic is not a futurist. He is convinced that we shall not be simply snuffed out at death, but his view of immortality is very unlike "the shout of them that triumph, The song of them that feast." The words of the wise that he values are such as these. "God is not the God of the dead but of the living, for all live unto him" (Jesus Christ). *Οὐδὲν ἀπολεῖται τῶν ὄντων*, "nothing that really is can ever perish" (Plotinus). *Quod Deo non perit sibi non perit* (Augustine). *Non est potentia ad non esse* (Thomas Aquinas). "All that is at all lasts ever past recall" (Robert Browning). Beyond this, if he has not had the advantage of a classical education, he is content to say with Thomas Huxley, "*agnosco.*"

The scene of the beatific vision has varied greatly. For the Greeks it was *ἐκεῖ*, "yonder," not here. For the Jews, the "days of the Messiah" would be on earth, and probably soon. For the Christians, futurism was dominant over the presence of the Holy Spirit, or the Spirit of Christ, "all the days, even to the end of the world," and the acceptance of the Book of Genesis imposed a very cramped picture of past history. The Renaissance brought back the Elysian fields to earth; in 1789 "it was a joy to be alive." The nineteenth century had a lay religion of its own, a superstition which had enslaved a philosophy,

We cheerfully abolished hell, and, as Macneile Dixon says, the gates of heaven shut with a melancholy clang.

The great question for mundane futurism is this: Is there in the nature of things a *nisus* towards universal meliorism? Are the scales gently tilted in the desired direction? Even the Persian religion, which like original Christianity was much more Manichean than its modernist caricature, gave Ormuzd the best of it. Samuel Alexander believed that God is preparing to emerge. Almost all religions and philosophies have said the same. Only the Scandinavian Olympus is finally to be stormed by the Titans, and when at last Woden meets Fenrir the Wolf, nobody knows what will happen. H. A. L. Fisher could not discern any such *nisus* in history, and was honest enough to say so. Tennyson, always a good interpreter of his generation, has a queer phrase about an "*increasing* purpose," and speaks of one far off divine event towards which the whole creation moves. If we believe our experts, the last event will be anything but divine; it will be a universe of dead moons observed by nobody. What possible unitary purpose can there be for all living species on this planet and for the billions of other worlds scattered through space? Surely it is more reasonable to believe in an infinite number of finite purposes, each having beginning, middle, and end? When they have fulfilled their task they do not pass out of existence, but take their place in the eternal order. We may find many Christian thinkers who have warned us against futurism in our pictures of the spiritual world. In the beautiful medieval treatise *The Cloud of Unknowing* we read "heaven ghostly to as nigh down as up, behind as before, on one side as on another. Whoso had a true desire to be in heaven, then that same time he were in heaven ghostly." The reality of history is superhistorical; Time, as Hooker says, "neither worketh in things any real effect nor is itself ever capable of any." An eternal purpose is eternally frustrate; a single purpose, once fulfilled, remains in the time-series in a frozen world of lifeless forms, against which Plato in the *Philebus* protests so vigorously, half frightened, we may guess at what some might make of his own philosophy.

To place our ideals in the future, says Bosanquet, is the death of all sane idealism. The religion of cosmic progress was in his time becoming a veritable "disease." There will be another Golden Age, and there will be another Dark Age; it may be approaching. *Habet mundus noetess suas et non paucas*, says St. Bernard. The future, as Anatole France tells us, is a convenient place in which to store our dreams; those who turn dreams into apocalyptic prophecies are preparing great disappointments for themselves. Liberal Futurism was evolutionary; revolutionary Futurism is apocalyptic.

No pure hope shall wither, except that a purer may grow out of its roots. The futurist after all has something to live for. Of such men

the writer to the Hebrews says, "They received not the promises. God having provided some better thing." There is no cosmic progress, but there is always good to work for and evil to resist. Toynbee has not mentioned a fifth method of reacting against disintegration, that of the soldier of the Cross, who puts on the whole panoply of God and wrestles against spiritual wickedness in high places. This is not escapism. But we shall agree with him that transfiguration is the true answer to the problem of life. The venture of faith justifies itself as it passes into conviction. If we live as we ought we shall see things as they are, and if we see things as they are we shall live as we ought. We may quote again, "Be ye transformed by the renewing of your mind, that ye may prove what is that good, and acceptable, and perfect, will of God."

BEHAVIOUR

D. W. HAMLYN, M.A.

One of the distinctions which Aristotle makes is that between ἐνέργεια (activity) and κίνησις (movement). κίνησις itself is sometimes said to be an ἐνέργεια, but one which is ἀτελής (incomplete), whilst ἐνέργεια in the proper sense is ἐνέργεια τοῦ τετελέσενου (activity of the complete).[1] The sense of "complete" here may be given by saying that an activity is something which contains its end in itself, which is carried out for its own sake, and not, as in the case of movement, for the sake of something else.[2] κίνησις, Aristotle says, arises out of a δύναμις (a potentiality) and may lead to a ἕξις (a state or disposition). The ἐνέργεια itself is the realization of that ἕξις. Perfect activity would be quite independent of any potentiality (ἄνευ δυνάμεως) but human activities only approximate to this state of affairs which is characteristic of the divine. The πρᾶξις (conduct) with which ethics is concerned is one form of ἐνέργεια.

This seems to be an important distinction, which has consequences for any form of study which is concerned with human affairs—for example, for psychology and ethics. (It has, indeed, importance for any form of study which is concerned with anything which is capable of forming a ἕξις, in Aristotle's sense.) Certain things can be said of activities which cannot be said of movements, and one such is reflected in the way in which Aristotle defines the distinction. To say that a movement is incomplete is to say that it is made for the sake of something outside itself. Its final cause is not in itself. But to talk of final causes is one way, and perhaps a misleading way, of referring to the reasons for which the movement is made. No movement is in itself and by itself intelligible. It is always possible to ask why it was made (if it can be said to be made rather than merely to occur, if it can be said to be an ἐνέργεια of any sort, even ἀτελής), and one form of answer is that in terms of "in order to . . .," or in terms of "because" where there is a sentence beginning with this which is equivalent to one beginning with "in order to." Thus if someone moves his hand towards a pillar-box, and is asked why he made the movement, he can say, "In order to post a letter," or "Because I wanted to post a letter." At the same time it may be possible for someone, say a scientist, to give the efficient cause or causes of that movement, and in doing so he will be treating the movement as something which can be said to occur rather than to be made; he

[1] Cf. *De An.* 417*a*, 16; 431*a*, 6; *Phys.* 201*b*, 31; 257*b*, 8.

[2] Cf. *Eth. Nic.* 1174*a*, 13 ff., where Aristotle says that movement could be complete, if at all, only ἐν ἅπαντι τῷ χρόνῳ.

may say what produced the particular muscle-movements in the arm. In the case of an activity it may, in the same way, be possible for the man to give the same sort of answer—"I posted the letter in order to fulfil my promise." But it is intelligible that no answer of that sort should be given. He might refer to the ἕξις from which the activity is derived—"I posted the letter because I wanted to," but to do this would be to imply that no further explanation is or need be forthcoming. The action of posting a letter is quite intelligible in itself; we understand what is going on and at any time during an appropriate series of movements it is still possible to use intelligibly the phrase "posting a letter." At the same time it would be absurd to ask for the efficient cause of the activity, as was possible in the case of a movement. One answer to such a question as "What caused you to post the letter?" would be, "Nothing *caused* me to post it; I just wanted to." This is not to say that the causes of activity can never be given in any sense, for, clearly, if someone posted a letter after having expressed his intention not to do so, we should be quite justified in asking, "What made you post it?" and in expecting an answer. Yet this answer would not give the cause of his posting the letter in the same sense as that in which a scientist might be said to give the cause of his arm-movement if he could give an account of its mechanism. Rather it would afford an explanation of his deviation from expectation, and to refer to the cause here is an elliptical way of accounting for such a deviation by showing that it could be subsumed under some law. When someone expresses his intention of not posting a letter we are justified in expecting him not to do so. If something occurred to make him alter his decision, then we should feel that this accounted for his posting the letter—was the cause of it—if such an occurrence could be said to lead to a change of decision for the most part. That one occurrence leads to another does not mean that the first is the efficient cause of the second, though we might use the word "cause" here in another Humean sense. The fact that we can use the word both in this case and in the case where a mechanism is provided in the strict sense reveals the ambiguity of the word. The mechanism case could be brought within the deviation from expectation case by saying that it accounts for a movement which is a deviation from what we would expect if the series of movements were random. But all the uses of the word "cause" do not imply the possibility of providing a mechanism. No mechanism can be given of activities, as opposed to movements. (This incidentally, shows what is wrong with Freud's characterization of neurotic symptoms as "mechanisms of defence"; in some sense the symptoms do provide defence, but they are the means adopted by the person to secure this, not mechanisms. Freud's hope for a biology of the mind cannot be fulfilled along these lines, for his explanation of the neurosis is

really in terms of what the person does, not in terms of what produces a reaction by that person.)

I take it, then, that the point of Aristotle's distinction, or one of them, is to show that an activity is intelligible in itself—that is, does not necessarily require an explanation in terms of anything else—whilst a movement is not. A movement could not occur unless there was already a possibility of it before it actually occurred. Continual occurrence of a movement in certain situations may, on the other hand, lead to the setting-up of a ἕξις. An activity always arises out of such a ἕξις, and it is a sufficient explanation of it to point to this, though not perhaps an explanation which is always satisfying, however adequate logically. It is a similar point, I take it, which is often made by moralists when they say that an act which is free is one which is derived from the personality of him who exhibits it. Activity which is perfectly free would be activity entirely so derived, the explanation of which could be given entirely in terms of ἕξεις, and none of which is independent of such ἕξεις. In Aristotle's terms, activity which is independent of ἕξεις would be ἀτελής, and thus mere κίνησις, not ἄνευ δυνάμεως.

One of the troubles about the distinction as Aristotle made it is that it sounds as if it is a material distinction, one between different kinds of entity. Are we being presented merely with an account of how activity develops? It may indeed be the case that, with regard to certain features exhibited by a person, to talk of activity is inappropriate, and to talk of movement is not. But where activity is exhibited, it is not necessarily inappropriate to talk of movements, but it will be so to do so in the same context, in the same universe of discourse. To represent the distinction as one between two kinds of entity is misleading, for sometimes the distinction might better be put as one between terms belonging to different modes of talk. Now the term 'ἐνέργεια,' which is usually translated "activity," is equivalent, where people (or organisms in general), are being talked about, to the term "behaviour." The qualification is necessary because Aristotle does not make it concerning 'ἐνέργεια'; the term is used for a variety of purposes. However, as my interest is in the study of human affairs, I propose to use the term "behaviour" in the following as opposed to "movement" or equivalent terms which I may specify. I am, in general, less concerned with what Aristotle actually says than with the relevance of what I interpret him as saying. In any context, then, in which it is possible to describe a person's behaviour, it seems possible also to describe the movements exhibited by him. Such descriptions will not serve the same purpose, and do not belong to the same level of generality. Indeed, it is fair to call descriptions of behaviour "interpretative." With movements we are concerned with physical phenomena, the laws concerning

which are in principle derivable from the laws of physics. But the behaviour which we call "posting a letter" or "kicking a ball" involves a very complex series of movements, and the same movements will not be exhibited on all occasions on which we should describe the behaviour in the same way. No fixed criteria can be laid down which will enable us to decide what series of movements shall constitute "posting a letter." Rather we have learnt to interpret a varying range of movements as coming up to the rough standard which we observe in acknowledging a correct description of such behaviour as posting a letter. Any form of interpretation implies the adoption of some standard; in this case the standard can be only loosely defined. This, too, is implied by the statement that behaviour is derived from a ἕξις,—a disposition or capacity (Aristotle makes no distinction here; 'δύναμις' should sometime mean "capacity," but 'ἕξις' is often used in its place without distinction). To refer to a person's possessing a capacity is not to say what will happen on a certain occasion; it is to indicate only roughly what may perhaps happen, although some restriction is put upon what is capable of happening.

At the same time as we can describe a form of behaviour, we can describe the movements which constitute the behaviour on this particular occasion. Are there any occasions on which this is not possible? We have seen that there are occasions on which we can describe the movements, but on which there is nothing that can be described as behaviour, though where the dividing line comes may well be a moot point. A reflex is clearly not a piece of behaviour. Aristotle implies that there are occasions on which we can describe the behaviour but not the movements, for he maintains that sometimes the ἕξις and the δύναμις are coincident. Sense-perception is an example.[1] It is odd to call perception and the like "behaviour" unless what is meant is the sort of interpretation which is carried out in seeing patterns *as* something. To see something is not to behave in any normal sense; it is, amongst other things, to come up to the standard implied in our ability to identify that something correctly. "To see" is what Professor Ryle calls an "achievement verb" as opposed to a "task verb." It is significant that in *Metaphysics*, 1048*b*, 18 ff. Aristotle hints at such a distinction and uses it to make his familiar distinction between ἐνέργεια and κίνησις.[2] He points out, in effect, that the present and perfect tenses of such verbs as "see" may be used at the same time of any person; and the force of the perfect tense is to point out the achievement. What is odd about the

[1] Cf. *De An.* 417*b*, 18 and *Eth. Nic.* 1174*a*, 14.

[2] Especially *Met.* 1048*b*, 23 ff. *ὁρᾷ ἅμα <καὶ ἑωρακε>, καὶ φρονεῖ <καὶ πεφρόνηκε>, καὶ νοεῖ καὶ νενόηκεν. ἀλλ' οὐ μανθάνει καὶ μεμάθηκεν οὐδ' ὑγιάζεται καὶ ὑγίασται. . . . τούτων δὴ <δεῖ> τὰς μὲν κινήσεις λέγειν, τὰς δ'ἐνεργείας.*

point as made in this passage is that learning is classed as a movement. The fact is, I think, that Aristotle has made one distinction where we should make two. We can distinguish between movements and behaviour, and between the latter and achievement. To describe behaviour requires interpretation of movements according to certain standards; to indicate achievement requires interpretation of behaviour according to the standard by which we recognize success. Both the terms "behaviour" and "achievement" are interpretative though at different levels and in terms of different kinds of standard. Aristotle realizes that there is a distinction to be made, corresponding, in material terms, to that between interpretation and description, and often applies this to behaviour and movement, counting perception as a form of behaviour. In this passage of the *Metaphysics* he realized that there was another distinction to be made, but instead of making it, he merely shifted the original distinction up a stage, so that what might otherwise be called "behaviour" is now called "movement." It might be said in justification that the distinction between ἐνέργεια and κίνησις is really meant to point to the completeness of the former, and that what counts as complete must be relative to the context. Here only success is to count as completeness. But the reason why Aristotle suggests that on some occasions we can describe the behaviour but not the movements (where these terms are being used in the ordinary sense and not that as shifted in the passage of the *Metaphysics*), is that he does not see clearly that on these occasions we are not concerned with behaviour in the ordinary sense but with achievements. We are concerned with "seeing" and not "seeing-as." 'ἐνέργεια' should not be used to cover both.

Students of human affairs may concern themselves with movements only. Physiologists do so and they might have a claim to be members of this class. In doing so they will be able to investigate, amongst other things, the causal mechanism of these movements; such a mechanism may be very complicated and unlike that involved in classical machines such as clocks. The seventeenth-century view of machines as exemplified by the clock will have to be modified if the movements of animals are to be explained in terms of mechanism. Even if it is too bold to assert that we already know what type of machine is required, we at least know far more than did Descartes. Human movements are not all reflex-like, by any means, and there is some justice in the claim that the simple reflex is, in any case, an abstraction. Granted, however, that it is in principle possible to give an account of some mechanism—perhaps of the self-adjusting type which is now becoming familiar, the study of which has been dignified by the title of "cybernetics"—this mechanism will account for movements only. While physiologists knew little about the structure of the nervous system they were content to deal with such things

as reflex action, which is essentially a movement in my sense, though not one which is made by a person; a reflex merely occurs, and we cannot ask for the reason for it, except, perhaps, in terms of a theory of evolution. Any reaction which is more or less mechanical can be classified as of this sort. The increase in our knowledge about the nervous system should not tempt us to suppose that we can do more. No mechanism of any sort can do more than account for movements, reactions and the like. It may, of course, be the case that a particular movement or series of movements may exemplify a kind of behaviour; it may be classifiable as such, and capable of such an interpretation. It is this possibility which permits us on any particular occasion to describe both the movements and the behaviour, though to do these things will by no means be to do the same thing. Thus, no mechanism can be given which will account for behaviour *per se*, however much we may feel that the behaviour will have been accounted for incidentally in providing a mechanism for the movements which constitute behaviour on a particular occasion. At other times, however, the movements involved may be different, though we may still describe the behaviour in the same way. This is the case because, as Aristotle saw, behaviour is derivable from a ἕξις and is explicable either in terms of this or in terms of what is akin to this—the final cause of the behaviour. Talk of final causes is akin to talk of ἕξεις because, as I mentioned earlier, both really provide reasons for the behaviour and not causes, in our sense. I take it that the ἕξις is, in fact, the formal cause of the behaviour. (A certain amount of qualification is needed in attributing these views to Aristotle with consistency. For example, in *E. N.* 1139*a*, 31, he says that choice is the efficient cause of action or conduct.[1] It is to be noted that he is forced, in consequence, to consider conduct in this case as a κίνησις. I take it, however, that this is a surrender to common modes of talk, as when we might say, "His hurry is due to (caused by) his decision to catch the next train." The act of choice, the decision, leads to the behaviour, it is true, but it does not cause it in any mechanical sense.)

As I have said, Aristotle uses the term 'ἕξις' both where the term "disposition" and where the term "capacity" would be appropriate. To attribute a capacity to something implies that it has at least a *prima facie* claim to be considered intelligent. (Instinctive behaviour is *prima facie* intelligent, but it fails to pass all the tests; e.g. it is too rigid and insufficiently flexible.) Thus if it is said that behaviour is derivable from a capacity or capacities, it is implied that such behaviour is at least likely to be intelligent. To say that it is derivable from a disposition may or may not imply this. The term "disposition" (in this sense a philosopher's term), is akin to the term

[1] πράζεως μὲν οὖν ἀρχὴ προαίρεσις—ὅθεν ἡ κίνησις ἀλλ' οὐχ οὗ ἕνεκα.

"habit," and whereas we often use the latter in order to point a contrast with intelligent or skilful behaviour, we may do this in a relative as well as in an absolute sense. That is to say that, sometimes, in saying that something is a matter of habit, we mean to imply that there is nothing intelligent about it, that it was purely mechanical and unthinking. At other times, we may use the term "habit" to point to the relative inflexibility of a mode of behaviour, and in this sense it belongs to the same family of terms as "custom" and "usual." In the former sense it belongs to the same family as "reflex" and "automatic." In the latter case it is likely that the habit will not have been instituted without prior behaviour which is both intelligent and spontaneous, to some degree or other. If we called such habitual behaviour unintelligent, it would be in the relative sense—i.e. in that implied by the epithet "stupid." On the other hand, it would be entirely inappropriate to call a reflex either stupid or intelligent. Behaviour can be relatively automatic but never absolutely so. Behaviour can always be called intelligent in the sense of that word which is opposed to "mechanical" or "automatic," though not always in that opposed to "stupid." It is sufficient to say that anything which is capable of behaviour is capable of being intelligent in this former sense. It is not necessary to attribute to human beings any spontaneity other than this, in which the behaviour is explicable by reference to a ἕξις, to the personality of the person concerned. Aristotle is not so clear on this point. Apart from suggestions that positive spontaneity may be attributed to human beings on occasions, he tends to identify reason with the divine; and the divine is said to have ἐνέργεια ἄνευ δυνάμεως. In ordinary beings the forms in which intelligence may be exhibited are limited by the movements which they are capable of making. Aristotle seems to imply that no such limitation exists in the case of the divine. But surely it would be a mistake to identify intelligence with the exercise of pure reason alone.

I think that it will be clear what implications this has for psychology as the science of behaviour. The ways in which we may account for behaviour will not be the same as those in which we may account for movements. Causes of behaviour cannot be given as causes of movements can. It is this very fact that allows us to talk sometimes of behaviour as spontaneous. But the proviso must always be added that in the case of any particular case of behaviour which is exhibited by a particular series of movements, it may always be possible to give the causes of members of that series, to show that they can be subsumed under specific causal laws. But the laws which deal with behaviour will be generalizations of a non-causal sort, if laws are to be formulated in this context. We may say that in certain circumstances people behave in certain ways without implying that

the one is the cause of the other. We might, of course, content ourselves with the programme of accounting for behaviour in terms of the capacities or dispositions from which it is derivable. This, however, is not a scientific programme, but one which may be carried out by anyone with sufficient experience of human affairs.[1]

The distinction which, following Aristotle, I have been anxious to make has consequences, also, for two, perhaps connected issues—that of behaviourism, and that of freewill together with the implications which any standpoint on the latter issue may have for the question of the function of moral judgments. The thesis of behaviourism was first introduced by John B. Watson as a methodological postulate, and only later did it attain the dignity of a metaphysical theory. As a piece of methodology it is clear that it would be a useful move against those psychologists who confined themselves to the frustrating programme of investigating and classifying mental states. It would be useful to point out that often, and perhaps generally, mental states, ideas and the like occur in the context of particular forms of behaviour, and should be looked at in this context. But Watson and his successors were impressed by the conditioned reflex and sought to analyse all human activities in terms of this, even thinking. For reasons which I have given this is a mistake, though there might have been some profit in investigating the mechanisms of movements which constitute behaviour on particular occasions. That this mechanism would consist solely of reflexes, conditioned or otherwise, is most unlikely, for reflex movements are not by themselves the sorts of movement which could constitute behaviour on particular occasions; reflex movements occur and are not made by the subject, they are not self-adjusting or purposive, in the sense that we could ask the subject why he made the movement. The point which I wish to make is that the thesis that organisms are entities which behave does not *ipso facto* imply that they are machines of the sort presupposed by behaviourists; conversely the thesis that they are machines would not, *ipso facto*, imply that they are not capable of intelligent behaviour, as long as a sufficiently liberal view of machines were taken. The main mistake of behaviourism, as it has developed, is that of taking the machinery for the behaviour and oversimplifying this. If this mistake is not made there is no bogey to be feared in behaviourism, unless it is the very idea that man may be a machine, albeit a very special one, that is feared. (It must be admitted that the facts of consciousness and all that is implied by that vague expression have to be reckoned with, and to deny this would be foolish, however much it requires analysis.) At any rate as a piece of methodology, behaviourism would be a sound thesis in the modified form which I suggest, in which the distinction

[1] Cf. some of the things said by Gellner—Maxims, *Mind*, 1951.

between behaviour and movements or reactions is made. It is the tragedy of much modern psychology that this distinction has not been made, and much time, labour and expense has been devoted to the vain task of making impossible identifications. That is to say that attempts have been made to identify behaviour in general with mechanical movement of one form or another. Pavlov was right in refusing to call reflexology "psychology," whatever his reasons for this were. Intelligent behaviour of any sort is by definition not mechanical, and it is with behaviour that psychologists are concerned. Human behaviour can be said to be mechanical in a relative sense only. Our ways of accounting for intelligent behaviour must be very different from the ways in which we would account for the movements of machines. Nevertheless, it may be the case that the movements in which behaviour is exhibited on any particular occasion are explicable in terms of some machine, albeit of a peculiarly subtle sort.[1]

As a metaphysical theory, on the other hand, behaviourism must be wrong, as must all metaphysical theories which, as distinct from speculative theories, depend upon the misuse of language by the failure to make relevant distinctions. It is important to distinguish between the pursuit of metaphysics and speculation, for whereas many metaphysical theories are incidentally speculative, the reverse does not always hold good. When carried on in the appropriate sphere and at the appropriate time, speculation may lead to important discoveries; metaphysical theories of the traditional sort may even prevent discoveries, for it may be thought that conclusions concerning matters of fact may be reached *a priori*. Part of the seductiveness of many metaphysical theories is due to the fact that they contain statements whose status is uncertain; apparently empirical propositions may be given a character of logical necessity (e.g. statements about sense-data), or partial truths may be generalized. As a form of materialism, behaviourism denies dualism in its Cartesian form and in this, perhaps, it is right. But this does not mean that it is right as a positive thesis any more than idealism. Behaviourists may have been right in pointing out that we do not need to assume a pure ego as a cause of activity, but this does not mean that behaviour is merely mechanical. For to assume this would be to deny what is obvious—that there is a sense in which we may be said to have a mental life; and in whatever sense this is true, it is true in the one which is implied in saying that we have some degree of intelligence. Enough has been said by Ryle, to make it unnecessary to labour that point. As it is, by its very negativeness,

[1] This amounts to a modification, perhaps an important one for some purposes, of what Ryle says on mechanism (*Concept of Mind*, p. 75 ff.), though in other ways it will be obvious that this account is in line with his.

behaviourism has been a hindrance to the progress of the science of behaviour in the true sense. As was the case with sensationalism before it, it has been based upon an atomism (in the one case that of sensations, and in the other that of reflexes), and has consequently presented the problem of how an intelligent animal can be built up out of such atoms. Both the Gestalt Psychologists and those who, like Dilthey and others, have espoused an "understanding psychology" as a cultural science, have been justified in their protests against it. But such protests should not themselves be couched in metaphysical terms. In pointing out that organisms capable of intelligent behaviour are not merely mechanical, the mistake should not be made of making the term "organic" or similar terms such as "gestalt" a source of mystery. Again, because behaviourism of itself cannot help us to understand intelligent behaviour, it should not be assumed that no psychology, as a natural science, can deal with behaviour. It is true that we can always talk of behaviour in an interpretative fashion, referring to an organism's achievements, reasons, capacities and the like, but this does not mean that no laws or generalizations can be formulated concerning behaviour. Clearly the more we know of the conditions under which people behave as they do, the better shall we be able to apply our interpretations also. If Freud had not told us of the correlation between certain childhood occurrences and behaviour in later life, we should understand neurotic symptoms far less. Only the methods of natural science can enable us to establish such correlations. A cultural science could not exist without such matters of fact being known first.

Behaviourism is, then, a bogey. By making a false identification of behaviour with movements it has suggested that human and animal behaviour may be mechanical. This is clearly to go against common sense, for there are clearly occasions on which behaviour might be said to be spontaneous. If, then, it is a bogey, it is not one to be feared. At the same time it has perhaps hindered the progress of science by the suggestion of a wrong model. If the exhibition of any form of behaviour in a concrete form is to be interpreted in terms of a model, that model will not be the type of machine exemplified in the clock. In any case, psychologists are not likely to wish to concern themselves merely with the exhibition of a form of behaviour on a particular occasion in a certain series of movements; nor do they confine themselves to this, but deal with behaviour in general, and in this they are justified. For, the ultimate end of a science is surely to enable us to understand its subject-matter. In psychology we are concerned to understand human beings and organisms, in general, not just the movements of their limbs, however much these may, sometimes, constitute behaviour. As the subject-matter of psychology, behaviour is and must be intelligible in itself. Whereas we

may justifiably expect some answer to the question, "For what reason was this movement made?" we will have no justification in always expecting an answer to the question, "For what reason was this done?" For on some occasions it would be considered silly to ask such a question and it is always logically possible that no answer may be given.

The problem of the freedom of the will is a many-sided problem but what I have been saying has this relevance—that we cannot give the efficient causes of behaviour, and, in fact, that the notion of cause is inapplicable to it, in the sense of "cause" which implies mechanism. One of the difficulties connected with the problem is that of reconciling the obvious fact that our actions are sometimes spontaneous with our increasing ability to predict human actions. This, however, will present difficulty only if this latter fact implies that our behaviour is mechanical in the sense opposed to that of "spontaneous." This cannot be so, for the only sense of "mechanical" which is applicable to behaviour is that equivalent to "stupid" or "unthinking" in being opposed to "intelligent." Behaviour is mechanical only in a relative sense. Thus even if it be admitted that science gives us increasing ability to predict human behaviour, even if it is true that human beings are machines in some sense, this does not preclude some of our actions being spontaneous. Similarly these facts would not preclude our attributing to people responsibility for their actions, for the mode of discourse in which we should talk of their behaviour, actions or conduct is very different from that in which we should talk of them as machines. People are responsible for their actions if it is possible to say that these actions are derivable from a ἕξις, from their character. The only sense in which actions could be said to be determined, when this is not meant, is that in which they can be said to be compelled. The sense in which compulsion causes behaviour is again, however, not the mechanical sense of "cause"; rather compulsion provides a motive for behaving in a certain way which is recognized in the context as being unavoidable. What constitutes unavoidability may vary according to the circumstances, but, at any rate, we are likely to hold a person responsible for an action only where it is derivable from his ἕξις, in some sense or other. As Aristotle saw, there are some occasions on which decision as to whether the action is derivable from the person's ἕξις may be difficult,[1] and only knowledge of further details of the case can make decision possible. Normally, however, we are well able to decide. In the case of compulsion it is clear that there are grounds for not attributing responsibility, and, *a fortiori*, for saying that the action is not free; but there is no reason for refusing to use the word "free" of behaviour in general.

[1] *Eth. Nic.* 1110*a*, 4 ff.

I do not wish to pretend that this is all that need be said on this question. It has many sides and many considerations are relevant. I do wish to maintain, however, that the issue of causal determinism *versus* indeterminism is irrelevant to any consideration about behaviour, as long as they are considered as strict theses. Behaviour is derivable from a ἕξις, as Aristotle maintained, and this does mean that there must be some regularity about it in order for it to be intelligible. Otherwise it would be reasonable to make the apparently paradoxical statement that strictly spontaneous behaviour would be strictly mechanical, in that no reason at all could be given for it. In saying that there must be some regularity, no reference to the notion of "cause" need be made, however much people might suppose that regularity would not be possible unless causal sequences occurred somewhere. But this is quite another matter, and it is not necessary for present purposes to commit oneself either way. Similarly it is not necessary to say with Stevenson[1] that a limited degree of determinism must be taken for granted in order that our moral judgments may influence behaviour. The sense in which our moral judgments influence behaviour cannot be a strictly causal sense, for, as I have said, the notion of "cause" in the strict sense is inapplicable to behaviour. Stevenson's account of the function of moral judgments is based upon his account of pragmatic aspects of meaning. Moral terms have an emotive meaning which serves to change people's attitudes. Stevenson might say that they have only a disposition to produce such changes, but the same argument applies. It is clearly true that changes of attitude may sometimes be produced by what people say, but it is still necessary to see how this can occur.

What is it to have taken up a certain attitude? Amongst other things it is to have come to exhibit a certain more or less delimitable range of behaviour-patterns on certain occasions. It does not entail that any one form of behaviour is involved, let alone any one form of movement, but only that we can roughly specify what sort of behaviour is likely to be exhibited on given occasions. Clearly nothing could cause us (in the strict sense) to take up an attitude, if that is what is meant, although a variety of means might be adopted in order to lead someone to take up an attitude, or to bring about a change of attitude. Propaganda may present people with bad but seductive reasons for a change of attitude—seductive in the sense that they appeal to motives which people have. It may, by constant repetition of statements, or the like, deprive people of the opportunity for, or interest in, considering reasons for not accepting them. Suggestion would not have any effect unless people had some reason or motive for being willing to accept suggestions. The motives may not always be conscious or explicitly recognized by the person

[1] *Ethics and Language*, p. 314.

concerned, but that is another matter. I take it, then, that the difference between argument and propaganda is that between the provision of good reasons for taking up an attitude and the failure to provide such or to allow such to be considered, whilst at the same time providing bad reasons.

My point is this—Stevenson is sometimes criticized for the view that the function of moral argument is to persuade. Even granted that his account of persuasion and persuasive definition is more subtle than his original account of emotive meaning suggests of itself, if the view attributed to him entails that persuasion is causative or quasi-causative, he is certainly wrong. On the other hand, it is not right to reinforce the criticism by saying that his view cannot account for the difference between moral argument and propaganda, as if this were a distinction between the provision of reasons for the adoption of an attitude and the causing of the adoption of an attitude. Propaganda does not cause the adoption of or change of an attitude, for reasons which I have given. Until and unless we can influence people's behaviour by interference with the mechanism of its exhibition, we will not be able to cause people to behave in any way, in the strict sense. Of course we do use the verb "to cause," especially when followed by an infinitive, in a vague sense, in that the assertion that we caused someone to do something implies only that something which we did led that someone to do something. I am concerned only with the literal sense of "cause." I do not wish to suggest that it is in any way improper to use the verb "to cause" in this other way. But in distinguishing between moral argument and propaganda, we should distinguish between the various ways in which we might influence people, none of which will be causation in the strict sense. Verbal utterances are not stimuli which cause mechanical reactions. In talking in order to influence someone, we always provide a reason or something akin to a reason for that someone's doing what we want. The crucial difference between moral argument and propaganda is that in the former it is possible to say what constitutes a good reason for a particular form of conduct. Good propaganda is not propaganda based upon good or valid argument, but effective propaganda; but it is effective in the sense that appealing to people's motives in certain ways leads them to behave in the desired way for the most part, not because the mere utterance of words causes behaviour. What constitutes a good reason for a moral judgment or decision is another story, but if moral arguments are persuasive this has no or little connection with their validity. If propaganda is persuasive this is all that need be said. At the risk of being tedious it is important to stress that neither cause the adoption of behaviour, in the strict sense. The function of moral judgment is to inculcate certain modes of conduct, but it does this by the provision

of reasons for behaving in this way, by appealing to principles (cf. "unprincipled" as a term of moral condemnation), the acceptance of which can be justified by the provision of different sorts of reasons in other ways; what constitutes a good reason depends on the context. Some systematization of these principles might be possible,[1] but in making moral judgments we do not *ipso facto* provide instruction with regard to them;[2] rather we presuppose them in making moral judgments at all, however much we may be led to argue about them directly in the course of argument.

"Behaviour," "conduct," "activity" and "action" are words of one particular type, though there are differences of use between them. "Movement," "reaction," "reflex" and the like are of a very different type. "Achievement" must be separated from both of these in turn. So, indeed, must the word "act," as used by moralists such as Ross, in phrases like "act of promise-keeping." An act of promise-keeping is not any one series of movements, or even any one form of behaviour. Promises may be kept by behaving in a number of different ways, in most contexts, and one form of behaviour may or may not constitute fulfilling one's promise in different circumstances. In fact, we can talk of human beings in many different ways, at various levels of generality, with varying degrees of abstraction, with different points of view, or with the presupposition of different standards. It is important not to confuse or run together these different modes of talk. In sum, I have wished to point out that we cannot give the causes of achievements in any sense, and that we cannot give the causes of behaviour in the mechanical sense; but of movements both these things are possible. On the other hand, the notion of a reason is in principle applicable to behaviour (though we would not be justified in always expecting one to be provided), and to movements which constitute the exhibition of behaviour in particular circumstances; it is not, however, applicable to isolated movements which could not be said to constitute behaviour (e.g. a reflex), nor to achievements, although we can give reasons for claiming achievements as such. The form of explanation depends upon the subject-matter and the context. Behaviour is not a series of movements.

(*University of Oxford*)

[1] Cf. Hare—Imperative Sentences, *Mind*, 1949. Also his article in *P. A. S. Supp.*, Vol. 1951.

[2] As seems to be maintained by Hare—*P. A. S. Supp.* Vol. 1951.

AN ANALYSIS OF SOCIETY

R. J. K. MURRAY, M.A., LL.B.

"A SOCIETY is more than a set of entities to which the same class-name applies" (*Process and Reality*, Pt. II, Chap. 3, Sect. II). Taking this *obiter dictum* of Whitehead's seriously, the present paper seeks to elucidate some of the more abstract properties of a society. By "society" I understand primarily human society in the sense in which it is an object of study for social theory, though part of what is said may admit of application to societies in some wider sense. An apology should perhaps be offered for the terminology introduced. The writer's only excuse is that there seemed no other way of expressing the ideas in question.

I take it for granted that a society is constituted solely by its members, who are individuals. That is, I assume that the relation of individual to society is that of constituent to whole.

Viewed in this way, there is no room for contradiction between the ideas of individual and society. Nonetheless these have often been held out as being in conflict. How has this come about? Possibly the confusion has arisen in part because of the evident contrast there is between solitary and social behaviour. This essentially qualitative difference, giving rise to feelings of stress in people, may have led them to suppose that the ideas themselves are opposed instead of complementary. Also it is obvious enough that the individual is sometimes opposed to the majority of his fellows, and it is easy though strictly incorrect to identify the latter with society.

Social behaviour is typically what an individual does in the presence of others, solitary behaviour what he does by himself. It seems natural to identify individual behaviour with solitary behaviour, because in this case individuality is so easy to discriminate. But this identification can lead to confusion. For though some behaviour is not social (the solitary behaviour of a hermit, for instance) all behaviour is the behaviour of individuals. It is improper to identify solitary with individual behaviour and hold this up in contrast with social behaviour, for these concepts overlap.

The distinction between solitary and social behaviour may also break down or become blurred. Take a Tibetan ascetic, for instance, living alone in a mountain cave. On the face of it, all his behaviour is solitary. Yet he studies holy texts he obtained from other men, and he prays in a language he learned in society. This behaviour is socially conditioned—is it not social?

In order to answer this question I begin by assuming that people display social behaviour typically when they are in society. The question then arises, what is society in this sense? A glance at

etymology may help us to get down to essentials. The word "society" stems from the root of *sequi* (Latin, to follow), so its primitive application is presumably to a following, gathering or company. Precisely there do we find individuals exhibiting social behaviour. We are not surprised, therefore, to learn that one of the earliest books on social psychology was Gustave le Bon's *La Foule.*

A point of confusion is that ordinary speech has attenuated the meaning of the word "society" in such a way that it now stands for something of which I am a member even when nobody else is present, e.g. I am a member of a club even when I am not at it. It seems plain that this is an extension of the primary meaning and not *vice versa.* One would be doubtful, I think, about applying the name "society" to an organization none of whose members ever met.

This difficulty may be met by saying that society in the extended sense stands not for a group, but for an institution. What, then, is an institution? Is it a mere abstraction or is it an entity? Legal practitioners, whose opinion we should respect here, for the matter is a practical as well as a theoretical one for them, appear to tend towards the view that they are entities of a kind. Even if the fully fledged doctrine of corporate personality is not embodied in the law, some qualified recognition that institutions are more than abstractions seems to be called for by practical necessities. It may therefore be asked—what kind of entities could institutions be?

Sociologists, too, have extended the meaning of "society," so that they apply the word to, say, the State or the community: something of which I am a member at all times and which never meets as such. Sociologists, it is true, do make a point of distinguishing society and community, but in this connection the difference is immaterial. By this extension the contrast between solitude and society may be lost. Thus the widest possible human society of which I am a member is that constituted by the whole human population of the world. I belong to this society at all times and wherever I go. Even the solitary ascetic is "in society" in this sense.

Now, while it is important to distinguish the different senses of the word "society," it is also important to try and express what these different meanings have in common. To this task I turn next. It calls for a detailed analysis of the idea of society.

Returning to the basic meaning suggested by etymology, society may provisionally be defined as a gathering or company. This is the conception of a number of individuals being present together. The notion of togetherness calls for further elaboration in this connection. "Together" may express a broad or a narrow conception. The broad conception is that of what might be called "subjective" togetherness, viz. the sense in which things are together when they are classed or

counted together. The sole connection between the entities taken together may be that they are so taken. This in itself tells us nothing about the relationships between the entities included. The narrow conception of "objective" togetherness may be contrasted with this. When one says that entities are together in this sense, one means that they are side by side, or spatially near one another, or that they "go together" in some other sense. This may or may not be a simple spatial idea, but certainly the spatial aspect of it is easy to grasp. Two things would not be said to be together in a spatial sense if they were far apart in space or if each was in the same place at a different time.

I start my analysis of the idea of society from this simple notion of "objective" togetherness, and I shall adapt it as I proceed. I should perhaps add that I do not wish to overstress the distinction just outlined between "subjective" and "objective" togetherness. The terms may be badly chosen and the distinction not an ultimate one. But it is sufficient for my present purpose if a rough-and-ready practical dissection along these lines be allowed; for I wish primarily to elucidate the conception of society, and only incidentally that of togetherness.

The idea of "objective" togetherness seems to call plainly for some frame of reference. Thus, to take a spatial instance, an astronomer thinks of the planets and the sun as being together though in fact they are thousands of miles apart. If the frame of reference is called a "place," then the facts may be stated more precisely by saying that the sun and planets are together in the sense that they are side by side in one "place" at one time. The place in question is the general locus of the solar system, and this may be roughly defined in relation to other astronomical entities.

Togetherness is evidently a relationship between entities which mutually exclude one another. So the smallest number of things which are together is two, and the place in which they are together must be at least big enough for both. This sets a lower limit of extension to the arrangement of entities which could be denoted by the word "society." Is there also an upper limit? Well, it is hard to say if we do not confine ourselves to human society. It is for astro-physicists to decide whether the cosmos can be said to have a limited extension or not. I take it that they would say it has. Certainly this is so with human society. An upper limit—a practical one, it is true, and possibly a temporary one—is set by geography. Human society extends no further than all the human inhabitants of the earth within the rough dimensions of a global surface. If this is a society, it could be called the "global society of men."

To call a gathering or grouping of this kind a society would be misleading in some ways. The human flavour of the word "society" might, for instance, lead us to overlook the abstract characteristics

such a grouping shares with collections or gatherings that would not ordinarily be called societies, e.g. all the mountain tops in the world or all the pebbles on all the beaches. What we need to pin down such elements is a neutral word free of mathematical or human associations.

I propose to use the word "assemblage" to denote this sort of grouping. The word has the merit of not being in common use. I intend its application to be quite general, i.e. not necessarily confined to human beings or to groups on a world-scale. Thus the stars in Orion constitute an assemblage, and so do the peas in a pod. In both these cases membership of the assemblage is homogeneous. But the stars in Orion together with the peas in a pod might be taken as an assemblage whose membership is heterogeneous.

Of homogeneous assemblages there are two main types: "concrete" ones, whose members are in actual contact, and "discrete" ones, whose members are separate. Discrete assemblages may be loosely knit or closely knit. The difference between the idea of an assemblage and that of a group may be brought out by reference to this property. A group, in so far as it is an entity and not simply an abstract set, is a closely knit assemblage of individuals more or less uniformly distributed in the locus of the group. An assemblage is not limited in this way to a closely knit uniform distribution of members. It is consequently the more general conception. A group, indeed, is a particular species of assemblage.

Compared to a concrete assemblage (such as the parts of a machine) or to a group (i.e. a closely knit discrete assemblage) an assemblage which is loosely knit in part or whole appears to be without order. This, I think, is not really so: it is rather "loosely" or "freely" ordered. The characteristic of this order is that spatial relationships between individuals in a given frame of reference are irrelevant, i.e. apart from falling within the locus the position of the members in space does not matter. In this respect such an assemblage differs from a concrete assemblage or a group.

An assemblage exemplifying this sort of order may be technically called a "stroma," after the Greek word for that which is strewn (στρῶμα); the order itself being described as "stromatic." A stroma is therefore defined as a discrete assemblage occupying a definite place within which the members have a definite position but any kind of distribution. It will simplify matters, no doubt, to think of stromas which are homogeneous in composition.

Stromatic order is illustrated when a handful of beans is scattered on the floor. Some of the beans may fall in clusters and others by themselves. A cluster of this kind is what would ordinarily be called a group. The name "cluster" is more appropriate for my purposes as "group" has an abstract mathematical sense as well as an "objective" sense. What determines whether a bean belongs to a cluster? Clearly

its nearness to other beans. But on the scale of a room or larger area all the beans may be said to be near one another, not just the clustered ones; nor are they together as a large cluster. To define a cluster we need a smaller scale—a bean-size scale, in fact. On a bean-size scale only the clustered beans are together; on a room-size scale all the beans are together, and not as a large cluster but as a stroma. Other examples of stromas are the islands in an archipelago or the trees in a park. The need for some such technical word in our vocabulary is shown by the far-fetched analogies to which we may be pressed to express this sort of order in our everyday speech. A group of radio transmitters scattered over the countryside is described as a "network": it is in fact a stroma. A set of shops centrally owned and managed is described as a "chain": it is also a stroma. Neither of these expressions adequately indicates the discreteness of the order referred to.

The idea of a global society of men may now be reconsidered in the light of this conception. The order this assemblage displays at any given moment is not that of a large cluster (or "crowd") but that of a stroma. For it is an assemblage on a global, not on a man-size, scale.

Over a period of time the global assemblage of men is a moving or dynamic assemblage. It moves within limits and irregularly, it is true, but it moves. A dynamic assemblage whose members at any instant constitute a stroma may be called a "sporad," after the Greek σποράς ("spread about"). There were some islands in the Aegean called 'αἱ Σποράδες' by the Ancient Greeks, presumably because of their stromatic distribution. The link with the English word "sporadic" provides a useful overtone of the dynamic to this term.

A purely dynamic sporad would be one whose members are in continuous motion, e.g. the molecules of a gas in a room, or a swarm of bees buzzing round the queen. A human sporad is less energetic than this; its movement is, indeed, "sporadic."

Dynamism, though typical of sporads, need not be confined to them. One can conceive of stromas which are identified or defined by function rather than spatial position. The stroma of iron filings in a pile of metallic chips could be picked out by their movement under the influence of a magnetic field. Similarly there may be functional properties connecting a concrete assemblage of parts in a machine.

Now it is plain that a stroma can be divided up into other assemblages which are stromas of some of the same members, e.g. in an archipelago, those islands with lakes may form one assemblage, those without trees another. Stromas can also be divided up into lesser stromas territorially.

Similar reasoning may be applied to sporads; with this difference, that, as the members of a sporad are moving about from time to time

some other principle for identifying the constituent members than spatial position is required. Identification may be qualitative, functional or nominal (where the individuals are named or particularly described). Thus the global sporad of men may be divided into lesser territorial units until we reach small sporads such as the people on a street or the players in a Rugby match. Dividing the global sporad functionally we may get small units of wide span, such as two people making a transatlantic phone-call. Dividing it genetically or nominally we may find a family unit which is scattered across the world—parents in London, son in South Africa, one daughter in U.S.A. and another in Singapore.

Sporads of this latter kind may be regarded as having a definite duration. A transatlantic call may last three minutes, a family one or two decades. A family can be conceived as a sporad whose span varies from time to time, sometimes forming a cluster, e.g. at mealtimes, sometimes scattered far and wide.

As the individual members of human sporads have a limited lifespan, we have to consider the effect of deaths or births upon a specific sporad, e.g. a family. It is plain enough that from a genetic standpoint there is one absolutely basic sporad, viz. the sexual couple, for this is the only reproductive sporad. If a sporad is identified nominally, it would appear most convenient to regard the sporad as altering or ceasing when a member dies or is born, leaves or is added, on the analogy of a partnership-at-law (in Scotland). But we need not commit ourselves to this assumption in general.

The foregoing analysis falls to be applied to the problems earlier raised. One distinction between solitude and society may now be stated with precision. A man is alone, in the primary sense, when he is not a member of a cluster; nevertheless he is still a member of at least one sporad (the global sporad). A man is "in society," again in the primary sense, when he is a member of a cluster. It is suggested that any further difference there may be between solitude and society is a qualitative difference in feeling and behaviour (after all, a man can be lonely and "alone" in a crowd, though this is not usual). It is to these latter aspects, and to these alone, that we must look in deciding whether the behaviour of a recluse is "solitary" or "social" in some secondary sense.

An attempt may be made to define the nature of an institution. It may be regarded as a sporad of long duration whose membership varies, and which is possibly centred in one particular part of its locus. Alternatively it may be regarded as the form characterizing a certain sporad or succession of sporads.

Finally, an accurate definition of society in the sense in which it is an object of sociological theory may be offered. Society is defined as

the global sporad of men and the lesser sporads into which it can be dissected. Different realms of social theory might be delimited by the sort of sporad they consider, i.e. the type of dissection they make. E.g. social psychology, in contrast with the rest, confines itself to small assemblages of short duration meeting largely as clusters.

Some further applications are given in conclusion.

A difficulty which faces the "organism" theory of society may be stated clearly. An organism is a concrete assemblage of cells, whereas a society is a discrete assemblage of men, displaying sporadic order. This points the contrast even if we ignore the internal differences between a man and a cell.

The concept of the sporad enables us to fix the common element in societies of all kinds, sizes and durations, thus freeing us to concentrate upon qualities of behaviour in social contexts exactly defined. There may, for instance, be a limit to the size of sporad in which the sort of behaviour we call "meeting" or "encountering" takes place. There is an obvious lower limit of two, and some people—Martin Buber is perhaps a case in point—might put the upper limit there as well; certainly the maximum is defined by a large crowd.

The sporad concept may also serve to correct the tendency sociologists might have to identify social with crowd behaviour. Evidently a great deal of economic activity in society is carried on in sporads which are small, and in the isolated parts of the economic sporad.

Perhaps most important, the sporad provides us with an additional conception for organizing the functional relationships of society. The prevalent idea of the nation-state is based on a simple geographical foundation. It may be suggested that this conception is inadequate for the creation of a world community—something which is fast becoming a political necessity. The sporad concept points the way to a personal rather than a territorial conception of political organization, akin to that which existed in medieval Europe. Where law or custom is personal its exact sphere is defined not territorially but by a sporad. So in pre-partition India, where common law, Hindu law, and Islamic law were enforced concurrently, the realms of Hindu and Islamic law respectively could have been defined by the Hindu and the Mohammedan sporad.

The exact character of a religious communion, e.g. the Anglican or the Roman Catholic communion, is that of a sporad. Also the Jewish community—legacy of the Diaspora—is a sporad of global span.

What is the status and significance of the analysis I have presented here? It is not, I think, a positive contribution to sociological knowledge, but rather a negative contribution to what might be called—somewhat pompously—"the logic of society." Its function is elucidatory and propaedeutic. That is all I should want to claim for it. On

the other hand, in fulfilling this function it may have a contribution to make on the practical side, e.g. in the field of political organization or law.

It might be argued, of course, that what I have done is simply to demonstrate the absurdity of atomism carried to its logical conclusion in the only field where it would be really likely to succeed, viz. human society. The man is plainly the social atom, and in this capacity he is strictly indivisible. If from the multiplication of such units we cannot synthesize a flesh-and-blood living society, then the likelihood is that the purely objective empirical approach to the study of society is doomed to failure. The decision of this question depends upon the type of supplementary explanatory concepts we find effective.

(*University of Edinburgh*)

DISCUSSIONS:

I

IS THE DEFINITION OF THE WORD *FACT*[1] THE FIRST PROBLEM OF PHILOSOPHY?

THE word *fact* is one of the most-used words in our language and it occurs in almost every book, especially those on science and philosophy. Yet it is hardly ever defined, and when it is defined, the definition is obviously unsatisfactory. To say that a fact is "whatever is the case," merely transfers the difficulty of discovering what the fact is, to finding what the "case" is, and we are given no instructions as to how this is done. Again, Lord Russell's definition that a fact is: "something that makes a proposition true," is too vague to be helpful.

But the clear definition of the word fact is of the first importance, and a vast amount of confusion arises through neglecting to agree upon a definition, both in philosophy and (to a much lesser extent) in science.

My attention was directed to this problem when I attempted to write an up-to-date book on the method and philosophy of science. Scientists are said to invent hypotheses and theories to account for facts. The hypotheses and theories are transient, and continually being extended or rejected, but the facts remain secure. This seems clear enough until we come across the words *real* and *true*. For one definition of *fact* in the *Concise Oxford Dictionary* is: "the true or existent reality." Now we are continually being told by writers who ought to know better, that, for instance, when we feel the wind blowing gently against our cheeks, this is "really" the irregular impact of an enormous number of molecules, and that when the wind grows hotter, it is "really" because the velocity of the molecules has increased, and so the blows which they give us are more severe and more frequent.

Here we have obvious confusion of a serious kind, for in science, the bombardment of molecules is part of kinetic *theory*, and the molecules themselves are postulates of the atomic *theory*. This bombardment cannot be both reality, (i.e. fact) *and* theory, otherwise it would make nonsense of any distinction between them, and the ordinary account of scientific method would be invalidated.

The first problem of scientific epistemology, and I think, of philosophy also, is therefore to decide what is to be the definition of a *fact*, since the whole edifice of scientific theory is built on facts.

In what follows, I shall try to put before you some suggestions concerning the definition of such words as *fact*, *true*, and *real*, suggestions which I have already made in a recent book called *Science: its Method and its Philosophy*.[2] I shall not make any pretence of having studied all that has been written on this subject, and a good deal of what I shall say has, no doubt, been said before. My hope is to put the matter sufficiently clearly to form some basis for agreement among scientists and philosophers.

What we know I propose to call *events of consciousness*—sensations of sight, sound, taste, smell and touch, together with feelings of various kinds, thoughts, and memories. At the present moment, for example, I am conscious of coloured patches which are automatically interpreted as people in a room: I am

[1] Address delivered at the Annual General Meeting held at University Hall, 14 Gordon Square, W.C.1, on July 15th, 1952.

[2] Allen and Unwin, 1950.

conscious also of sounds interpreted as my own voice, birds outside, and the traffic. I have certain feelings some of which are interpreted as the pressure of my feet on the ground, the clothes on my skin, and so on. These, together with thoughts, are the sort of events of consciousness which are all that we ever know, and we cannot doubt that they occur.

Now, should we call these *facts*? Some people think that we should. Spengler, for example, in what I still think is the most profound book ever written—*The Decline of the West*—defines a fact as "a uniquely occurring impression on a waking being." That is what I have called an event of consciousness.

The reason for rejecting this suggestion is a very strong one, and I want now to consider it. The word *fact* is a symbol, and symbols have arisen through the need for human communication, and human communication takes place almost entirely through the use of words. Consequently if *fact* is to refer to events of consciousness, and is to be useful in communication, we must consider how these can be verbalized.

Suppose a lightning flash occurs. Ought we to say: "I am conscious of a lightning flash," or should we say, as I think Lord Russell recommended many years ago: "A coloured patch occurs."

To deal with this very difficult question, I think we must consider as much of experimental research as seems relevant to it. It is found experimentally that, as regards stimuli through the sense organs, we are not able to distinguish between events if they follow one another with sufficient frequency. Everyone knows that the eye does not see the cutting-off of the light by the shutter of a cinema projector, between the successive different pictures; and as regards the ear, a series of taps merges into a continuous note. The time period involved is round about one-twentieth of a second. Events which are not separated by a time interval greater than this become merged in consciousness. But one-twentieth of a second is a long time when we consider the rapidity with which electrical and chemical changes can occur in nerves and in the brain. If, therefore, we look upon the brain, as we do nowadays, not as an inactive receiver waiting for a stimulus to start it in action, but as a centre of great electrical activity into which the sense organs and body feed stimuli, these stimuli will cause some alteration in the activity; and if further, what we are conscious of is some integrating process with a minimum period which is large compared with the time that electrical changes require to circulate, then what we are aware of would be a mixture of incoming stimulus with activities already present. If this way of looking at it is correct, it would follow that a "pure datum" such as a coloured patch, is never known in consciousness. It is always mixed with other events due to changes already occurring and which have been determined, to some extent at least, by heredity and past history.

It seems, therefore, that we must reject such statements as: "a coloured patch occurs," for the reason that such a pure datum is not given in consciousness.

Also we must reject "I am conscious of a lightning flash" because the symbol "I" does not stand for anything separable in consciousness, for as we have seen, the stimulus and the activity already present are mixed up and we are only conscious of a sort of summation of the two. It is a misleading use of words to set an "I" over against a "datum," such as a coloured patch, or even an "interpreted datum" such as lightning flash. This does not symbolize what is known in consciousness. If it symbolizes anything, it must be an act of introspective analysis made after the event. Those who have relied on analysis and introspection, without experiment, have consequently been led into great confusion over this vital point.

Perhaps then, we should say: "A lightning flash occurs." This certainly indicates that association and interpretation leading to *naming* has taken place. But equally, it shows only too clearly that such statements are not suitable to form the basis of a reliable structure of human knowledge, since it is common experience that our associations and interpretations are sometimes false. The flash of lightning may have been caused by a photographer's flashlight.

Let me repeat this slightly differently in order to make it clearer. Let us suppose that the latest way of regarding the brain as the seat of great activity at all times during life, is correct. Let us cut out as far as possible all effects due to the external world. This can be done to some extent by lying down in a quiet, dark room. We are then conscious of slight pressure effects on our bodies, thumping of the heart, etc., and also changes in the brain itself which we call "thoughts" or "ideas." Our events of consciousness in such a situation might suitably be symbolized by "I." Now imagine opening the eyes and seeing a lightning flash. The lens of the eye undoubtedly throws on the retina an image which we can call a coloured patch, but it is an illusion to suppose that we can be conscious of this. The lightning flash can be shown to last for as short a time as one-two-thousandth of a second, but this is a time interval far too small for conscious discrimination, and a rapid succession of five such flashes, for example, is seen as one flash. What we become conscious of is the interaction of the stimulus with activity already present, so that the final conscious result might be described as *datum* plus *association and interpretation.*

This is a strong reason for not using the word *fact* to symbolize events of consciousness. They are all that we ever know, and we have complete certainty that they occur, but being an indistinguishable mixture of datum plus interpretation, they do not form when verbalized, something absolutely unquestionable such as the word *fact* generally implies.

And in addition, of course, such a definition would be very far from ordinary use.

We turn, therefore, to public knowledge. Human communication, as I have said, apart from grimaces, winks, etc., which we can ignore, is performed by means of symbols called words arranged in certain ways in sentences. Originally the association of words with their referents has to be formed in common symbol-situations, or in similar symbol-situations. The activity and structure of the brain is presumably modified in some way, so that when next the same words are fed into it by nerve impulses from the ear (or eye), the association takes place automatically, and so quickly that we are not conscious of hearing the words and *then* deciding their meaning—we hear and know the meaning simultaneously.

Words and sentences can, of course, be used for other purposes than strict reference. They may be used to produce special effects as in poetry, or sermons, or to indicate the attitude of the speaker to the referent or to the listener, but in considering common knowledge and science in particular, we are almost entirely concerned with sentences which assert or deny something, such as: "the Earth is round"; "there are trees in Hyde Park," and so on. Such sentences, I suggested, should be called *propositions*, and propositions are only *known* to be true if they are verifiable. My suggestion, then, was that the word *fact* should denote *propositions which are verifiable.* This use of the word fact would be closer to its ordinary use in science. What are the facts of chemistry for instance? We take a book on chemistry and find, for example: "Sodium chloride melts at 801° C. Sodium chloride boils at 1750° C. Sodium chloride sublimes at higher temperatures without decomposition." And so on.

These are sentences which assert something that can be verified, and so the ordinary use of the word *facts* for these, agrees with our definition.

Summing up, then, the position once again is this. All we ever know are the events of our own consciousness. We could call these *facts*, but unfortunately they turn out to be composite—not only incoming stimuli but also the effects of these on processes already going on which have been determined to some extent, at any rate, by our past experiences. The result in consciousness is stimulus plus interpretation. But deception and illusions show us that this automatic interpretation may be false. Verbalization of these events of consciousness does not form, therefore, a secure basis for common knowledge.

A further difficulty is that *facts* would symbolize purely private experiences, unshared, unknown, and unverifiable by others.

If, therefore, instead of taking *fact* to refer to the events of private knowledge, the verbal expression of which is liable to error, we take it to refer to the verbal expression of common knowledge, and define it as a proposition that can be verified, then the possibility of error is very greatly diminished. Because although an assertion such as *There are trees in Hyde Park* requires interpretation before verification can occur, and interpretation, as we have seen, is dependent on the past history of each individual and is liable to error, and furthermore, verification itself involves interpretation of visual and tactile stimuli, which are also liable to deception, nevertheless the general agreement of all normal people about the results of verification is the accepted basis of secure knowledge. If all normal people who go to Hyde Park agree that the proposition *There are trees in Hyde Park* is a correct verbal expression of their events of consciousness, then the proposition is verified. We cannot have greater certainty in public knowledge than this. [Note that they cannot agree about their *events of consciousness* when in Hyde Park: no one knows what goes on inside someone else: all they *can* agree on is the *verbal expression*.]

My submission is, then, that the word *fact* should be reserved for what is most reliable in common knowledge, namely, propositions which can be verified.

Corresponding to the powerful noun *fact* is the equally powerful adjective *true*. I suggest that *true* should only be used of verifiable propositions. If a proposition is verifiable it is *known* to be true. Propositions such as *There are trees on Mars* which may be true, but are not *known* to be true, are hypotheses.

In conclusion I must deal briefly with criticisms of this definition.

The reviewer in our journal PHILOSOPHY says the definition means that a fact is a mere string of words. This, of course, is as misleading as saying that a motor-car is a mere string of steel, rubber and other parts. A fact is an arrangement of words so as to make an assertion that can be verified. I may add that more than one philosopher has told me that my definition is wrong, but when I write to ask these philosophers what *their* definition is, no reply comes to my letter.

Another objection concerns historical statements. It is obvious that assertions of the type *Napoleon I died at St. Helena* cannot now be verified. All we can verify now are propositions such as:

(1) Many people assert their belief in the proposition.

(2) A very large number of books are concerned with the life and death of a person called Napoleon I, and state the proposition.

(3) In store-rooms of libraries and museums old documents and letters can be seen, signed Napoleon, in the same handwriting.

(4) A magnificent tomb of red porphyry in Paris is stated to be that of Napoleon I,

and so on.

If a man doubts any of these facts, a symbol-situation can be arranged in which he can only maintain his doubt by denying the evidence of his senses or

the accepted meanings of words. This is not true of the original proposition *Napoleon I died at St. Helena.* There is no situation we can arrange now to prove it. It is, therefore, an unverifiable proposition which I call a hypothesis. Napoleon I is a term symbolizing a hypothetical person invented to account for facts, the facts being such as I have mentioned (about the documents, tomb, etc.).

Those who do not like to think of Napoleon as a hypothetical person invented to account for facts, should consider historical figures a little further off. King Arthur, for instance—rather doubtful? or Homer—very doubtful!—we just don't know whether Homer stands for one person or several. But where is the iron curtain between Napoleon and Homer, making one certain and the other uncertain? Of course there is none. Our belief in these hypothetical persons varies with the amount of evidence and the time that has elapsed since their death. Calling historical events hypotheses allows for the great variation in the strength of our belief in them—very strong in the case of *Napoleon I died at St. Helena* and very weak in the case of *Homer wrote the Iliad.*

It is, however, important in historical studies to differentiate between hypotheses as to what occurred in the past, and hypotheses as to the causes or motives behind what occurred in the past, and I suggest we might introduce a new term *historical-fact* to denote statements like "Napoleon I was defeated at Waterloo." It is historical-facts like these which a historian may try to explain by means of hypotheses.

This suggestion has caused some confusion, and I have been accused of distinguishing between two different kinds of fact, when, of course, the distinction is between two kinds of *hypothesis*—hypotheses as to what were events of history, and hypotheses as to what were the causes of these events. Perhaps the suggestion was unfortunate, but I made it because I did not expect to be able to persuade historians to drop the word *fact* altogether, and I thought that by tacking the word *historical* on to it (historical-fact) a clear distinction would be made between events of history (which are subject to doubt of varying degree) and facts (which cannot be denied without either denying the evidence of the senses or the accepted meaning of words)[1].

But the strongest reason for the reluctance of many philosophers to accept the definition of a fact that I have suggested, arises, I think, through some unanalysed belief in Reality with a capital R. In some way they think the word *fact* applies to it—something that makes a proposition true. But although all of us, no doubt, believe there is an "external world" which is the cause of many of our events of consciousness, what this external world is, is just what we want to find out. If this external world is "what is the case" then we must not call it *fact,* because it is the least certain part of our knowledge and not the most certain, as the common use of the word fact implies.[2]

The most certain parts of our knowledge are our events of consciousness, and, for the reasons I have mentioned, I do not think it would be satisfactory to call these facts. But we could call them *real.*

The use of the words *real, fact* and *true* would then be as follows:

All we ever know are our own events of consciousness: these are *real,* and

[1] I should, perhaps, record that one historian of my acquaintance admitted at once that, strictly speaking, there were no facts of history (except statements such as those in 1 to 4 above).

[2] It only causes confusion to say: "The universe is full of facts that we don't know." We are discussing human knowledge, and human knowledge is what human beings know—not what they don't know. Of course we can invent any number of assertions, some of which may later turn out to be verifiable (such as "There are trees on Mars"), but until they are verified, they are not *known* to be true, and consequently cannot be used in raising a structure of reliable human knowledge.

it cannot be doubted that they occur. Unfortunately they are the consequence of association and interpretation in the brain, so that when verbalized for communication to another person, they may not be accepted, and consequently do not supply a foundation for a reliable structure of common knowledge. They should not, therefore, be called facts. If, however, we use *fact* to denote an assertion that can be verified, we are using it to denote something on which a reliable and progressive structure of common knowledge can be raised, and such an assertion might then be called *true*. This is the definition which I think is implicit in scientific method, and as this method has proved to be the only successful method for enlarging human knowledge, my suggestion is that we should agree to adopt it openly and explicitly.

It only remains to show that the clear definition of the word *fact* is the first problem of philosophy—or, indeed, of any activity which involves rational thought. If in reasoning we make great use of the word, and we do, all the time, then it is important that it should have only one meaning, and that a clear one. Three meanings of the word *fact* have been discussed. It is sometimes used for events of consciousness; sometimes for assertions of common knowledge that all normal people could verify; sometimes for the supposed external cause of everything ("whatever is the case"; "Reality"). The first is private knowledge; the second is common knowledge of as great certainty as can be achieved by human beings; the third is hypothesis.

A word of universal use, carrying such different meanings, cannot be used in rational thinking and argument without causing immense confusion. That is why all who hope to use reason fruitfully must make it their first duty to agree upon a clear definition of the word *fact*.

C. Burniston Brown, M.Sc., Ph.D.

(*University College, London*)

II

MODERN COSMOLOGY AND THE CONCEPT OF GOD[1]

The late Professor E. A. Milne was one of the leading mathematical physicists of his time. His later work was much concerned with the foundations of physical theory and he considered that he had gone a long way towards the promotion of physical laws to the status of *theorems* in a purely deductive system. In his concern about this possible significance of his work he showed himself to be a true "natural philosopher." The present book gives a description of the work itself and a discussion of the significance he claimed for it in regard to the nature of physical laws and also in regard to the wider fields of thought indicated by the title.

The book consists of the Edward Cadbury Lectures in the University of Birmingham for the year 1950. Milne's sudden death, at the early age of fifty-four, occurred only a few days after he had finished writing them and before they had been delivered. We are indebted to Dr. G. J. Whitrow for editing Milne's manuscript and to the publishers for the (under present conditions) speedy appearance of the lectures in print.

The title of the book is liable to be misleading on account of its adjectives. We shall refer later to the use of "Christian." As regards cosmology, that treated here is what Milne calls his own brand. Beyond a few passing criticisms, the reader will look in vain for any account of "modern" cosmology in general because Milne declared that he had no faith in theories other than his own. Moreover, Milne's cosmology will be seen to comprise the whole of fundamental physics and not to be merely an application of accepted terrestrial physics to the large-scale behaviour of the universe.

The book is, in fact, a general descriptive account of Milne's *kinematic relativity* presented with particular attention to the questions of significance mentioned above. Milne had brought together his researches in this subject in his two well-known books *Relativity, Gravitation and World Structure* (Oxford, 1935) and *Kinematic Relativity* (Oxford, 1948), but the present book is the only existing comprehensive account that is mainly of a non-mathematical character. It should be said at once that as such it is a brilliant exposition of a brilliant scientific achievement—though a highly controversial one. It will be welcomed by the many scientists and philosophers who have long wished to know what kinematic relativity is without having to master its mathematical techniques. It will be welcomed, too, by those who have some acquaintance with the mathematical treatment but who wish to see the subject as a whole and also to know what were Milne's latest views on its merits.

Kinematic relativity is an alternative to other relativity theories and, in particular, to Einstein's theory of general relativity. From the outset, the formulation is different from that of these other theories. The following is a somewhat crude but, one believes, not misleading sketch: Observers are supposed to be equipped with the equivalents of "clocks" and "radar-sets," these being initially uncalibrated. Using no other equipment, any two observers, A, B, can (under certain general conditions) agree upon a calibration of their clocks which may be said to render them congruent.[2] Calibrating their radar-sets in accordance with this calibration of their clocks, A and B can then use their equipment in the standard way to assign epochs and distances

[1] *Modern Cosmology and the Christian Idea of God*, by E. A. Milne. (Clarendon Press, Oxford. 1952. Pp. 160. Price 21s.)

[2] This part of the work was expounded by Milne in his paper "A modern conception of time," *Philosophy* **25** (1950) 68.

to any observed events, and the law of transformation from the values assigned by either observer to those assigned by the other can be determined. A *general* third observer cannot calibrate his clock so as to be congruent to both A's and B's after these have been calibrated as stated. Nevertheless, Milne shows that there does in fact exist (in a mathematical sense) an infinity of observers each of which is congruent to any other.

Milne then studies a theoretical model universe in which such an "equivalence," as he calls it, constitutes the set of fundamental observers, these being identified with observers attached to the nuclei of the galaxies. He then postulates that the model universe satisfies the cosmological principle with regard to these observers, i.e. each of them sees the same "world-picture" as any other. He also postulates that the mathematical statement of any natural law must take the same form for each such observer. I think there is no doubt that he does require this, though his use of it in his later presentations of his work was less explicit than in the earlier ones.

The requirements that Milne thus imposes on his model universe are kinematical in character. Obviously they place restrictions upon the possible behaviour of the contents of this universe. The interesting thing is that Milne's mathematical treatment shows one of these restrictions to be such as we should normally describe by saying that the contents of the universe obey an inverse square law of gravitation. Thus he claims to have *deduced* the existence of such gravitation. He makes further deductions which need not be mentioned here.

In the second stage of his work, Milne looks for mathematical relations that bear a general resemblance to the laws of dynamics and which conform to his postulates. In particular, they must take the same form when we pass from their expression in terms of quantities assigned by one fundamental observer to those assigned by another. It then appears that Milne can write down effectively only one set of equations which play the part of the laws of dynamics in his model universe. So he says that these *are* the laws and he claims to have deduced them as theorems instead of having to take them as empirical laws of Nature. His treatment of electrodynamics is similar. (I do not think that Milne has in fact established the uniqueness of his results, but this is a problem outside the scope of the present review.)

The fundamental difference between Milne's procedure and the traditional procedure is now evident. The latter starts with laws of nature (whether they be framed as empirical laws, hypotheses, or postulates) and seeks to infer the behaviour of the universe. The laws are not regarded as being determined in any explicit way by the actual contents of the universe. On the other hand, Milne starts with the universe (as he postulates it) and seeks to infer the laws of nature. For him, the laws are determined explicitly by the contents of the universe.

Which procedure is to be preferred? Both are open to *a posteriori* criticisms, of which probably the most serious are these. The traditional procedure yields infinitely many "possible" universes, whereas a wholly satisfactory procedure would be expected to yield the actual universe as the only possible one. Milne's theory applies to only one universe, the model from which he starts and which he must identify with the actual universe if the theory is to have any physical significance. There is, of course, a serious difficulty in knowing why we should start from this model, but the more serious one for the moment is that his whole procedure would collapse unless the actual universe is *exactly* like his model. In particular, his mathematical treatment is impossible unless the universe conforms strictly to his cosmological principle.

Now most cosmologists believe that the universe does conform to the cosmological principle *in the large*, or, as we may say, statistically. But it

manifestly does not conform in detail. Indeed, were it to conform strictly, it is difficult to see that there would be any requirement for laws of nature, since such laws are normally required in order to predict the behaviour of local physical systems whose very existence denotes a departure from uniformity in the universe.

Following out these ideas, the answer to our question appears to be that neither procedure is to be preferred and that the only hope of progress is in a combination of both. A physical law is in general a proposition about local irregularities in the universe; without these irregularities there would be no requirement for the law; but the "constants" in the law, the form of the law, and even the fact that we can have a law, may depend upon the large-scale uniformity of the universe. If this is true, traditional physics fails to reach the fundamental basis of its laws because it does not take account of their dependence upon the actual contents of the universe; Milne's theory fails because it excludes the systems for which the laws are required. (The reviewer believes that Milne's theory has proceeded somewhat further than we should have expected because of certain implicit departures from the programme which he lays down for it.) The most promising procedure appears to be to try to develop the subject from both ends and then to try to render the two developments consistent with each other. The hope is to find that they can be made consistent but only in one way and that this unique theoretical possibility corresponds to the unique actual universe of experience. Until some such hope is realized, we may expect to make a certain amount of progress by the application of either procedure separately provided we recognize its limitations.

All this discussion suggests various comments upon Milne's present book. Undoubtedly, the discovery it records of what one has termed Milne's procedure is a major contribution to thought upon the subject. Our discussion should show why Milne includes so much of physics that is not usually treated under the heading of cosmology; for him, cosmology leads to physics, and not physics to cosmology. But if the argument of this review is valid, much of other current cosmological theory is complementary to Milne's; it is much to be regretted that he viewed it as incompatible with his ideas and dismissed it so unsympathetically.

Here it should be mentioned that the conception of a dependence of the laws of physics upon the actual contents of the universe is held to have originated with Mach, as Milne fully acknowledges. The only other general contribution to which he makes sympathetic reference is that of Eddington. But, except in a very broad sense, there is little in common between Milne's and Eddington's ideas. Actually the cosmology proposed in 1948 by H. Bondi and T. Gold may be regarded as belonging to the same general category as Milne's, but Milne appeared not to appreciate this aspect of their contribution.

It has seemed to the reviewer that the most useful service he can perform is to attempt to state what Milne's theory is and to assess its relationship to other theories. The reviewer does not forget that Milne's first two chapters are a general discussion of "the problem of the origin of the laws of nature." But this discussion covers ground that must be much more familiar than the rest of the book to readers of *Philosophy*.

Still less does the reviewer forget that Milne's theme in this book is "the relationship between Cosmology and Christianity to-day." But Milne asks, "Was not God a geometer to Plato?" and it seems to the reviewer that most of Milne's own thought led him by a fresh route to only the same conclusion. This is, of course, very remote from the Christian idea of God. It is only to be expected that such must be the case since Milne is for the most part concerned with the domains of thought most remote from those to which the idea

naturally belongs. Milne writes in his closing paragraph that "in a larger synthesis one must tread outside these limits" (of the domain of pure physics). One may suppose that he would claim only to have taken here a first step towards this synthesis. It happens that the main point to which this review calls attention in the domain of cosmology is the gain to be expected from the meeting of developments that start from two extremes in the subject. In that connection one could not help regretting Milne's disinclination to take this view. In the domain of knowledge of God we hope also to profit from the meeting of ideas that have widely different origins. In this case, the book supplies every indication that Milne would concur.

W. H. McCrea.

(*University of London*)

III

GOD AND NATURE

God and Nature. By G. F. Stout. Edited by A. K. Stout with a memoir by John Passmore. (Cambridge Press. Pp. 339. Price 30s.)

Ten years elapsed between the delivery of the late Professor G. F. Stout's Gifford Lectures and the publication of the first volume which he based upon them. That volume, entitled *Mind and Matter,* was not a transcription of any part of the original course but an independent work setting out afresh the views advanced by the author on some of the topics discussed in the lectures. It was notable especially for its refutation of materialism and for a suggestive, but not in my view altogether plausible, account of causality inclining to a somewhat animistic view of Nature. The former has rarely been rivalled and gives the first volume a permanent importance for students of philosophy. In the course of developing his views the author made it plain that there was implicit in them for him the more positive notion of "one universal and eternal Mind developing and expressing itself in the world of finite and changeable beings." It was his intention to set out these ideas also in an independent work; but, anticipating that the project might not be carried out, he also left instructions with his son, Professor A. K. Stout, to prepare the appropriate parts of the original course for publication in the event of the work to be based upon them not being available at the author's death. It is thus the parts of the lecture course that were not absorbed into *Mind and Matter* that appear now under the title *God and Nature,* and it is a tribute both to the lectures themselves and to the skill of the editor that there are only one or two points, the scanty discussion of self-identity for example, where the reader is likely to feel the absence of the balance and unity appropriate to a book.

In addition to the lectures themselves the book contains an editorial Preface, where filial piety is all the more impressive because of its restraint, together with a memoir of the author by Professor John Passmore and a list of Stout's publications. The first part of the memoir outlines the main stages of Stout's career and provides a charming and intimate picture of the manner of man he was. The second part offers an assessment of Stout's achievement which should be of considerable value to students of psychology and philosophers alike.

To turn to the lectures; it is evident to Stout that his argument will not get under way at all unless it be established that the universe has an ultimate all-inclusive unity. His attention is thus first engaged with the notion of the unity of the universe and the prospect we have of discovering something worth knowing about it. The subject is broached with a characteristic appeal to view topics of this sort "in a dry light"; and after wise and timely observations on the kind of neutrality appropriate to the enquiry, including shrewd exposure of the disguised prejudices of the confirmed sceptic as well as of the open dogmatism of believers, Stout brings us to one of his main contentions, namely that if the universe has a unity its nature cannot be as completely hidden from us as Spencer and others suppose. This is on the ground that the nature of a part must give some indication of the nature of the whole. Knowledge so obtained may be not only incomplete but also equivocal in the scholastic sense, Stout having obviously much sympathy with the scholastic

view provided it be not interpreted in too sceptical a sense. But such knowledge is also of first importance to us despite its limitations, and it would be much more misleading to repudiate it than to accept it cautiously. This does not mean, as some idealists have supposed, that if we knew all about the flower in the crannied wall we would know all about God and man. Stout has some very pertinent comments to make on that kind of idealism—"the clue supplied by any one part is only partial" (p. 41 cf. also pp. 224–230). His view is the much more modest one that "we must start from the nature of finite beings and discount as irrelevant what presupposes or follows from their limitations and defects" (p. 32). I doubt, however, whether Stout has done full justice to the more sceptical views he rejects. He notes Spencer's argument that "the unknowable is unknowable because it is absolute in the sense of being unrelated, whereas 'to know is to relate' " (p. 26), and he comments that "if anything is unrelated to what we know, we can have no ground for asserting that it exists at all." This is plausible at first sight, but it does not seem to take due account of the uniqueness of our knowledge of God. It is the radical imperfection in the very process of relating terms that compels us to postulate some other more absolute or transcendent kind of unity for the universe as a whole. In *this* context it is not pertinent to insist, as Stout does in warning us away from the more cautious, and in my view more discerning, forms of the scholastic view, that "we cannot know how A is related to B without, *pro tanto*, knowing how B is related to A" (p. 28). This misses the peculiarity of the necessity of thinking of a unity of the universe as a whole. One is thus not surprised to find Stout later rejecting the traditional notion of absolute creation. Matter, he contends, "is fundamentally co-ordinate with mind" (p. 231). The Universal Mind is "all-powerful over matter" since matter is "transparent" to it, but it does not create matter. But the traditional view, with its corresponding stress on revelation, seems to me nearer the truth here, and for that reason I doubt also the appositeness of the designation of God, in any strict sense, as a Universal Mind. Must He not be more than that? But this is to go ahead too quickly.

To indicate further how he himself understands the notion of an all-inclusive Universe of Being, Stout next dissociates his own position sharply from that of Hegel. He accepts the substance of Russell's criticism of Hegel when the former accuses Hegel and his followers, Bradley and Bosanquet, of proceeding, by way of a false identification of incompleteness with self-contradiction, to the conclusion that everything short of the one Real Being is unreal or illusory. The reality and distinctness of finite beings must not be jeopardized, they are not to be "merged and lost" in the unity of the whole. But Russell in turn is accused of overlooking the "obviously fragmentary character of everything short of the whole," the close discussion of Russell's theory of knowledge being one of the most valuable parts of the book. It includes a lucid exposition of the "theory of acquaintance" and "knowledge by description," together with criticism based on the view that we can only pass from particulars to knowledge about them if the former are known in the first instance as essentially incomplete. This leads to a discussion of the relation of universals and particulars in the course of which Stout's celebrated theory of universals as distributive unities, developed more fully in his essays, is concisely stated, but without doing much to remove its considerable difficulties. The universal is thought to be a unity of its instances, including possible as well as actual instances, and the essential dependence of the possible on the actual is stressed in a consideration especially of hypothetical and disjunctive statements. The notion that there are no particulars which do not involve universals and call for completion in some unity beyond themselves

prepares the way for a more direct account of the nature of the external world and our knowledge of it.

The key-stone here for Stout is "common sense and science." In ordinary life we assume that "the material world includes a vast system of things having extension, figure, relative position and motion in space, which exist, change their nature and relations and causally interact, quite independently of being perceived by individual minds such as ours. On the other hand, we are in the first instance conversant with this world only by way of sense-perception" (p. 112). The latter "includes, besides much that is logically inference, a certain nucleus which is not acquired, but is primary" (p. 118). The main problem is to determine what this "primary sense knowledge," primary in a logical but not of necessity psychological sense, must be in order to yield knowledge of the material world which we all take for granted in ordinary thought and conduct. The notion that "what we primarily perceive is merely our own sensa" is rejected on the grounds that, even if we suppose, with the Neo-realist, that the immediate contents of sense experience may exist unperceived, the latter could not constitute or even be included "as parts or partial phases" in a strictly physical system. Although sensa are ultimately thought to be material and not mental they fall outside the physical order. For not only do we have sense presentations in dreams and hallucinations without any physical body, but all such presentations are subject to perpetual variations which cannot be ascribed to physical things. It seems thus that while we are only in touch with physical things by sense experience the contents of sense experience are no part of the physical world. In further rejection of the phenomenalist alternative to this obviously difficult view there is advanced the well-known argument that an account of physical things in terms of permanent possibilities of sensation, even "in Russell's elaborate and novel development of the Berkeley-Mill theory," is bound to use the "language of independent physical things" at some point. This is well stated, but again, in my view, not in a way which precludes a sufficiently persistent and careful phenomenalist from avoiding this particular inconsistency. Difficulties due to incompatibilities between immediate tactual and visual sensations, together with similar variations within the same sense, are also stressed; and the Berkeleyan notion that we need only take tangible extension to be physically real is shown to fail in the same way. At the same time Berkeley is warmly applauded for the view that in sense experience we have contact with material reality, the author being not unwilling to describe himself as a Neo-Berkeleyan and claiming that his view, in this respect, is unavoidable if due regard is to be had to common sense. The plain man believes that he has direct access to material facts in sense experience. But how can we defer to the plain man here and deny to sense presentations a place in the physical system?

Stout's answer is in terms of "a mode of knowing which involves neither inference nor direct acquaintance with what is known" but in which "the place of premises is ultimately (taken by) the essential incompleteness of what is immediately experienced, which cannot be known at all unless in knowing it we know something else connected with it" (p. 134). Other examples of this mode of knowing, adduced to show that it is not introduced *ad hoc* to solve one problem only, are knowledge of universals, the relating of images to the impressions they represent, memory knowledge, knowledge of time relations and knowledge of the relations of premises and conclusion in an inference. None of these seem to me quite to suit the purpose, it being particularly questionable whether in knowing an image we *ipso facto* "know it as the image of an impression." But once this mode of knowing is admitted the way is open for Stout to hold

that in apprehending the sense presentation as essentially incomplete we have thereby some knowledge also of physical reality beyond it, knowledge which we can then proceed to make more precise by correlations of the data of sense.

It seems then that "the physical fact must be primarily and primitively apprehended as connected in nature and existence with the perceptual sensum" (p. 144). These "are more or less akin in nature. The sensum is akin to the physical fact as being of a piece with it. The sensum is the continuation within our immediate experience of something which is not immediately experienced. The physical object is thought of as the prolongation of the content of immediate experience into a region beyond it" (p. 145). This seems to do justice to both of the assumptions of the plain man, namely that in sense knowledge he knows physical facts, which are not thus merely inferred from immediate sensa, and that "what he primarily knows is what he immediately experiences." In this way we can "harmonize common sense with itself and with philosophical analysis" (p. 146).

In terms of this view there is provided next a detailed and fascinating account of the way our knowledge of the physical world is made determinate. In identifying physical objects much depends on the presence or absence of subjective control of what we immediately experience. This process and the part played in it by organic sensibility is carefully described, Stout making important use again of the notion which figured so prominently in *Mind and Matter*, namely that of varying degrees of "effort against resistance" in our contact with physical things. Discussion of the correlation of the data which are found to be external leads to an original account of causation and of the relations of primary and secondary qualities, in the course of which a great deal is said that can stand independently of the particular view of the external world which it is intended to subserve here. I shall not attempt to summarize these highly ingenious central chapters in an already lengthening review. But it seems to me that Stout had a particular flair for dealing with topics of this kind and I warmly commend his treatment of them to students of perception. Whether they agree or not they cannot but find the discussion extremely suggestive. The culmination of much in this part of the volume comes in a short but crucial chapter on "the status of sensa." We are here reminded of the "thorough-going distinction between sense-experience and physical objects, and also their continuity of existence and community of nature" (p. 197). The question then arises of the relation between these two. On this vital question, however, we are told little beyond the affirmation that sense presentations belong to the material world ultimately "as part to whole." For a mind that knew the whole material world "there would be only one immensely complex sensum, having a unity and continuity analogous to the unity and continuity of the content of our own sense experience. But for us only a tiny fragment of the whole is existentially present" (p. 198). Beyond this the author does not take us, and the chapter in question is tantalizingly short. For it is just here that the main questions arise. How can entities so distinct be also continuous in nature, and is it not a very far cry from common sense at any rate to suppose that we apprehend material reality in dreams and hallucinations, the more so in view of the radical distinction between sense contents of all kinds and physical things? Can we also avoid ascribing to the contents of sense experience some location in the one Space with the physical objects with which they are alleged to have such continuity of nature? The relation of part to whole in itself may not require this, but taken in conjunction with the peculiarity of spatial relations and of sense contents, it is far from obvious that they need not all be included in one spatial system. On the other hand, to assume that they are so included raises other very

grave problems, to my mind insuperable ones. But even if these and kindred problems are not insuperable we seem at the very least to have a curious duplication of entities which, by their invitation of the use of a celebrated razor, cast much suspicion on the theory as a whole and on the genuineness of the difficulties it is designed to meet, notably the alleged incoherence of phenomenalism.

A complaint I should like to voice especially is that Stout seems to pass far too easily from the contention, with which I entirely agree, that what is immediately experienced is "essentially incomplete" to his own view of the sort of completion it requires. To argue against Russell that the particular contents of experience cannot be a source of further knowledge unless "in knowing them we know something else"—this is one thing. But it is another to jump to conclusions about physical objects altogether distinct from sense contents. That we cannot "construct a bridge" from atomic data to our knowledge of things seems very true, but it leaves open the question what sort of system is involved in knowledge of the external world. Subsidiary arguments based on the incompatibilities in the way an object is presented to different senses and on the interdependence of primary and secondary qualities (p. 193) seem to me equally inconclusive where the question what sort of independence belongs to physical things is concerned. They do not preclude us from viewing this independence in terms of a completer systematizing of the sense contents themselves. The dichotomy of sense contents and physical things within the one material world seems thus unnecessary, to say nothing of a nest of new problems it engenders.

The last stage of the central argument of the book is reached with the insistence that the immediate contents of sense experience, although presumed for the reasons noted to be material, nonetheless depend on the mind. Several arguments are adduced here. The first proceeds from affinities between the senses to the conclusion that those types of sensa, visual ones for example, which might be thought capable of existing independently, together with those whose status seems uncertain—warmth, smells, taste and sounds—must share the obvious dependence on experience of organic sensa like tickles, cramps, and nausea. The second stresses the peculiarly intimate relation of the contents of sense experience to subjective states like pleasure and pain, while a third argument turns on the similarities of mental images, taken to be patently mind dependent, and other impressions. The position as a whole is reinforced by urging that introspection is not, in the case of sight for instance, a wholly reliable guide here; for we may well be led to ascribe to the impression itself the sort of independence which only belongs properly to the object of which it makes us aware. But once it is established that sensa are mind dependent there seems to be an easy transition to the view that the other elements of the material world which are held to be continuous in Nature with sensa must likewise depend on some mind. We thus arrive, by a route reminiscent of that taken by Green in his account of the Spiritual Principle in Nature, at a view of the system of nature as a whole as involving a single Universal Mind. But it must be added that our guide is much more subtle in argument and more lively than Green, albeit apt to stumble into similar equivocations about the externality of nature.

From the argument I have outlined Stout next turns, in the remaining third of the volume, to "other lines of enquiry" which he himself considers to be the most important, albeit he treats them somewhat more scantily here. These begin with an examination of the origin of mind, it being presumed to have been established in *Mind and Matter* that mind cannot owe its existence to anything not mental. The last assumption, taken in connection with the

view, which seems to me beyond question, that minds such as ours derive from some source beyond themselves, yields the conclusion that our minds must have "their source in mind which already exists" (p. 210). A survey of various forms of mind-stuff theories and monadologies results in the view that, even if we postulate minds other than those now associated with animal organisms, we cannot stop short at a multitude of finite minds, these being themselves derivative. "The unity of the universe" thus points again to the notion "of one underived and universal mind." But this argument will not convince those who dispute the conclusions of the earlier volume.

A study of the concomitance of brain processes and mental processes, in the course of which we are warned not to overlook the further correlation of these with sense presentations, already claimed to be a portion of matter known "intuitively as it is in itself," together with note of the psychophysical conditions of mental dispositions, is taken to reinforce further "the universal correlation of mind and matter" (p. 238) so central to Stout's main contentions. Likewise, an investigation of the problem of "other minds" brings us to the view that, while we are bound to know other persons in knowing ourselves, we are aware of others, not by inference in the first instance, but through "a primary demand for psychical existence beyond the self, founded on the essential incompleteness of the finite individual" (p. 248). This is parallel to the "demand for causal connection founded on the essential incompleteness of temporal occurrences" (p. 248), and as it cannot "be met by positing the existence of any finite individual or group of finite selves" (p. 257), the conclusion follows for Stout that our knowledge of other minds requires the existence of a Universal Mind. There seems to me, however, to be some gap in the argument which passes from "the incompleteness of the finite individual" to a "primary demand for psychical existence"—why of necessity psychical? The latter notion also presents grave problems of its own. Can it be understood, for example, apart from some intuition of other particular minds, a view to which there are well-known objections? If not, it seems rather abstract and remote from the actual knowledge of other minds in which it is supposed to be involved. Stout's arguments against the inference theory have in my view been met by Professor Price (cf. *Philosophy*, October 1938), but much that he says on this head, including a reference to primitive animism reminiscent of the earlier volume, retains its interest for the subject.

It remains to mention arguments of a more general sort, already familiar from the literature of idealism. From the insistence that cognitive unity, being a knowledge of unity, involves as its ultimate correlate the unity of the universe, we are brought, *via* an admirable presentation of the essentials of idealism in the last chapter but one, to the view that unity of interest and striving requires the inclusion of these in "the self-complete unity of a universal good" (p. 309). I will not go here into the well-known difficulties of this view, except to mention the problem, which Stout does little to alleviate, of accounting in terms of it for deliberate wrong-doing. But some further note must be taken of the way Stout conceives of the Universal Mind which he posits in these various ways.

Stout deals expressly with this topic in Chapter XIV which should prove exceptionally helpful because it sets out very clearly matters which have only been vaguely mooted by others. It is plain that for him "universal" is not altogether an apt designation here. For there is no intention of holding that individual minds are in any way parts of some other mind or capable of being absorbed into it. On the contrary the emphasis is on the distinctness of finite minds and the reality of temporal processes. The peculiarly indivisible unity of a mind is stressed. "Eternal," a term which is also used but less

frequently, is thus in some respects apter, although it has some other implications which Stout would not favour. Stout holds that the Universal Mind must be "without beginning or end" and "without change or succession." It knows and determines the whole system of nature. But in knowing the past and future God knows it *as* past and future, the temporal distinction being as real for Him as for us. Neither can He will what is contradictory. For example, He cannot will that our choices should be free and also determine our conduct. He is the originator of other minds but He does not create matter, matter and mind being essentially collateral. Such a theory has obvious advantages and helps us in some ways to reach a more consistent religious view. It rids us of some of the paradoxes to which a more absolutist or transcendental conception of God commits us, there being limits set to the way we must speak of His power and control over other reality. It also affords a plausible account of our knowledge of Him. For we know Him, on the present view, as essentially akin in nature to ourselves. He is a Mind as we are minds. This does not mean that we can "realize in thought or imagination" what the difference between His Mind and ours "positively means." "There is here a legitimate place for a critical and cautious agnosticism" (p. 223), our analogies being very imperfect. But there is also much that we can safely affirm on the basis of the identity of His nature, as mind, with ours. Nonetheless, alluring though this prospect is, it appears to me that we must abandon it and forswear the simplification of the problem of our knowledge of God which it ultimately involves. The price to be paid for restricting the dimensions of the problem is seen most sharply in the rejection of the notion of God as absolute creator of matter. This is as opposed to religious feeling as to the thought which brings us, in the first instance, logically if not psychologically, to the idea of God. For it is the inherently derivative character of all finite being as such, as opposed to the specific incompleteness we trace, and partially reduce, in the structure of things as we find them, that induces us to posit an ultimate unity of all being; and it is doubtful whether the demand for unification, in the form presupposed and partially met in ordinary thought or science, can stand without the more radical, if less intelligible, unity involved in the very being of anything, not excluding rational relations. Stout never seems to pass beyond the former, indebted though he is to Thomism; and so the emphasis on "essential incompleteness" is not understood in the way which leads most directly to religion and accords with its spirit. These matters have been much stressed of late in theological writings of various sorts and in religious philosophy. One wonders whether Stout would have modified his idealism further if he had written later.

These comments must not be taken to imply disagreement with Stout's insistence on the distinctness and reality of finite beings. He makes it plain, as others have done, that there is no solution of problems by denying inescapable facts in that way. But neither can we avoid some kind of absolutism in our thought about God. Even to say that He knows and wills may be misleading although it may be yet more misleading, in some sense, to deny this. How these and kindred paradoxes are to be treated is not a subject we can consider to any purpose in closing a review. It constitutes the crucial problem of the philosophy of religion in the interesting phase it has reached to-day. But one thing seems certain, namely that particular note must be taken of religious experience and of revelation as a way in which Supreme Reality finds distinctive embodiment in finite facts. Stout himself speaks with great respect of religious experience and represents his own task, in his philosophy of religion, as that of providing a theory consistent with such practice. He insists that "the cogency [of the experience] can be appreciated

only in experiencing it" (p. 255). But all this fits very loosely into Stout's system. It is by no means plain why a unique and mysterious experience is required, there is certainly no absolute mystery for him. The mysteries he allows are super-imposed on what we know independently of God, whereas they seem to me essential at all points. This implies that Stout's enterprise as a whole is doubtful, as is all purely natural theology, although we are not precluded from using much that he says in another way. That appears to me the main significance of the failure and radical artificiality of arguments such as those adduced so skilfully and ingeniously by Stout in support of the notion of a Universal Mind. They seem curiously irrelevant at the properly religious level and far removed from the pressing realities of the religious life. Nor could there be a plainer reflection of this than the definition of religious experience as "an emotional and conative attitude towards the whole of being" (p. 255). It may be this, but something essential seems to be lost in such generality. Religious experiences are specific and peculiar, and it is much better to speak of them in the plural. In considering further how we should think about them, and what patterns they present in themselves and in their relations to other events, there is a great deal that we can learn from a lucid and careful presentation of idealism such as we have in this book. But we shall also go far astray in religion if we do not begin with the sort of mystery which cannot be properly comprehended in any form of rational idealism.

I must, however, hasten to add that sympathy with the sort of criticism I have just been making should not diminish our appreciation of the worth of this book. *God and Nature* is a worthy successor to *Mind and Matter* and it should rank high among volumes of *Gifford Lectures*. Those who have no taste for speculation or religious philosophy will find the book a mine of suggestions for the study of perception and the "mind-body problem."

H. D. Lewis.

(*University College of North Wales*)

PHILOSOPHICAL SURVEY

PHILOSOPHY IN FRANCE

Some few years ago Henri Gouhier published a book under the title of *La philosophie et son histoire*; now, to complete the balance in a manner typical of the style of its author, comes *L'histoire et sa philosophie* (Vrin, Paris). The history in question is, in fact, primarily the history of "philosophy," though M. Gouhier makes by the way many remarks of interest and concern to the "philosophy of history" in the more general sense of that somewhat dubious phrase. It is above all, however, with the problems of how to study, recount and teach the philosophies, or philosopher's views, of the past that he is concerned. What are the differences between the histories of philosophies, or philosophical systems, of philosophers, of philosophy itself (the *philosophia perennis*), of *weltanschauungen*, in the Diltheyan sense of particular "types" of philosophy, and of *visions du monde*, that is to say the world-views of particular philosophers? How far are these different histories compatible with, or even complementary to, one another? To what greater or lesser extent are each of them more typically historical or philosophical? M. Gouhier himself inclines towards the view that the history of *visions du monde* is the nearest one can get to a non-distorting historical account; but he is concerned with discussion rather than the advocacy of any one view. He is not what one would call a linguistic analyst and is quite prepared to talk of essences; he has, nevertheless, a very fine sense of the ways in which language and thought can dovetail into each other. For much of the time he follows the best French scholarly tradition and lets others speak for him; indeed, his work is so full of references that at times it takes on the character of a conversation piece, arranged, produced and commented on by the author. However, let there be no doubt that it is M. Gouhier himself, who has, of course, done much work in the field which he is here discussing, who is responsible for this brief and suggestive book, which is both a pleasure and a stimulus to the reader.

Many of the problems raised by M. Gouhier must have been faced by Yvon Belaval in the construction of his *Pour connaitre la pensée de Leibniz* (Bordas, Paris). The book is divided into two portions, the first, entitled "The Formation," being just about twice as long as the second, entitled "The System." The foreground theme of the first part is indeed the gradual formation of Leibniz's thought, and this is placed against a middle distance and background of the philosopher's life, and the diplomatic, political, religious and philosophic activity of the time. This background is supplied by means of a quite remarkable amount of highly compressed, detailed information, which, for the reader who can be relied upon to supply the broad outlines himself, is calculated to sharpen the focus (though for the reader who cannot may, more probably, blur it). The second part presents a version of the completed system, given, to an admirably large extent, in Leibniz's own words. It is frequently said of Leibniz, of course, that he was a man of two philosophies, one which as a philosopher he believed to be correct, but kept very largely to himself, and one in which he didn't believe at all, but which as a politician he deemed fit for presentation to the public. M. Belaval is, for his part, firm in his insistence on the essential unity of Leibniz's thought; and although he does not exactly conceal the fact that Leibniz was also personally ambitious, his emphasis throughout is placed on the underlying continuity both of his motives as a patriot and of his hopes of bringing about a reconciliation of the

disunited churches. In particular, he attempts to show that the doctrine of a *vinculum substantiale*, which Leibniz expounded in his correspondence with the Jesuit Father Des Bosses, must be regarded as an integral part of the monadological system, rather than as an expedient introduced solely in order to allow for the possibility of the doctrine of trans-substantiation. Certainly, given the position that no state of any monad can be said to be identical with any different state, that all monads are continually active (for action is the nature of Being), and that every monad reflects every change in every other monad, it is hard to see what legitimate account can be given of what it means for a body to retain its organic identity from one (differential) instant to another; though whether the introduction of some sort of formal principle capable of insuring similar phenomena from different collections of monads will do the trick seems somewhat doubtful. At any rate, the discussion is extremely interesting, M. Belaval's suggestion that "the idea of resemblance constitutes effectively in God the essence of the species" and thus "the ultimate foundation of the essence *in so far as it is realized in an actual existence* resides in the vinculum" reminding one curiously of Russell's resort to similarity as the only indispensable universal. Still, it remains true that, whatever Leibniz's motives may have been, "even without the vinculum, the phenomena would be the same, the logical connections between the monads would be the same; only the basis of reality would be changed"; and whether this addition is one that can fairly be made without distorting the rest of the system is a question that I can only leave to true Leibniz scholars. A similar sort of question, also with its echo in modern controversies, comes up in connection with the problem of whether or not any man can sensibly be said to deserve better than he gets. If an individual, Adam, is only fully defined by the total list of predicates of which he can be made the subject, the answer is clearly not, simply because he can then be no other than what, in the broadest sense of the word, happens to him. But *is* Adam in fact reducible to the series of his predicates? This is a sort of question that has cropped up regularly in debates over phenomenalism; and, of course, people are always asking, in one fashion or another, what it is that names name.

But this is to pick out particular points of interest from what is designed as an overall presentation, the success of which is above all due to the care with which have been developed the connections with Cartesianism, Theology and Mathematics, in particular the Differential Calculus and the Theory of Dynamics. There is a sense, perhaps, in which the book as a whole might fairly be said to aim at a more typically French rather than an English audience, an audience, that is to say, who, although non-specialist, possess a wide background of general culture against which Leibniz can be easily, if he is not already, situated; and who are asking, in effect, to have their knowledge deepened at this particular point. But for anyone who may feel himself to be a prospective member of such an audience, this is a book that can be wholeheartedly recommended.

Raymond Ruyer, in his *Philosophie de la valeur* (Armand Colin, Paris), sets forth the thesis that in any account of value there are three aspects to be distinguished—the agent, the form and the ideal, where, in spite of a certain natural tendency for the second and third aspects to become confused, "form" is to be taken roughly as "type actually realized" and "ideal" as "governing essence"; for instance, an artist, the agent, seeking an ideal of beauty, produces a particular form of picture. All three aspects, M. Ruyer contends, must somehow be held together. However, the difficulty with such analyses is to know how to deal with the "ideal," or "essence," and most present-day English philosophers would doubtless take the view that the language that he

uses is largely responsible for M. Ruyer's somewhat Platonic journey into the "meta-spatial." His other leading theme is that modern science has shown that Nature is through and through "axiological." The argument involved seems to be that the smallest physical components have been shown to act, that is to institute actions, rather than simply to react, and that this they can only do in view of some end or in accordance with some pattern, for an agent only knows what to seek if he knows, in some very ill-defined sense, what he is to become. This seeking after fulfilment of a type is taken to be typical value-seeking activity. But quite apart from the question of whether the majority of scientists would be at all prepared to accept an argument of this type, to stretch "axiological" terminology in this way to be applicable to the behaviour of both the atom and the artist seems to be covering over rather than analysing the difficulties of knowing how to talk sensibly about values.

Le Père Teilhard de Chardin et la pensée contemporaine (Le Portulan, chez Flammarion, Paris) by Louis Cognet is a philosophical work only in a very special sense, for it belongs to a discussion between Catholics on points of Catholic doctrine. Le Père Teilhard, it seems, is a distinguished geologist and paleontologist, who has been trying to work out a view of the world which is both Catholic and in accordance with what he takes to be the viewpoint of modern science. M. Cognet, while welcoming this attempt as courageous and necessary, nevertheless attacks it all along the line, chiefly because he finds it at variance at nearly every important point with the traditions of Christianity as interpreted by the Catholic Church. Certainly, some of the Reverend Father's ideas—sin as a kind of statistical necessity, for instance—sound odd enough from any point of view. However, be that as it may, the book has, I think, a possibly wider interest. Firstly, because it provides a good simple example of the sort of things that a believer who takes seriously the traditions of the Church is committed to saying. And secondly, because it demonstrates the extreme difficulty, at the least, of combining a modern reinterpretation of a historical religion with a maintenance of the doctrinal content which makes that religion the distinctive religion that it is.

I doubt whether *Les Etudes Bergsoniennes*, Vol. III (Albin Michel, Paris) will have much appeal in England, though, considering the influence that Bergson has had on the climate of thought in France, it is, in its way, most instructive, not least in the records that it presents of the meetings of the Bergson Society. Instructive also is Lydie Adolphe's examination of Bergson's dramatic use of images, for it is interesting to see this question dealt with by a sympathizer. Among the many works which would be easier to read for someone with some acquaintance with Bergsonian ways of thinking, is Henri Brocher's *Les étapes de la pensée humaine* (Labor et Fides, Geneva), or at any rate that lesser half of it which does not simply constitute an anthology of anthropological curiosities, but which elaborates a distinction between mystic, mechanist and moral ways of thinking; where the first results from a primitive failure to distinguish between the inner and outer world, the second deals with the outer world alone and the third deals with the inner world and is essentially Christian. The author of this really very slight little book has some odd reflections on the westward path taken by the centre of world thought across the ages, which is now to be found, apparently, round about San Francisco, Los Angeles and Seattle. No less odd, though in a very different way, is *Le principe d'antagonisme et la Logique de l'énergie* (Hermann, Paris) by Stephane Lupasco, who for some time has been engaged in an attempt to show that in whatever direction one may pursue one's research, one will come in the end upon irreducible contradictions. This particular book is designed to elaborate his thesis in the realm of symbolic logic. Though knowledgeable, however, he

seems to have no very clear notion of the nature of logic and of its relation to matters of language and fact in general; nor, incidentally, does he write very well.

For the rest, Pierre Auger, a physicist, who is a strong advocate of the view that there is only one world and that that belongs to the physicist and for whom atoms and men are both individuals in virtue of similar characteristics, sets out, in *L'homme microscopique*, to trace the consequences of applying the ideas and concepts of atomic physics to the whole of human activity, becoming increasingly speculative as he goes along. While Dr. Maurice Vernet, a biologist, whose thorough, if repetitive, study of living phenomena in *La vie et la mort* seems guided by certain metaphysical or religious assumptions, advocates equally strongly the view that Life is governed by a principle of energy in no sense reducible to any physico-chemical principle. (Both these books are published by Flammarion in their *Bibliothèque de philosophie scientifique*.) Paul Siwek, S.I., expounds and attacks Spinoza from a Catholic standpoint in his *Au coeur du Spinozisme* (Desclée de Brouwer, Paris); and Georges Gougenheim and Pierre-Maxime Schuhl present a careful commentary on the test of *Trois essais de Montaigne* (Vrin, Paris), one essay being chosen from each book. Among reprints are *Platon et l'art de son temps*, also by M. Schuhl and first published in 1934; and *Le malheur de la conscience dans la philosophie de Hegel* by Jean Wahl, first published in 1929 and primarily concerned with Hegel's early thinking before his system finally closed down upon him. (Both republications are by Presses Universitaires de France, Paris.) Translations include two from the Italian; *L'existence de Dieu* by Michele-F. Sciacca, translated by Régis Jolivet (Aubier, Paris), which is notable, in these days, for its firm advocacy of the ontological argument, and *Le temps harcelant* by Enrico Castelli (Presses Universitaires de France), a plaint against the way in which modern life exchanges rush for humanity, which for me was chiefly attractive for the memories of his early life in old-world Piedmont, the memories of another world altogether, which the author evokes by way of contrast. Finally, it may be worth while to draw attention, first to a quite unpretentious little article on "Le vocabulaire comme structure et comme expérience," by R. Michéa, which appeared in *La revue philosophique* of April–June 1952, and which directly is about the advantages and limitations of limited vocabulary systems, but a good deal of which could be taken to be about the advantages and limitations of sticking to ordinary language; and secondly to Vol. 17–18 of the frequently admirable *Revue Internationale de Philosophie*, which is on this occasion devoted to the notion of Verification, and which opens with a brief and excellent introductory article, in English, by none other than Professor Ryle.

ALAN MONTEFIORE.

NEW BOOKS

The Greeks and the Irrational. By E. R. Dodds. (Berkeley, U.S.A.: University of California Press; Cambridge University Press. Pp. 327. Price 37s. 6d.)

Professor Dodds has in this book added a useful and ample documentation to his Sather lectures of 1949, and with them conveniently reprints two articles on Maenadism and Theurgy. He will attain his purpose of interesting many besides classical scholars (whom he properly exhorts to acquaintance with anthropologists more recent than Lévy-Bruhl and Durkheim) and will be found a reliable guide to some often disregarded aspects of Greek life and thought. By some who idealize the Greeks they may have been disregarded because their existence was unwelcome; yet there is some excuse for preferring to give one's attention to that part of Greek life and literature that has inspired or can inspire our own. Prof. Dodds urges, however, that his subject has a lesson for us. If we are to constitute a rational society, we must understand, in order to control, human irrationality. In these lectures he wishes to show how the Greeks attempted but failed to achieve a solution. A short review can do no more than outline the main theme, and cannot do justice to the interest and value of the detailed examination given to many particular topics.

Often the Greeks ascribed to an external agency psychical events for which we should seek an internal cause: Homeric man, lacking a unified concept of personality, frequently believes himself to think, feel, or act on a divine impulse; in the following Archaic age feelings of guilt, created by the structure of society, lead to the idea of jealous, vengeful gods, who are later transformed, to meet human needs, into agents of Justice. Other less usual experiences give rise to the belief in "possession," seen in prophetic inspiration and the enthusiasm of certain religious rites. The same readiness to appeal to external causation appears in the Greek attitude to dreams, on which there is an excellent chapter. Although wish-fulfilment and symbolism were familiar as explanations, there was a persistent tendency to regard a dream as something objective (as always in Homer); and this is part of the reason why the Greeks so often experienced, and acted upon, a type of dream rare to-day, that in which a respected figure, even a god, reveals the future or gives instructions.

Another strain of thought is that according to which the *psyche* does not merely survive the body, but is a stranger in it, and can obtain occult knowledge by dissociation from it. Prof. Dodds advances the theory that an impulse to this was given by acquaintance with Thracian *shamans*; that their activities and beliefs were generalized and adapted to give the doctrine of transmigration of *all* souls, of a universal afterworld with rewards and punishments, and of ritual purification from sins, the doctrine that we associate with Pythagoras and the even more elusive Orphics. This was transformed by Plato, but the *shaman* can still be seen in his philosopher: the trance has become the practice of mental concentration, occult knowledge the vision of metaphysical truth, and the memory of past earthly lives the recollection of the eternal Forms.

Plato had welded this other-worldliness to a belief in the rationality of the soul's true nature, which he never satisfactorily reconciled with his empirical knowledge of man as he is. Prof. Dodds shows that the excessive intellectualism of Socrates and some fifth-century sophists had excited protest before Plato recognized the strength of irrational forces in man. At the same time he had seen towards the end of the century a panic reaction in defence of the old order of things, and the growth of new superstitions to replace those religious

beliefs that rationalism had undermined. The *Laws* provide his response to the inconvenient fact of man's actual irrationality. If society is to survive a modicum of purified religion must be provided and enforced, while men's thoughts must be rigidly controlled.

The tide of rationalism rose again in the third century, the achievement of which is too often underestimated; but Stoic intellectualism, Academic scepticism, and the progress of science and mathematics were followed by an ebb of renewed superstition, mental stagnation, and anxiety for personal salvation. To previous explanations of the Hellenistic failure Prof. Dodds adds his suggestion that it was due to a fear of living a life of free and rational choice, and that if we to-day are faced with a similar problem we may solve it with the resources of modern psychology. If, as is to be hoped, he has an opportunity of expanding these ideas, he might define more closely the meaning of "irrational," and make clearer his view of the value of habituation in conduct and of religious feeling as a mode of experience.

F. H. Sandbach.

Leisure the Basis of Culture. By Josef Pieper. Translated by Alexander Dru with an introduction by T. S. Eliot. (Faber & Faber. 1952. Pp. 169. Price 10s. 6d.)

Mr. T. S. Eliot, who writes an introduction to this translation of two of Dr. Pieper's recent essays, is not alone in complaining of the present "sickness of philosophy"—although he seems unaware that logical positivism, which he regards as "the most conspicuous object of censure," is already *démodé* in contemporary philosophical circles and only kept in circulation by a few ingenuous scientists. Of the two essays concerned, which are closely interrelated, the first offers a theory of leisure and the second a theory about the correct way to philosophize; and both are stimulating, well written and highly contentious. The importance of Pieper's work, it seems to me, lies in the fact that he argues a case, with undaunted persistence and no little skill, for a complete reversal of the whole trend of philosophy since Descartes and Locke, in different ways, ushered in the modern era. The question is, therefore, whether Pieper's influence will, as Eliot claims, "restore to their position in philosophy what common sense obstinately tells us ought to be found there: *insight* and *wisdom*."

Let us take his theory of leisure first. In order to understand the proper meaning of leisure, we have to recall, as a start, the medieval distinction between *ratio* and *intellectus*—between the power of discursive, logical thought and the capacity of simple intuition or "that simple vision to which truth offers itself like a landscape to the eye." On this view the process of knowing is the action of these two together; as Pieper puts it, "the mode of discursive thought is accompanied and impregnated by an effortless awareness, the contemplative vision of the *intellectus*, which is not active but passive, or rather receptive." The point he wishes to establish is that whereas *ratio* involves "real hard work," intellectual contemplation, the other vital part of the epistemic process, is "essentially not work." Thus Kant was wrong in declaring philosophy to be genuine only in so far as it is "herculean labour," and the Marxists are equally wrong in their use of the term "intellectual *worker*"—for this misleads us into believing that the pursuit of knowledge is on a level with other activities concerned with utilitarian ends, and that man can never be more than a functionary or official even in the highest reaches of

his activity. In short, intellectual contemplation, which was derided by Kant but is in fact the mark of the educated man who takes in the whole world, is incompatible with the inner meaning of the concepts "intellectual work" and "intellectual worker."

This brings us closer to the main point of the essay, for we are now in a position to proceed to a definition of leisure. "Leisure . . . is a mental and spiritual attitude—it is not simply the result of external factors, it is not the inevitable result of spare time, a holiday, a week-end or a vacation. It is an attitude of mind, a condition of the soul. . . . Compared with the exclusive ideal of work as activity, leisure implies (in the first place) an attitude of non-activity, of inward calm, of silence; it means not being 'busy,' but letting things happen." But it is not just non-activity; it is something more. For instance, feast-days and holy days are the inner source of leisure, for on such occasions man affirms his "fundamental accord with the world." It is because leisure "takes its origin from 'celebration' that it is not only effortless but the direct contrary of effort; not just the negative, in the sense of being no effort, but the positive counterpart." Leisure, then, is not a break in one's work, a link in the chain of utilitarian functions; it runs at right angles to work—just as intuition is not the prolongation of the work of the *ratio*, but cuts right across it, vertically. *Ratio* used to be compared to time, *intellectus* to eternity.

Much of this argument—which is hardly new—will doubtless gain some measure of assent, even if "intellectus" is one of those slippery terms which mean everything or nothing. It is true enough that we need insight, in all branches of study, and that we also need, at times, to think disinterestedly—which is what the contemplative or leisurely attitude should promote. But Pieper's crucial point is to follow. "Celebration is the point at which the three elements of leisure emerge together: effortlessness, calm and relaxation. . . . But if "celebration" is the core of leisure, then leisure can only be made possible and indeed justifiable upon the same basis as the celebration of a feast: and that formation is *divine worship* . . . cut off from the worship of the divine, leisure becomes laziness and work inhuman." Thus humanism, in these irreligious days, is not enough—for "it is quite futile to defend the sphere of leisure in the last ditch but one." In short, "culture lives on religion through divine worship. And when culture itself is endangered, and leisure is called in question, there is only one thing to be done: to go back to the first and original source." Hence, just as Plato, who understood this conception of leisure, allotted a place for divine worship in his Academy, so must we to-day, if we value leisure, make similar provision. But since, so Pieper holds, it is impossible "to find any other worship whatsoever in the Europeanized world," it is only Christian worship which can properly provide the core of leisure and the basis of culture.

I fear this is an excessively partisan conclusion; and it will certainly offend members of other faiths, such as Buddhists, Moslems and Jews, as well as those who subscribe to no particular faith. It seems almost ludicrous to ignore the fact that there are many intelligent people who for one reason or another entirely reject the dogmatic claims of Christian theologians, but who are nevertheless humanists in the best sense of that much abused term and fully alive to the necessity of preserving culture and leisure against totalitarian attack. Hence, to demand an indissoluble link between leisure and divine worship, and more narrowly between leisure and the Christian Church, is to demand something which will arouse the deepest hostility on the part of large numbers of educated men and women. Indeed, some will feel that Pieper is trying to reintroduce the religious bigotry of the Middle Ages.

This attempt to put the clock back is strikingly developed in Pieper's

second essay entitled "The Philosophical Act." Even if we admit that modern philosophy sometimes resembles a blocked road, it is hardly helpful to suggest that the theological escape route is the right way out of the impasse. However, we must in fairness examine his thesis.

Dr. Pieper asks first of all, What does philosophizing mean? The preliminary answer is that "to philosophize is to act in such a way that one steps out of the world of work in which man earns bread by the sweat of his brow"—one becomes concerned with the "common good" rather than the "common need." This distinction is developed by pointing to a dictum common to Aristotle and Aquinas—that philosophy is akin to poetry in that both are concerned with wonder or marvelling (cf. Plato's *Theaetetus*), a feature that promotes transcendence of the everyday world. Philosophy, moreover, is a "free" as opposed to a functional knowledge—which it is not allowed to be in totalitarian States, for there it is merely assigned the task of defending and demonstrating the validity of some particular ideology. So far, I think, there will be a good deal of sympathy for this view—west of the Iron Curtain at least. But this sympathy is soon likely to be dispelled by what immediately follows. For Pieper goes on to claim that we can only contemplate or "theorize" in the full sense "if we are able to look upon the world as the creation of pure spirit." We must accept Aquinas' enigmatic proposition *omne ens est verum*, we must "fix our mind's eye on the totality of being" and we must agree that a philosophical question cannot be put without bringing into play "God and the world." Indeed, "the distinctive mark of a philosophical question is that it brings out what constitutes the essence of spirit: *convenire cum omni ente*, in harmony with everything that is."

Now there is much to be said, in these analytic days, for any thinker who tries once more to achieve a synoptic approach to philosophical problems; but a modern synoptic approach does not imply a return to Thomism. Yet this seems precisely what Pieper would have us do. For he goes on to affirm—what it is the great merit of all post-medieval philosophy to have denied—that philosophy must take its cue from, or (as he puts it) be "trained on," theology, as it was in Aquinas' system. And let there be no half-measures. "The philosopher who reflects upon the things of this world in the light of the revealed doctrine of the Logos, will attain to knowledge that would otherwise remain hidden from him . . . philosophical knowledge of things in themselves." Hence, although Sartre's atheistical existentialism may be a vital philosophy (since it appears to involve certain theological presuppositions), for a philosophy to be vital *and true*, it "must be the counterpoint to a true theology, and that, *post Christum natum*, means Christian theology."

All this seems most unfortunate. In the first place, how can we be *certain* that Christian theology is any more or less true than Moslem or Jewish or Hindu theology? All the main competing theologies in the world are based on allegedly authoritative interpretations of certain sacred texts—but there is no available criterion, which would appeal to philosophers *as such*, for deciding which, if any, is divinely inspired and therefore true. In the second place, Pieper talks of Christian theology in the singular as if he were ignorant of the fact that there are a score or more of Christian theologies all differing on vital points of dogma. It is surely necessary for him to state clearly which particular dogmas are in fact to be regarded as the minimum basis for philosophical speculation. (A religious sceptic would also want to ask whether Dr. Pieper was acquainted with Biblical criticism, and particularly with the scholarly work of Alfred Loisy, when making his claim.) However, the fact remains that the reorientation of modern philosophy recommended by Pieper involves that philosophy should "receive its impulse and impetus from a

prior and *uncritically accepted* interpretation of the world as a whole" (my italics)—and that this interpretation is to be furnished by a Christian theology.

This is medievalism with a vengeance; and I imagine that such a recommendation will be as unpalatable to philosophers who are also Christians as to those who are of some other faith or of no faith at all. If it is true that philosophy is in an unhealthy condition at the moment, it must be cured by other methods than those proposed by Dr. Pieper.

J. HARTLAND-SWANN.

Bertrand Russell's Theories of Causation. By ERIK GÖTLIND. (Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksells Boktryckeri AB. 1952. Pp. 164. Price not indicated.)

This book contains a lucid exposition and careful examination of Russell's theories of causation, which occupy an important place in his philosophical work. The development of philosophy in the first half of the present century coincides to a considerable extent with the development of Russell's thought. Mr. Götlind's monograph will thus be welcome both to readers who are concerned with Russell's views for the sake of their philosophical content and to those who are interested in the history of recent philosophy.

To Russell philosophy is philosophical analysis of the results of scientific inquiry and of common-sense beliefs. Although he has nowhere at length explained his conception of philosophical analysis two of his methodological assumptions seem fairly obvious. First, analysis is translation, if necessary with modifications, into a precise language whose structure is or approximates to that of *Principia Mathematica*. Second, while the philosopher has first-hand knowledge of common-sense beliefs, he is in the analysis of scientific propositions largely dependent on the judgment of scientific experts. This means in practice that his translations of scientific propositions are less free than those of common-sense beliefs.

Mr. Götlind shows how Russell throughout his work on causation has taken his epistemological marching orders from natural science, in particular from physics. When paying attention to "pre-scientific" and non-scientific causal propositions he tends to regard them as provisional rules of thumb to be replaced by scientific propositions even when the manner of the desired replacement is for the time being not clear.

The greatest change in Russell's views on causal propositions occurred after the advent of relativity and quantum-physics. Mr. Götlind makes it, however, quite clear that Russell's epistemology is sensitive even to comparatively minor changes in the field of physics such as the transition from Bohr's to Heisenberg's theory of atomic structure. It might indeed appear that on Russell's principles epistemology is in danger, if it is a danger, of becoming an *ad hoc* commentary on the rapid changes in contemporary physical theory. Mr. Götlind seems to recognize this when he distinguishes the relation of Russell's views to contemporary physics from their relation "to the great slow-moving philosophical debate, where there may be centuries between the replies" (p. 77).

Russell's first detailed treatment of causal laws is found in his *Principles of Mathematics* where he expresses the laws of classical dynamics in terms of the logical language first developed in this work and later refined in *Principia Mathematica*. These causal laws, which involve differential equations, are, as Mr. Götlind shows, regarded as formal implications. It might have been worth while to dwell in greater detail on this feature of Russell's analysis for at least

two reasons. On the one hand, Russell adhered to it throughout his work on causation. On the other hand, recent discussions of unfulfilled hypotheticals have thrown serious doubt on the analysis of causal propositions into formal implications and consequently on Russell's fundamental assumption that the logical system of *Principia Mathematica* is a generally suitable tool of philosophical analysis.

From his analysis Russell deduces two important corollaries which he also never abandons: first that scientific causal propositions are not merely descriptive but, roughly speaking, predictive, and second, that certain philosophical maxims about the nature of causation are wholly inadequate if applied to Newtonian and post-Newtonian physics. Most of these maxims, e.g. that the effect must resemble the cause, have been proclaimed long before Galileo. After a detailed discussion Mr. Götlind accepts these corollaries with some qualifications.

He traces admirably the development of Russell's views on scientific causal propositions and on the related topics of induction and probability from the *Principles* to *Human Knowledge*. He also shows clearly how concern with the problems of the external world and the continuity of the self has led Russell to the recognition of different types of causal propositions and thoroughly discusses their nature.

In the last chapter of his book Mr. Götlind considers Russell's almost Kantian attempt to discover the essential postulates by whose adoption scientific inquiry as we know it becomes possible. He argues (unconvincingly, I believe) that these postulates are empirical propositions and gives reasons why, in his view, they are not sufficiently strong to fulfil their alleged function.

It is not possible here to mention all the important points raised by Mr. Götlind. I have noticed a comparatively large number of misprints, none of which, however, is an obstacle to the understanding of the argument which is often illuminating and always full of philosophical interest. S. Körner.

The Chief Currents of Contemporary Philosophy. By Dhirendra Mohan Datta. (Calcutta University Press. Price Rs.10/8.)

This is a longish book (it extends to 531 pages) and the purpose of its author is "to share with a wider reading public, interested in modern problems, his studies in the chief philosophical movements of the present century in Europe, America and India." Prof. Datta writes in a lucid and uncomplicated manner and has succeeded in giving an adequate and indeed scholarly account of the modern philosophical scene, starting with the Neo-Hegelians and ending with the logical positivists. Some contemporary thinkers exhibit, as we know, an extreme impatience, not only with the great figures of the past, but with all modern philosophers who do not appear to show sufficient proficiency in linguistic clarification. It is all the more necessary, therefore, for the unbiased student to be able to judge for himself the sense or nonsense of what has been said in the last fifty years. This of course may seem to some a rather formidable task. We may be glad, therefore, that Prof. Datta enables the interested student to master, in (say) one week's comfortable reading, the main features of all significant modern philosophical writings, and that he provides, at the same time, a definite impetus to the study of some original texts.

The most noticeable characteristic of Prof. Datta's approach is his sympathetic handling of every system or philosopher considered. He does not of course fail to point out weaknesses—and particularly any lack of self-consistency—but he makes it clear that even the seemingly oddest doctrines put

forward were the result of strenuous efforts to attain truth. The chapter headings, which by themselves give only a bare indication of the amount of ground covered, are as follows: Neo-Hegelian Idealism, Italian Idealism, Indian Idealism, Pragmatism, Philosophy of Bergson, Realism, Philosophy of Sense-Data, Emergent Evolution, Whitehead's Philosophy of Organism, Logical Positivism and the Philosophical Aspects of Marxism. (There is also an Appendix on the contribution of Modern Indian Philosophy to World Philosophy.) It is difficult to single out any one chapter since the standard of exposition is so evenly maintained; but I found the account of Neo-Hegelianism excellent and the chapters on Bergson, Whitehead and the Logical Positivists comprehensive without being dull. I should stress, perhaps, that Prof. Datta makes no attempt to emulate those popular works of "philosophy without tears" of which we have already had a sufficiency. We may hope that this book will soon be published in this country and thus become more readily available to English readers.

J. HARTLAND-SWANN.

Bertrand Russell's Construction of the External World. By CHARLES A. FRITZ, JNR. (Routledge & Kegan Paul. 1952. Pp. 231. Price 23s.)

The author's avowed object in this book is to give an account of Russell's method of "logical constructions" and, in particular, of his application of it to "the problem of our knowledge of the external world," i.e. of material objects and the entities of physics. A third of the book is taken up by a brief general introduction and a fairly long explanation of Russell's analysis of cardinal and real numbers, of descriptions and of classes. This is ground that has been covered a good many times before, by Russell himself as well as by his expositors. The author has nothing new to add here, but he tells the story more clearly, I think, than it is usually told; and this part of his book might have considerable value for students. He seems somewhat uncritically to accept the view that we are faced with the alternatives of adopting some such analyses as Russell's or assuming that there exist "entities denoted by" numerals, descriptions and class-names; and that we had better avoid making this assumption if we can. The author does not explain the meaning of the question, whether numbers or classes are entities, or the sense in which the view that they were entities would be an alternative to Russell's or just the sort of risk we should run in supposing that they were. But it would perhaps be disingenuous to suggest that the need for an explanation of these points has very generally been felt.

The rest of the book is devoted to an examination of Russell's attempts to solve his main epistemological problem, viz. that of justifying, on the basis of what alone he holds to be certain (the "hard data" of "immediate experience"), both the theories of physics and our ordinary beliefs about material things. The author describes the evolution of Russell's views from the earlier programme of replacing "inferred, non-sensible entities" with logical constructions from sense-data and sensibilia, to the later enumeration of postulates which, if accepted, would serve to justify certain of such inferences. The story is worth telling and is conscientiously if a little repetitively, told. The author does not seriously question the general form in which Russell states his problem, though surely grounds for questioning it are fairly well known. But within the limits thus set, he produces reasonable criticisms of Russell's solutions. In particular, he effectively questions Russell's claim to be using a new, metaphysically neutral, purely *logical* method in philosophy.

This is, in the ways and within the limits I have indicated, a useful and interesting book.

On p. 32, line 2, the first "by" is a misprint for "be." On p. 43, line 3, the phrase "or equal to" should, I think, be omitted. P. F. STRAWSON.

The Existentialist Revolt. By DR. KURT F. REINHARDT. (Bruce Publishing Co., Milwaukee. 1952. Pp. vii + 245. Price $3.40.)

Dr. Reinhardt is a Professor of Stanford University who studied in his early years under Husserl, Jaspers and Heidegger. In *The Existentialist Revolt* he has given a very clear and useful account of seven existentialist philosophers, including his tutors. He himself is a Thomist who holds that Aquinas inaugurated a revolution in metaphysics when he turned the philosopher's interest from "form and essence, where it had lingered for so many centuries, to the act of existing," thus becoming the first existentialist, the first philosopher to recognize the primacy of the act of existing over essence. Dr. Reinhardt regards all true Christian thinking as "existentialist" in that it is not concerned primarily with pure thought or pure knowledge but gravitates towards "existence," towards a "way of life"; he defines existentialism as a kind of thinking concerned with calling to life, with making and re-making the life of the unique, responsible person.

As a Christian existentialist Dr. Reinhardt takes a critical view of Nietzsche and Sartre, especially the latter. The atheist existentialists are indeed at one with the Christians in their attempts to rescue the individual from the abstract generalities of idealism and from submersion in the impersonal collective. But the idea of freedom in Sartre, whom Dr. Reinhardt describes as "the ape of Lucifer," is one of self-deification; Sartre annihilates all value in order to choose himself in absolute autonomy as the one and only value. The Sartrian hero, Orestes, in *Les Mouches*, claims his crime of matricide with pride as his own because he has chosen it. On this view one should never repent of any deed, whatever it may be, that one has freely chosen. "The man," says Sartre, "who has been smitten by his freedom as by a flash of lightning, is beyond good and evil." Dr. Reinhardt regards as pernicious this denial to value of all objectivity; the Sartrian freedom is the freedom of Lucifer, born of pride and a refusal to serve.

Although Jaspers lays stress on the value of a personal relationship to God or Transcendence, Dr. Reinhardt criticises him because his doctrine is a philosophy of "becoming" rather than of "being," because he rejects any attempt to define rationally the nature of man, because in his ideal of personality he is concerned almost exclusively with man's capacity for continually creating and re-creating himself. "The highest forms of spiritual life," in Dr. Reinhardt's opinion, "are characterized by quiet and an utter simplicity, individual beings becoming more perfect the more they approach the immutability of the Divine Being."

While his Thomist views lead him to many criticisms of all the existentialists, except Marcel, Dr. Reinhardt admits that his attraction to the school has been so great that the writing of his book has been a matter of compelling urgency, "a necessity of thought." He values all the seven thinkers with whom he is concerned for their devotion to the freedom and integrity of the human person, and holds that they are useful also in helping to rescue Christianity from certain of its besetting temptations. J. B. COATES.

Theory of Beauty. By HAROLD OSBORNE. (Routledge & Kegan Paul. Pp. 220. Price 21s.)

This is a closely argued attempt to salvage something from the rather battered stronghold of "objective aesthetics." The adversaries most considered are those who hold the "subjective relational" view that "anything is beautiful which is related as . . . expression to . . . emotion." I suppose the best known modern supporters of some such view are Wordsworth, A. C. Bradley, Croce and Collingwood. Though all these appear in the very extensive bibliography, none except Wordsworth is mentioned (quite incidentally) in the text; and from the author's criticism of "expression" and "emotion" it would hardly appear that he knew the sense in which any of them use these words. He describes his own view as *similar in type* to that of Clive Bell and Roger Fry that "anything is beautiful which is *both* potentially an object of a unique mental state *and* has a specific objective structure." He allows that our only data for aesthetic theory are those experiences in which we recognize a common unique character that we call aesthetic. But he paradoxically asserts that such experience is only stimulated by "works of art." I certainly recognize such a common quality in my experience of Chartres, the Medici Tombs, some Rembrandts, Chardins, Vermeers, Botticellis and some tragedies, but no less clearly in my experiences of many natural objects: mountains, storms, flowers, clouds, animals and the human face; and these latter differ from the former set no more than those from one another.

The thesis of the book is that "if it could be shown that there is some objective property common and peculiar *more or less* to those things which are the objects [= stimuli?] of this mental state or activity we should have a solid basis" for an objective aesthetic.

What then is the "work of art" which, it is hoped, may turn out to have such an objective property? Not the pigmented canvas or worked marble or musical score or written or recited words; not any physical shapes or vibrations even when perceived as colours or sounds. That which has such a property is "no continuous existent" nor even the collection of sensa occasioned in you or me by the physical object, for the sensa will differ according to the capacity and training of each. "A work of art [which alone and always is beautiful] is a permanent possibility which is actualized when any *competent* observer [my italics] looks at a picture or sculpture . . . or hears the organized construct of sounds . . . or words which is that work of art." And the "competent observer" turns out to be the one who is himself capable of *constructing* "a special kind of organic complexity" out of the presented sensa. We are warned that probably no two persons experience the same work of art, nor does any one at different times. "The appreciator must always perform something of the functions of a performer."

Such a view of "the work of art" seems quite compatible and indeed comparable with Croce's account of the "truth" of aesthetic experiences (*Estetica XVI*), which has I think been refuted; his purpose was only to account for the possibility of communication, but the different purpose does not affect the validity of the arguments.

I am not convinced that works of art (still less all "beautiful objects") are all and alone "organic wholes," that is to say, that the class of aesthetic experiences is empirically found to coincide (even "more or less") with the class of objective organic wholes or of the organic wholes constructed out of sense data by "competent observers." If it be emphasized that only one "special type" of such construction is in question, we shall indeed question what that speciality is.

It will have become clear however that it is well worth the while of any student of aesthetics to read this book and judge for himself. E. F. CARRITT.

The Logic of Personality. By BERNARD MAYO. (London: Jonathan Cape. 1952. Pp. 188. Price 10s. 6d.)

This book covers a very great deal of ground. Among the topics discussed are the nature of perception, the nature of language, the nature of "the Self," aesthetics and ethics. These separate topics are all treated as "different approaches to the problem of personality."

Mr. Mayo, in his Introduction, sets two basic questions: "What is the difference between understanding persons and understanding other things?" and "What constitutes knowledge of persons?" He at first contrasts "knowledge about things" as "knowledge of properties" with "personal knowledge" as "knowledge of the unique." This "knowledge of the unique" is "an entirely different sort of knowledge, which we shall call *acquaintance*." It is soon seen that what bothers Mr. Mayo is not so much the differences between our knowledge of things and persons, as the differences between our knowledge of the general and the particular. Because of its generality, psychology "fails to take account of the essential element of personality. . . . We must try a different approach, suggested by the implied difference between knowing that a person has certain characteristics or personality traits and knowing that person." These "limitations" of psychology reveal nothing about the logic of personality, for Mr. Mayo might find the very same limitations in physics and in pursuing the "problem of individuality" he does just this.

"What makes the table *the* table?" Mr. Mayo asks. It can't be in terms of its properties. "For what differentiates one table from every one of nine others may not differentiate it from every one of ninety-nine others." It is not anything about the table itself that makes it *ultimately* different from other tables. What can it be then?

> "I think we are now in a position to say in what its individuality consists. It consists, not in any property or relational property, but in the unique one-to-one relation in which it stands to myself."

It is not easy to see how this is consistent with his saying that "Things, as well as persons, are unique individuals with which we can become acquainted." He seems to imply both that things and persons are unique and have individuality apart from our acquaintance with them and also to say that they are unique and individual in virtue of our acquaintance with them.

What does this "one-to-one relation" amount to? Mr. Mayo, throughout the whole book, gives extraordinarily few cases and illustrations. The nearest thing to a case is the following. Concerning my pipe, "its relation to me is what gives it its individuality; in a box of other pipes at the tobaconnist's it has no individuality." It is clear that my pipe gets individuality from my personal relation with it if, for example, it has my teeth marks. It becomes obscure what sort of individuality it gains from an indescribable, unique personal relation.

Perhaps the best way in which to understand what is being done here is to see that Mr. Mayo slides from talking about things and persons to talking about experience of the moment. "We can be directly aware of persons and things just as we are aware of coloured patches." This is what is "unique" and devoid of "generality." "It [knowledge of personality] must be knowledge which is confined entirely to a particular, unique situation and does not involve any generality, any extension beyond the particular." My experience of the moment does not involve "extension beyond the particular" because what looks to me now, what appears to me now, is not challenged by what looks to me later, or by what appears to me later.

With the personal relation condensed to the "particular, unique situation," what we *do* with things, *say* to persons, evaporates away, for all of this *does* involve "extension beyond the particular," and most certainly is describable. Mr. Mayo attains the unique and particular but then attempts to give it a use, a logic that it cannot have.

"Knowledge of personality" is not to be contrasted with "knowledge of things" for it is described in terms of "acquaintance," and Mr. Mayo asserts that we can be acquainted with things as well as persons. The distinction that Mr. Mayo makes between a person and a thing is that a thing can stand in a personal relation to somebody, but somebody cannot stand in a personal relation to it. My pipe can be mine, but I cannot be my pipe's.

Mr. Mayo does not emphasize the fact that pipes unlike people do not see sunsets, feel sad, dream, hold silent meditation. There is a strain of behaviourism in the book that makes people all too like pipes.

> "To say that the organism is aware of something is to say no more than that it reacts in a characteristic way to that something or that its behaviour in the presence of that something is regularly different from its behaviour in the absence of the something." C. B. MARTIN.

The Claim of Morality. By N. H. G. ROBINSON. (London: Gollancz. 1952. Pp. 333. Price 21s.)

What is Value? By EVERETT W. HALL. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 1952. Pp. xiv + 255. Price 25s.)

These two books are in many ways complementary. Between them they illustrate well the change that has come over moral philosophy in the last twenty years. Dr. Robinson's book is written in the idiom of a generation ago: to open it is to be carried back to that court in which *Ross* v. *Prichard* is for ever up for hearing, *Carritt* intervening. The old issues are debated, and Dr. Robinson's own suggestions are modest: he nowhere acknowledges the metaphysical assumptions behind his chief questions ("What are the bearers of the fundamental moral qualities? Do they belong intrinsically to acts and the like, regardless of whether these are the objects of a moral consciousness?"), so he finds nothing much in the literature since Ross's *Foundations of Ethics* worth mentioning. Professor Hall, on the other hand, is painfully up to date, both in manner and in references, and the result of his labours is not so much a book as a scrap-book or commonplace-book, in which the author debates with himself the relevance of all the latest articles and books to his own central interests: this may not be easy to read, but it is absorbing, and one hopes that Dr. Robinson and those who think like him will have a go at it—for the very first of the things that Professor Hall calls in question is that which Dr. Robinson takes for granted, namely, that "right," "good" and the like are the names of qualities. And he questions this, not as a subjectivist questions it, because he is intent on putting feelings or attitudes in as "the true referents" of moral words, but rather as one who is determined to find a respectable place for "value" in the world, despite his dissatisfaction with the traditional assumptions. Nevertheless, the results of his analysis are fairly exiguous: all genuine value-sentences are declared to be irreducibly normative, but what it is for this to be so is not elucidated, and the different character of the different types of value-sentences is not touched on. One finds oneself up once more against the fundamental unsatisfactoriness of moral philosophy: Professor Hall convinces one that *il faut reculer pour*

mieux sauter, yet one cannot help suspecting at the same time that *toujours reculer, c'est jamais sauter.*

For this reason, readers of PHILOSOPHY may get more direct enlightenment from Dr. Robinson, especially from his refreshing chapter on "The Moral Situation." Still, even in his rehash, they may find intuitionism as bad as open subjectivism: one may respect a man's judgment on moral matters, but that does not mean that the propriety or admirability of an action turns on his judgment about it. They may also feel that his metaphysics makes things unnecessarily hard for him: are there not several different noun-partners with which the moral adjectives can work equally happily? Need there be any competition between these nouns for the dubious title of "bearer" of the "fundamental moral qualities"? After all, if I write a cheque to my bookseller in settlement of my account, one might ask the question "Is it the bookseller I am paying, or the bill, or my debt, or £8 13s. 6d., or some complex combination of these?"; but one does not *have* to ask this question, since one does not *have* to choose between these answers. If one stuck to the adjectives "right," "good," "objectionable," "admirable," etc., instead of dealing always in "characters" (such as "ought," p. 165!), qualities and other such nouns, would the old perplexity remain?

Here Professor Hall's treatment is more illuminating, though even he finds himself in the toils over "facts." Some kinds of sentences he is not worried about: "declarative" sentences, he feels, have good solid "facts" to authenticate them. The problem is, to find something analogous for value-sentences. This is a problem indeed, but again an unnecessarily hard one: the respectability of "value-sentences" demands, not tangible or visible verifiers, but rather that there should be some moral and aesthetic truisms, things which are, in the moral or aesthetic field, beyond serious question, things to be accepted as in fact so, and not just matters of opinion. And this, of course, is something which in practical life we never—or hardly ever—have occasion to doubt.

STEPHEN TOULMIN.

The Religion of China, Confucianism and Taoism. By MAX WEBER. Translated and Edited by HANS H. GERTH. (The Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois; agents: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. London. Pp. xi + 308. Price 32s. net.)

It is a truism that there are grave dangers in using only secondary sources, especially in dealing with such inward phenomena as religion and philosophy. A Chinese who had never been to the Occident, who was not a Christian, and who used only Chinese accounts of the West, would inevitably produce a quite distorted account of Christianity. Chinese have indeed attempted such accounts—and the results have been as should have been expected.

It is hence not really surprising that Max Weber, who did not read Chinese (p. 64), had never resided in China, had no direct acquaintance with Chinese society, and used accounts written by others, should have come to a similarly bizarre result. The facts that he has, are consequently often misapplied and used without a realization of their limitations. A generation ago it was quite common for occidentals to describe the one corner of that land which they had seen and declare that it represented China. Yet Chinese are quite as different from one another as are Europeans. De Groot, upon whom Weber chiefly relied, was guilty of this error. De Groot, moreover, over-systematized and set up philosophical theories for Chinese religious practices, about which most Chinese know nothing. So Weber was seriously misled about Chinese religion. Had he used such a realistic account as that by H. Maspero, "The

Myths of Modern China" (in J. Hakin, *et al.*, *Asiatic Mythology*) he might have been spared many errors.

Not being a sinologist, he was, moreover, unable to distinguish first-rate sources from poorer ones. There is perhaps more misinformation about China than about any other civilization. His quite wide reading was therefore largely misapplied and his attempts at being critical (cf. p. 272, n. 7) were quite inadequate. For example, Wang Mang, who attained the throne by trickery and intrigue and never led an army, is said, since he became the court commander-in-chief, to have been a "victorious general proclaimed emperor by the army" (pp. 26, 65). Weber was also victimized by the large amount of mistranslation from the Chinese. He picked a poor translation of the Lao-tzu's work and consequently reaches quite mistaken conclusions about this philosophy (pp. 181–190).

Like some of the older writers about China, he assumes an unreal uniformity in Chinese civilization through the ages. He recounts together practices which have the same name in the early Han period of the second century B.C., in the programme of Wang An-shih in the eleventh century A.D., and in that of the Chinese Nationalists, without realizing their fundamental differences (p. 93). He assumes that the characteristics of taxation in the Manchu period were those of all periods (pp. 55–56). Even worse, he fails to understand the radical changes in Confucianism during the last two and a half millennia (Chap. VI). He takes the teaching of Confucius as typical of Confucianism—as if we should take that of Socrates as typical of neo-Platonism. Confucius was not interested in technical metaphysics, because his personal religion, which was very much the same as that of Socrates, satisfied this need. So Weber declares that Confucianism is "in large measure bereft of metaphysical interest" (p. 154). Yet Confucianism produced one of the world's great scholastic metaphysicians in Chu Hsi—about whom Weber appears largely uninformed.

What Weber does know about the changes in Chinese culture is, moreover, often mistaken—he states that in Confucianism the idea of a personal god was "upheld in the eleventh century but vanished in the twelfth century" (p. 23). But the dominating Confucian philosopher, Hsüntze, in the third century B.C., had already denied the existence of all gods and spirits! The gradual adoption of Taoistic ideas by Confucianism during its first millennium and a half leads Weber to declare that "originally the meaning of [Lao-tzu's] doctrine did not differ in the main from that of Confucianism" (p. 177). Yet the Lao-tzu was actually a radical opponent and extremely caustic critic of Confucianism.

The upshot of Weber's fundamental methodological errors is that, to the sinologist, this book is an extraordinary collection of howlers. He declares that "the Chinese tongue has been unable to offer its services to poetry" (p. 124). The total amount of Chinese poetry, good and bad, however, far exceeds that of any other civilization! Of this culture with a rich collection of unwritten folk tales (cf. W. Eberhard, *Chinese Fairy Tales*), he says, "All phantasy and ardor fled from the poor and formalistic intellectualism of the spoken word" (p. 124). A Chinese had already in the fifth century calculated the value of π correctly to the equivalent of seven places of decimals. A learned descendant of the Ming emperors enunciated, before 1584, the musical scale of equal temperament, calculating $\sqrt[12]{2}$ and using it to fix the length of his pipes, yet Weber says that the Chinese have lacked "all training in calculation" (p. 125).

The really remarkable feature in Weber's book, however is the number of keen insights it contains, especially in connection with social phenomena. For

example, he sees that the precise character of the alleged Chinese "democracy" lies in the unusual strength of Chinese clans (p. 96). He explains how the failure of China to develop an industrial capitalism is due to the structure of the Chinese State (p. 100). His account of the economic functioning of the *literati* (pp. 136–141) is keen indeed. His explanation for the absence of Natural Law and for the nature of the Chinese administration of law (pp. 147–150) should be pondered by every student of Chinese society. That such keen insights should have been reached in spite of his poor knowledge of Chinese philosophy and religion, can only be genius. Weber is not primarily interested in philsophy and religion, but in the sociological position and influence of the forces concerned (p. 180). In that respect, this book is admirable; in others, it is often very poor. This book is then one which the non-sinologist had best avoid, for he will inevitably be misled. But it is also one which, because of the fine pearls it contains in its often muddy water, should be read by all persons who know Chinese culture well enough to pick and choose the unusual insights here presented. HOMER H. DUBS.

Books also received

J. A. PASSMORE. *Hume's Intentions*. Cambridge University Press. 1952. Pp. ix + 164. 18s.

RICHARD SYMONDS. *The Making of Pakistan*. London: Faber & Faber. 1952. Pp. 227. 12s. 6d.

PAUL W. KURTS. *The Problems of Value Theory*. New York: own publication. 1952. Pp. v + 197. No price stated.

PAUL MASLOW. *Powers of the Mind*. Vol. II of the Life Science. New York: own publication. 1952. Pp. 135–288. No price stated.

H. M. SPALDING. *In Praise of Life*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 1952. Pp. x + 290. 21s.

F. M. CORNFORD. *Principium Sapientiae: A Study of the Origins of Greek Philosophical Thought*. Cambridge University Press. 1952. Pp. viii + 270. 25s.

JOHN EMBRY. *The Namic Philosophy*. New York: Philosophical Library. 1952. Pp. ix + 238. $3.75.

MATTHEW C. MENGES. *The Concept of Univocity Regarding the Predication of God and Creature According to William Ockham*. Louvain: Franciscan Institute Publications. 1952. Pp. xi + 196. No price stated.

Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research. Vol. XLIX, Part 181. November 1952. Presidential Address by DR. GILBERT MURRAY. Pp. 41. 2s.

EDITH B. SCHNAPPER. *One in All: An Anthology of Religion from the Sacred Scriptures of the Living Faiths*. London: John Murray. 1952. Pp. xvi + 155. 7s.

K. V. BELL. *Moral Calculus for the Modern World*. Washington N.J. 1952. Pp. vi + 41. No price stated.

WILLIAM MCDOUGALL. *Psychology* (Introduction by Cyril Burt). Oxford: Home Universities Press. 1952. Pp. 180. 6s.

T. E. JESSOP (Ed.). *Berkeley: Philosophical Writings*. Edinburgh: Nelson Philosophical Texts. 1952. Pp. xxv + 278. 10s. 6d.

F. M. H. MARKHAM (Ed., Trans. and Introd.). *Henri Comte de Saint-Simon: Selected Writings*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 1952. Pp. xxlx + 116. 12s. 6d.

A. C. CROMBIE. *Augustine to Galileo: The History of Science, A.D. 400–1650*. London: Falcon Educational Books. 1952. Pp. xv + 436. 42s.

THOMAS MILLER FORSYTH. *God and the World.* George Allen & Unwin. 1952. Pp. 160. 10s. 6d.

R. F. A. HOERNLÉ. *Studies in Philosophy* (Ed. with a Memoir by D. S. Robinson). George Allen & Unwin. 1952. Pp. xvi + 333. 30s.

D. R. G. OWEN. *Scientism, Man and Religion.* Philadelphia: The Westminster Press. 1952. Pp. 208. $3.50.

FRED KOHLER. *Evolution and Human Destiny.* New York: Philosophical Library. 1952. Pp. 120. $2.75.

MURDO MACKENZIE. *Contrast Psychology.* London: George Allen & Unwin. 1952. Pp. 304. 21s.

L. P. JACKS. *Near the Brink: Observations of a Nonagenarian.* London: George Allen & Unwin. 1952. Pp. 120. 12s. 6d.

EVELYN U. SHIRK. *Adventurous Idealism: The Philosophy of Alfred Lloyd.* University of Michigan Press. 1952. (London: Geoffrey Cumberlege.) Pp. xi + 299. 36s.

J. C. P. D'ANDRADE. *Philosophy and Life, and Other Papers.* Orient Longmans Ltd. 1952. Pp. xxxviii + 246. 18s.

L. J. BECK. *The Method of Descartes: A Study of the Regulae.* Oxford University Press. 1952. Pp. x + 316. 30s.

F. GABRIELI (Ed.). *Corpus Platoni Medii Aevi: Plato Arabus.* Vol. III. University of London: Warburg Institute. 1952. Pp. xiv + 76. 21s.

JOHN WISDOM. *Philosophy and Psycho-analysis.* Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 1952. Pp. 282. 22s. 6d.

D. T. SUZUKI. *Essays in Zen Buddhism.* London: Rider & Co. 1953. Pp. 367. 21s.

IRVING LOUIS-HOROWITZ. *The Renaissance Philosophy of Giordano Bruno.* New York: Coleman-Ross Company, Inc. 1952. Pp. vii + 150. $3.00.

STEPHEN TOULMIN. *The Philosophy of Science.* Hutchinson's University Library. 1953. Pp. viii + 176. 8s. 6d.

VARIOUS AUTHORS. *Science, Language and Human Rights.* University of Pennsylvania Press. 1952. Pp. 211. $2.50.

IMMANUEL KANT. *The Critique of Judgement.* Trans. James Creed Meredith. Oxford University Press. 1953. Pp. 180. 21s.

GOVINDA CHANDRA DEV. *Idealism and Progress.* Das Gupta & Co. Ltd., Calcutta. 1952. Pp. x + 454. Rs.10.

G. L. S. SHACKLE. *Expectation in Economics.* Cambridge University Press. 1952. Pp. xvi + 144. 7s. 6d.

WILLIAM TAYLOR. *The Relationship Between Psychology and Science.* George Allen & Unwin. 1953. Pp. 246. 12s. 6d.

ROSALIND MURRAY. *The Further Journey: In my End is my Beginning.* Harvill Press, London. 1953. Pp. ix + 197. 12s. 6d.

R. P. ANSCHUTZ. *The Philosophy of J. S. Mill.* Oxford University Press. 1953. Pp. 184. 15s.

M. HIRIYANNA. *The Quest After Perfection.* Mysore: Kavyalaya Publishers. 1952. Pp. viii + 112. 7s. 6d.

M. HIRIYANNA. *Popular Essays in Indian Philosophy.* Mysore: Kavyalaya Publishers. 1952. Pp. viii + 114. 7s. 6d.

EDGAR SHEFFIELD BRIGHTMAN. *An Introduction to Philosophy.* London: Sir Isaac Pitman & Sons. 1953. Pp. xvii + 349. 25s.

LUCIUS GARVIN. *An Introduction to Modern Ethics.* Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin Company. 1953. Pp. 572. $4.50.

THOMAS GILBY. *Between Community and Society.* London: Longmans & Co. 1953. Pp. xiv + 344. 25s.

HENRY B. VEATH. *Intentional Logic.* New Haven: Yale University Press (London: Geoffrey Cumberlege). 1953. Pp. xxi + 440. 40s.

GEDDES MCGREGOR. *Les Frontières de la Morale et de la Religion.* Paris: Aubier, Editions Montaigne. 1952. Pp. 188. No price stated.

CHARLES ROHMER. *Le Personnage et Son Ombre.* Paris: N.R.F. Gallimard. 1952. Pp. 233. Fr. fr. 590.

LUIGI STEFANINI. *Itinéraires Métaphysiques.* (Trans. J. Chaix-Ruy.) Paris: Aubier, Editions Montaigne. 1952. Pp. 121. No price stated.

V. DE MAGALHAES-VILHENA. *Socrate et La Légende Platonicienne.* Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 1952. Pp. 235. Fr. fr. 1000.

V. DE MAGALHAES-VILHENA. *Le Problème de Socrate: Le Socrate Historique et le Socrate de Platon.* Presses Universitaires de France. 1952. Pp. 568. Fr. fr. 1900.

VARIOUS AUTHORS. *L'Experimentation Humaine en Médecine.* Paris: Centre d'Etudes Laennec, P. Lethielleux. 1952. Pp. 219. Fr. frs. 475.

ANDRÉ HAYEN, S.J. *S. Thomas D'Aquin et la Vie de L'Église.* Publications Universitaires de Louvain. 1952. Pp. 103. Belg. fr. 48.

H. HEIMSOETH AND ROBERT HEISS. *Nicolai Hartmann: Der Denker und Sein Werk.* Göttingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht. 1952. Pp. 312. D.M. 19.80.

JURGEN V. KEMPSKI. *Charles S. Peirce und der Pragmatismus.* Stuttgart and Cologne: W. Kohlhammer Verlag. 1952. Pp. 115. No price stated.

VARIOUS AUTHORS. *Meinong-Gedenkschrift.* Schriften der Universitat Graz. Vol. I. 1952. Pp. 171. Austr. sch. 48.

H. GAUSS. *Handkommentar zu den Dialogen Platos.* Berne: Herbert Lang. 1952. Pp. 244. Sw. fr. 16.65.

ALFRED KLEMMT. *John Locke: Theoretische Philosophie.* Westkulturverlag Anton Hain, Meisenheim/Glan. 1952. Pp. 331. D.M. 24.

GERHARD LEIBHOLZ. *Der Strukturwandel der modernen Demokratie.* Karlsruhe: Juristische Studiengesellschaft, Vlg. C. F. Müller. Pp. 38. D.M. 1.80.

HANS HERTER. *Platons Akademie.* Bonner Universitäts-Buchdruckerei. 1952. Pp. 40. D.M. 2.40.

LEO GABRIEL. *Existenzphilosophie, Von Kierkegaard zu Sartre.* Vienna: Verlag Herold. 1951. Pp. 416. No price given.

HINRICH KNITTERMEYER. *Philosophie der Existenz.* Vienna: Humboldt Verlag. 1952. Pp. 504. No price stated.

NUNZIO INCARDONA. *Problematica Interna dello Spiritualismo Cristiano.* Milan: Fratelli Bocca. 1952. Pp. 208. L. 1000.

MARIA TERESA ANTONELLI. *La Metafisica di F. H. Bradley.* Milan: Fratelli Bocca. 1952. Pp. 281. L. 1300.

INSTITUTE NOTES

Le XI^e Congrès International de Philosophie qui se tiendra à Bruxelles du 20 au 26 août est assuré dès maintenant du plus éclatant succès. A l'heure actuelle, plus de quatre cents, communications sont déjà parvenues au secrétariat. Toutes ces communications seront intégralement publiées dans les volumes des Actes, qui paraîtront trois mois avant l'ouverture du Congrès et seront expédiés aux membres actifs afin de permettre une préparation sérieuse de la discussion. On prévoit que le nombre des membres actifs dépassera très largement le millier.

Pour le Comité,
Les Secrétaires:

Prof. Ch. Perelman,
32, rue de la Pêcherie, Uccle.

Prof. H. L. Van Breda,
2, place Cardinal Mercier, Louvain.

OBJECTS OF THE INSTITUTE

The Royal Institute of Philosophy exists to bring leading exponents of various branches of Philosophy into direct contact with the general public, with the purpose of satisfying a need felt by many men and women in every walk of life for greater clearness and comprehensiveness of vision in human affairs.

With this broad educational purpose in view, the Institute—

(1) Provides at suitable times in the day and evening courses of lectures by leading exponents in the more important subjects coming within the scope of Philosophy. All branches of Philosophy are represented—Ethics and Social Philosophy, the Philosophy of Law and of the Sciences, of the Fine Arts and of Religion, as well as Logic and Metaphysics and Psychology.

These lectures are free to members.

(2) Issues a quarterly philosophical journal (free to members).

(3) Proposes to form a philosophical Library.

(4) Gives guidance and assistance to individuals in their philosophical reading.

(5) Encourages research in Philosophy.

There are Local Centres of the Institute at Bangor, Cardiff, Liverpool, Manchester, Newcastle, Durham, and Sheffield.

Students of philosophy are reminded that they may become Associates of the Institute at a reduced fee of 8s. 6d. per annum, provided they are full-time students studying for a degree or diploma at a university or university college and are not engaged in a gainful occupation. Present or past Members of the Institute are not eligible to become Associates.

Further information and forms of application for membership may be had on application to the Director of Studies at University Hall, 14 Gordon Square, London, W.C.1.

(Suggested)

FORM OF BEQUEST

I bequeath to THE ROYAL INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY the sum of..... free of duty, to be applied to the purposes of that Institute, and I declare that the receipt of the Honorary Secretary, or other proper officer for the time being of that Institute, shall be sufficient discharge for the same.

CONTENTS

		PAGE
I.	MAN'S IDEAS ABOUT THE UNIVERSE. Viscount Samuel .	195
II.	ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF HEGEL. W. H. Walsh, M.A. .	207
III.	EXISTENTIALISM. J. B. Coates	229
IV.	A. N. WHITEHEAD ON GOOD AND EVIL. Professor R. K. Harrison	239
V.	IMAGES, SUPPOSING AND IMAGINING. Annis Flew, B.A. .	246
VI.	DISCUSSIONS:	
	(I) Jaspers' Concept of Transcendence (God) in Recent Literature	255
	(II) The Epistemology of Buddhism, Taoism and Confucianism	260
VII.	PHILOSOPHICAL SURVEY: Philosophy in Italy. . . .	265
VIII.	NEW BOOKS	268
IX.	INSTITUTE NOTES: Announcement of Kierkegaard Fellowship	288

Printed in Great Britain by
UNWIN BROTHERS LIMITED
WOKING AND LONDON